FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

Supplement

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-198-S
Friday
12 October 1990

Soviet Union
SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-90-198-S *12 October 1990*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Council of Ministers Declares 9 Nov 'Off-Day' *[Moscow TV]* 1
Yakovlev at Journal's Historical Truth Talks *[Moscow TV]* 1
Democratic Party Undergoes 'Radical' Name Change *[Moscow TV]* 1
PRAVDA Says CPSU Youth Policy 'Nonexistent' *[5 Oct]* 2
Orthodox Church Registers Two Publications *[IZVESTIYA 4 Oct]* 2
Humanitarian Organizations Congress Held *[TASS]* 3
Magazine Editor Views Costs, Future of Press *[Moscow Radio]* 3
Procuracy Officials on Press, Kalugin Case *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 40]* 3
Kalugin Suit Against Kryuchkov Reported *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 4 Oct]* 5
PRAVDA Assesses Political Parties' Relations *[26 Sep]* 6
Foreign Ministry Official On New Travel Laws *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 28 Sep]* 13
Two Newly Registered Papers Publisher's Profiled *[London MOSCOW NEWS No 18]* 14
Religious Leaders Welcome New Law, Note Flaws *[PRAVDA 28 Sep]* 15
Ligachev Memoirs To Be Published 'Next Year' *[TASS]* 15
State of Economy, Pace of Reforms Pondered *[IZVESTIYA 25 Sep]* 16
Presidential Decree Awards Socialist Leader *[Moscow Radio]* 19
Ryazan Official Denies Paper's Allegations on Coup *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Oct]* 20
General Forum of Democratic Forces Postponed *[MOSCOW NEWS No 19]* 20
New Communist Youth Movement's Aims Outlined *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Oct]* 21
Comparison of Defense Conversion Program *[PRAVDA 29 Sep]* 22
TV Production Company Plans Expansion *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 7 Oct]* 23
Moscow Soviet Faces Economic, Tax Problems *[London MOSCOW NEWS No 19]* 23
Homosexual Group Registers Campaigning Paper *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Oct]* 24
Democratic Press Group Meets To Discuss Plans *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 40]* 24
Moscow Police Chiefs 'Not Keen' on New Trade Union *[IZVESTIYA 6 Oct]* 25
Polls Show Most, Least Respected Politicians *[Moscow TV]* 26
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editor Interviewed *[KOMOSMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 8 Oct]* 26
New Customs Posts on Latvian Border *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 11 Oct]* 27
CPSU City Committee Headquarters Firebombed *[PRAVDA 11 Oct]* 27
PRAVDA Carries Subscription Campaign Results *[12 Oct]* 27
Voronin Forecasts End to Tobacco Crisis *[Moscow Radio]* 28
Russian Democratic Party Official Interviewed *[Vienna PROFIL 9 Oct]* 28
Television Production Company Plans Expansion *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 7 Oct]* 30

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Savisaar Comments on Current Crises in Estonia *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 19 Sep]* 31

RSFSR

Biographer of Boris Yeltsin Interviewed *[BALTISKOYE VREMYA No 34]* 34
RSFSR Talks With Other Republics Viewed *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Oct]* 35
RSFSR Party Reformers Examine Congress *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 29 Sep]* 36
Fruits of Perestroyka Seen on Sakhalin *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 40]* 38
Situation Among Vorkuta Miners Examined *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 30 Sep]* 40
Statute on RSFSR Party Referendums *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 30 Sep]* 43

Western Republics

Snegur Addresses Moldavian Supreme Soviet *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA 4 Sep]* 45
Moldavian Party Official on Republic Tension *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA 7 Sep]* 51
Moldavia's Luchinskiy Discusses Political Climate *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 15 Sep]* 54
Moldavian Nationalism Sparks Russian Backlash *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 23 Sep]* 58
Moldavian Law on President, Constitution Issued *[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA 9 Sep]* 61
Ukrainian Democratic Platform Principles Stated *[KOMSOMOLSKOYA ZNAMYA 11 Sep]* 66
Ukrainian Opposition Said To Threaten Order *[PRAVDA 28 Sep]* 67
Ukrainian Trade Union Chairman Interviewed *[TRUD 30 Sep]* 70

Caucasus

Levon Ter-Petrosyan Comments on Republic Issues 73
ARMENPRES Interview 73
IZVESTIYA Interview *[10 Oct]* 74
New Armenian Newspaper Published in Yerevan *[Moscow Radio]* 75
Alternative Armenian Writers Union Founded *[Moscow Radio]* 75
Georgian Journalists Discuss Media Ownership *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Oct]* 75
Georgian Legislation Examines Electoral Rights *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 7 Sep]* 76
Georgia Political Parties Registered, Denied *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 5 Sep]* 77
Denied Parties Appeal *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 7 Sep]* 78

Central Asia

'Mafia,' Informals Blamed for Osh Disorder *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 22 Sep]* 80
Masaliyev Discusses Osh Clashes Cause, Effect *[PRAVDA 25 Sep]* 84
Makhkamov Addresses Tajik Supreme Soviet *[KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 31 Aug]* 87

Political & Social

Council of Ministers Declares 9 Nov 'Off-Day'

LD0610052490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] In the interests of creating favorable conditions for working people's relaxation and the rational use of working time, the USSR Council of Ministers has decided to switch the off-day from Sunday 11 November to Friday 9 November 1990. This decision allows enterprises and organization to work on 10 November, given agreement with trade unions and committees. Work on 10 November can be compensated by the granting of another day off or in cash format double rate.

Yakovlev at Journal's Historical Truth Talks

LD0610220290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The editorial office of the journal KOMMUNIST held a roundtable today. The subject was the restoration of historical memory as part of the process of improving the health of contemporary society.

[Unidentified correspondent] Regular readers of this journal have noticed how its contents have changed over the recent period, how its range of subjects has broadened and the ranks of its correspondents have opened up. Here today, it can be said, are the authors of a whole future edition. They have differing political beliefs and levels of vigor and faith, but they discuss with equal commitment the theme of historical memory, or as we more often see it now, historical truth.

None of us wants to be a country with an unpredictable past any longer. We do not want to rewrite history to please the political short term, as we have felt for ourselves that cutting off our roots inevitably causes spiritual mortification. The roundtable was unanimous on this. But now, while resorting historical justice, can we refrain from amodern view of what happened long ago? Will it not bring about new repressions? How can we help the honest old people to live out their lives with dignity, and young people not to feel rootless? Forgotten books and prohibited authors are returning to our lives and archives are being opened up, although the party and KGB ones are still inaccessible even to academics.

The current restoration of historical memory—from your point of view idoes it promote some kind of consolidation of our society, some kind of restoration of health, in general, the good which we have to generate in ourselves and of which we now have an unusual need?

[A.N. Yakovlev] I think that this will eventually lead—but I don't believe that this will be immediate in view of the contradictions inherent in this actual question, in actual destiny, because there are millions of people caught up in this and there cannot be unanimity on this foundation and there shouldn't be such unanimity because there are millions of interests, millions of outlooks, views, attitudes to this, and varying levels of people in terms of culture, knowledge, wishes, and levels of indifference. You really have to be very correct here with mass consciousness, with individual consciousness, because you could get an effect of a completely contrary nature.

Everything that is printed has to be the truth. There is a great deal, and I simply know of this, that is alien, far-fetched, incorrect, short-term, incidental, lacking proper study. We now have to proceed, in studying this period of life, I would say, from a scientific point of view. Writing on current affairs has gradually to give way to science.

[Correspondent] History itself, the roundtable concludes, has to become an exact science.

Democratic Party Undergoes 'Radical' Name Change

LD0610222490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Vladimir Stefanov] By all accounts it would seem in our sometimes unpredictable political life that it is but a step from democracy to conservatism. At its second congress today the Democratic Party declared itself the Conservative Party. Nevertheless, the members of this organization see nothing surprising in such a radical name change. Their principles are stabilization, sanctity of the law, observance of human rights, and equality of opportunity based on the constitution.

[Correspondent Oleg Bobin] This is the building of Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies. Since May, 15 parties have been registered here, or rather the rayon sections of those parties. For a party to be registered at the republican level it must apply to republican bodies. But anyway, of the 15 parties registered here one-third contain the word democracy in their names.

One of these is the Democratic Party. It convened today in the Krasnogvardeyskiy Executive Committee Hall for its second congress. As you can see there are not too many delegates. But the party is in the process of being set up and there are representatives from Surgut, Odessa, Strezhevoy, and Donetsk as well as its Moscow members.

You are no doubt intrigued by the blue and white flag over the presidium. I will explain. Ever since the time of Voltaire this has been the symbol of freedom and friendship. Ubozhko, party chairman, took the floor at the opening of the congress to propose changing its name to conservative.

[L.G. Ubozhko] In view of the fact that there are so many diferent parties with democratic [word indistinct] in their names, we decidced to make a change for tactical considerations because the Centrist Block of political parties and movements has now been set up. This block is trying to introduce order in the country the parliamentary way. All these leftwingers and rightwingers do is lead to civil wars.

[Bonin] And so the conservatives are debating their program. Their viewpoint is that conservatism today means stability tomorrow. And presumably it is with this name that they will try to gain registration as an all-Union party.

PRAVDA Says CPSU Youth Policy 'Nonexistent'

PM0810153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Report by N. Anisin: "Nonexistent Policy"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Press Center in the "Oktyabrskaya" Hotel. The day before yesterday three Central Committee members—V. Zyukin, G. Seleznev, and G. Yagodin—and V. Fronin, chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, met with journalists there. Special features of CPSU youth policy were the subject of the meeting.

The most important conclusion that can, in my view, be drawn from the ensuing dialogue is this: The ruling party is to all intents and purposes not implementing any policy among young people. The 28th CPSU Congress, V. Fronin said, adopted a resolution on youth policy. A generally intelligent and necessary resolution. But its fulfillment remains at zero.

Brief point of information: No one in the Politburo or the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat is specially engaged in youth policy. There is no one responsible for working with young people—professionally, that is—in local party committees either. Who should answer for the fact that the congress resolution remains just a paper resolution?

"We have stopped lying to young people," G. Yagodin said, "they have received an opportunity to learn all the historical truth and analyze values. But we are unable designate new ideals for them, which is extremely dangerous."

It is well known that nature abhors a vacuum: Unsown wasteland usually becomes overgrown with weeds. Class values have been debunked in young people's eyes and they have not yet comprehended panhuman values. Or they are doing so with difficulty. The shortage of youth mass media is one of the objective reasons for this.

Brief point of information: The CPSU Central Committee produces a whole series of publications directed at ideologists, propagandists, and party officials: KOMMUNIST, IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS, DIALOG, GLASNOST, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN.... But the Central Committee does not seem to have raised the question of setting up newspapers and journals geared to the young reader. So where can the best party minds, advocating good, humanism, and justice, address our young people?

Another problem surfaced at the news conference. Bottom of the list, but not in terms of importance. Formerly—I am citing the gist of what G. Seleznev said—journalists were able to create prestige for one individual or another. The order was received to give such-and-such a person such-and-such an image. Now that politics has become subject to glasnost, a politician creates his own prestige.

You cannot fail to agree with Gennadiy Nikolayevich's claim. That is how everything is. But it occurred to me that the Central Committee members who spoke to the journalists are not fully aware of whether the incumbent party leaders can win prestige among young people.

"When some former Politburo members came to us at the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee plenum," V. Zyukin said, "and took the floor, I always felt uncomfortable for the person addressing the plenum participants." That is how the retired supreme party leaders looked in young people's eyes. It is probably too early to judge how their replacements will look—only a short time has elapsed since the politburo election.

Orthodox Church Registers Two Publications

PM0910112790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by G. Alimov: "Religious Publications Obtain Official Status"]

[Text] On 3 October the publications of the Russian Orthodox Church, ZHURNAL MOSKOVSKOY PATRIARKHII and the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY TSERKOVNYY VESTNIK, received certificates registering them with the official state organ—the USSR State Committee for the Press.

For the first time in Soviet history, religious publications are obtaining equal status to secular publications. "This is a deeply symbolic act," A. Gorkovlyuk, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press, said, handing the registration certificates to Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Kolomna. In his turn, Metropolitan Pitirim said that the church does not intend to stop there. It will also submit applications for the registration of other publications.

ZHURNAL MOSKOVSKOY PATRIARKHII has been published since 1943 in Russian and English. Its circulation is now 32,000 copies. In the future it is proposed

that the periodical be issued twice a month with (monthly or quarterly) supplements, with a circulation of up to 200,000 copies.

MOSKOVSKIY TSERKOVNYY VESTNIK, which started coming out in April 1989, would like to reach a circulation of one million copies in 1991.

Will these publications be available on subscription? The whole question now boils down to paper.

Humanitarian Organizations Congress Held

LD0710023790 Moscow TASS in English 2113 GMT 6 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—A constituent session of the union of movements and organisations "Humanitarian Protection of Individual" (the Blue Confederation) has been held at the Soviet Peace Committee. It adopted the rules of Confederation and the main document—The Appeal to All. Its main idea is that "man is the purpose and not the means of transformations". A Coordination Council of the Confederation was created and its steering bodies were formed.

The new bloc of public forces was created on the initiative of the all-Union public organisation "For Social Ecology of Individual" which is also called the Blue Movement. It was stressed at the session that the idea of humanitarian, spiritual protection of man became especially topical now, when socio-psychological tension grew in society because of the forthcoming transition to a market-based system. In these conditions it became necessary to unite various forces working for the establishment of all-human values in all spheres of life. This opens up a humanitarian way of overcoming the economic, political and cultural crisis.

Magazine Editor Views Costs, Future of Press

LD0910170190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Since September we have been able to take out newspaper subscriptions, and you have probably already selected your preferred publications. But clearly many will have been unable to take out subscriptions to all they would like. There is no getting away from it—the prices hurt! That is the opinion of we the readers. But, what do those who prepare press material for us think? Our correspondent Elena Kadysheva talks about the subscription situation with Aleksandr Alekseyevich Rudenko-Desnikov, first deputy editor in chief of the magazine DRUZHBA NARODOV.

[Begin recording] [Rudenko-Desnikov] Our print run must fall, because again the state has doubled the cost of printing. The situation is widely known, but what it is doing is weaning our readers off the idea of literary publications even existing. The commercial press will always come through, but the literary press could gradually start to die out. I would not rule out the possibility that the style of magazines could change in the new conditions. But literary magazines—the fat sort, as they have developed in this country—well, you know, this is a tradition which I would be desparately unhappy to see broken.

I believe the issue may be posed thus: If the state needs culture, then it must think about how to resolve these problems. But, if the state does not need culture, then it will become commercialized and die. [passage omitted]

Procuracy Officials on Press, Kalugin Case

91UF0025A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 40, 6-12 Oct 90 pp 4-5

[Report on interview with military procuracy officials by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent P. Lukyanchenko; place and date not given: "What Is the Procuracy Looking for at ARGUMENTY I FAKTY?"]

[Text] First, let us outline only the facts.

On 2 October 1990 the department editor of our weekly, P. Lukyanchenko, was summoned for interrogation at the Chief Military Procuracy as a witness in the well-known case of former KGB Major General O.D. Kalugin.

What was the investigator of the Chief Military Procuracy, V. Petrov, interested in? From where did we receive a stenographic record of a speech by O.D. Kalugin made at a conference of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, on the basis of which we prepared the article "KGB Undisguised" published in issue 26 of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY for this year; who brought the stenographic record to us; who among the management of the weekly read the stenographic record and authorized its publication; was the text of the stenographic record corrected; did O.D. Kalugin edit the stenographic record or add to it; who was in charge of the issue in which the article was published; which censor signed the authorization to release the issue to the public; was the publication coordinated with the KGB? And so on, and so forth. The interrogation lasted a total of four hours.

On 3 October investigator V. Petrov arrived at the editorial office with a resolution on conducting a seizure of the original stenographic record. As the resolution said, "Having reviewed investigation case No. 9-90, Justice First Lieutenant V.A. Petrov, member of the investigative group of the Chief Military Procuracy, established that a stenographic record of a statement by O.D. Kalugin at the conference of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU on 16 June 1990 is in the possession of the editorial office." He resolved to perform a "seizure" of the stenographic record from the editorial office. He was also the one to come and "seize" it, behaving improperly, to put it mildly. The resolution is signed by First Lieutenant V.A. Petrov.

Having familiarized ourselves with the chronology of these events, we, and perhaps our readers, have questions to ask. We asked the leader of the Chief Military

Procuracy investigative group to respond to questions concerning the legitimacy of conducting investigative activities in this particular form. However, one more question remains: Is this case not an attempt to give a warning to newspapers which are upholding glasnost and defending people's rights, even if the latter happen to be KGB employees? We would not speak for the readers, but this is the impression we got.

ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent P. Lukyanchenko met with Justice Colonel V. Matus, head of the chief Military Procuracy investigative group and senior investigator for particularly important cases of the chief military procurator, and Justice Colonel Yu. Bagrayev, senior investigator for particularly important cases of the chief military procurator and a member of the group.

[Lukyanchenko] Your investigative group is working on case No. 9-90, which the press has called "the Kalugin case." What stage has the preliminary investigation reached?

[Matus] At present we are working with the editorial offices of the newspapers MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, SOBESEDNIK, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, KOMMERSANT, and your newspaper. We are establishing the authorship of articles by Kalugin and finding out whether correspondents allowed inaccuracies to occur or added something on their own. This is exactly why we are looking for stenographic records, newspaper type pages, and printed texts with corrections made in his hand.

[Lukyanchenko] When attempting to seize from us the stenographic record of Kalugin's speech at the conference of the Democratic Platform, your investigator violated Article 167 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Procedure Code, which says that "seizures of documents containing information constituting state secrets are performed only with the authorization of a procurator or his deputy...." But Petrov himself issued an authorization for the seizure.

[Matus] Your arguments would be correct if the stenographic record carried the classification "Particularly important," "Top Secret," or "Secret." However, as I understand it, there was no such classification on the stenographic record. Therefore, the investigator acted within the law.

[Lukyanchenko] However, Kalugin is being accused of divulging state secrets in his presentations, in particular at the conference of the Democratic Platform.

[Matus] No such accusation has been leveled against Kalugin.

[Lukyanchenko] It certainly has. A USSR Procuracy communique published on 24 July said that information constituting state secrets was disseminated through the mass media with references to Kalugin or in his name.

[Matus] However, the criminal case was initiated on the basis of instances of divulging state secrets, on the basis of indications of corpus delicti as envisaged by Article 75 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (divulging state secrets).

[Lukyanchenko] You are saying yourself that it was on the basis of instances of divulging state secrets, but not of the indications of such instances....

[Bagrayev] This is pure legal casuistry. However, we may say that there was a basis for initiating a criminal case.

[Lukyanchenko] What basis?

[Matus] I mean publications containing information on resources and means, forms and methods of KGB operations which may amount to state secrets. There also are other materials which it will be premature to discuss at this point.

[Bagrayev] As far as the possible divulging of state secrets is concerned, a commission of seven experts is now at work precisely on evaluating publications in the five aforementioned newspapers and determining whether facts contained in Kalugin's presentation fall within the scope of the "List of Most Significant Information Constituting State Secrets."

[Lukyanchenko] How old is this list?

[Matus] It was adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers on 3 December 1980, and amendments and additions to it were made on 25 February 1990.

[Bagrayev] Special services may unearth state secrets even on the basis of a single imprudent word by analysis and comparison with other information. Let us assume that Kalugin revealed the structure, forms, and methods of KGB operations, the network of agents, and named some names....

[Lukyanchenko] However, almost everything Kalugin said has long been known in the West. Look at, say, the two books by the American J. Barron, "KGB" and "KGB Today."

[Bagrayev] What the journalist Barron says is one thing, and what the professional Kalugin says is another. Who is more trusted?

[Lukyanchenko] I would agree with you if that same book by Barron, "KGB," contained only its author's deductions. However, it is based almost in its entirety on the accounts of KGB officers who defected to the West. They know indeed the structure and methods of KGB operations, to say nothing of the network of agents.

[Matus] We will take all of this into account in the course of the investigation.

[Lukyanchenko] Some of Kalugin's former colleagues with whom I have happened to talk maintain that he has divulged two secrets—his affiliation with external counterintelligence and the content of the instruction on banning the collection of compromising evidence against CPSU leaders. Could it be that these things amount to state secrets?

[Bagrayev] We cannot say right away whether this is a state secret or not. What was a state secret five or seven years ago may no longer be such under the conditions of glasnost. Time is necessary in order to determine this. As of now, only the USSR Council of Ministers has the right to decide which information constitutes a secret and which no longer does.

[Lukyanchenko] If no charges have been leveled against Kalugin, in what capacity is he a party to this case?

[Matus] In the capacity of a witness. Unfortunately, Oleg Danilovich is avoiding a meeting with us based on the fact that, supposedly, his own testimony may be used against him. You would recall that Gidaspov failed to show up in court, and he was fined 50 rubles....

[Lukyanchenko] ...which was later canceled. Incidentally, the USSR KGB chairman failed to show up on 2 October at the Moscow City Court for proceedings on a suit brought by Kalugin against the KGB.

[Bagrayev] Under the law, any citizen of the USSR, regardless of his post, must show up in the court and at the procuracy.

[Lukyanchenko] How many personnel are there in your group?

[Matus] Four. Three are from the Military Procuracy, and one is from the KGB Department of Investigations. The KGB employee has been instructed to collect Kalugin's interviews to the Soviet and foreign press and materials of his presentations before various audiences.

[Lukyanchenko] A final question. What will you be able to submit to the Moscow City Court by 23 October? After all, the court suspended its proceedings in order to clarify a question concerning the progress of your investigation.

[Matus] How can we answer them? By saying that the investigation has not yet been completed, and that it is premature to draw any conclusions. Expert examination aimed at determining the degree of secrecy has been scheduled, and other investigative actions are in progress.

Kalugin Suit Against Kryuchkov Reported

91UN0042A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 4 Oct 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by TASS correspondent N. Demidov: "Hearings Begun and Postponed"]

[Text] Moscow—The hearing of the civil suit pursuant to the complaint from former reserve Major General O.D. Kalugin against the actions of USSR KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov in which he denied Kalugin a military pension began in the Moscow city court on 2 October.

V.M. Kholodov, chief of the administration of the financial- planning division of the USSR KGB, and V.S. Morozov, deputy chief of the financial division of the administration of the USSR KGB for Moscow and Moscow Oblast, were also called to participate as court officials in the case.

The chairman of the USSR KGB is represented by the chief of the USSR KGB legal division, V.I. Alekseyev. A member of the Moscow city court, N.S. Romanenkov, is presiding over the case. The people's assessors are A.I. Kireyechev and S.A. Korshikova. The case was scheduled for hearing with the participation of the procurator of the Moscow Procuracy, M.N. Vinogradova.

Even the USSR Supreme Court, when prosecuting its most sensational cases, never saw so many movie, television, video, and photographic reporters, along with just plain reporters. And it is indeed an extraordinary case. Especially taking into account the fact that Kalugin submitted complaints also against the action of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev regarding the ukase to strip him of his government awards, and against N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, regarding stripping him of his military rank—reserve major general. "The complaints made their way to the court in August and, as we know, regarding one of them—against N.I. Ryzhkov's actions—a decision was made to refuse to bring suit," the chairman of the Moscow city court, Z.I. Korneva, told a TASS correspondent in an interview. Here is why: In the first place, the Council of Ministers is a collegial organ and therefore a complaint cannot be made against just one person; after all, it was not Ryzhkov's own personal decision. In the second place, the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers regarding Kalugin was adopted before 1 July 1990, that is, before the time when the USSR Law "On the Procedure for Court Appeals Against Incorrect Actions on the Part of the State Administration and Officials who Infringe on the Rights of the Citizens" went into force.

"In general, the consideration of Kalugin's complaints does not promise to be easy," continued Z.I. Korneva. "For example, because the USSR Supreme Court plenum that adopted the decree on the interpretation of the law did not give a clarification of the possibility of court appeals against decisions of higher state administrative organs and state officials. Up to this point there are various viewpoints concerning whether or not the USSR president is an official."

The petitions were filed on the first day of the hearing. The representative of the chairman of the USSR KGB thought that the proceedings on the case should be stopped because, in his opinion, V.A. Kryuchkov's actions did not violate O.D. Kalugin's rights. The procurator objected, saying that O.D. Kalugin has the right to have his complaint considered.

The court determined that this petition was considered unfounded and the hearing of the case would continue.

Nonetheless, it was soon postponed. The reason was the court's decision "To ask the chief military procurator

about the status of the criminal case it brought concerning the divulging on Kalugin's behalf of information that comprised a state secret, and to ask the USSR Council of Ministers about giving the court clarifications, which was the basis for resolving the question of stripping Kalugin of his military rank."

PRAVDA Assesses Political Parties' Relations

90UN2898A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Sep 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Report on PRAVDA "roundtable" presented by N. Kozhanov, A. Petrushev, I. Podvirov and Yu. Shabanov; date not given: "Discussion Leaflet 66: Cooperation or Confrontation"]

[Text] **No one, perhaps, is in any doubt today that a multiparty system in our country is changing from being a subject of theoretical deliberation into an inalienable factor of contemporary political life. It is clear also that the fate of the country and the fate of perestroyka will depend on the nature of the relations between social and political parties and movements to a considerable, perhaps decisive, extent. This was the subject at a "roundtable" meeting of the PRAVDA editorial office.**

The following took part in the discussion: V.A. Kuptsov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who heads the Relations With Social and Political Movements Department; I.I. Antonovich, member of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee; A.V. Buzgalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee (chairman of the "Marxist Platform in the CPSU") and assistant professor of the Moscow State University economics faculty; V.V. Bezuglov, representative of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU (Communist Reformer Section) and senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Bioorganic Chemistry Institute; Candidate of Historical Sciences V.V. Damye, chairman of the "Green Alternative" Party; V.V. Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union; A.I. Kolganov, member of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee and member of the "Marxist Platform in the CPSU" Coordinating Council; V.V. Lantratov, first deputy chief of the Moscow city party committee [gorkom] Ideology Department; I.O. Malyarov, lecturer at Moscow State University and member of the United Workers Front Coordinating Council; Ye.B. Sakhonko, member of the "Communist Initiative" youth movement organizing committee; S.B. Sheboldayev, people's deputy of the RSFSR and the Moscow City Soviet, a participant in the "Democratic Russia" movement and a member of the Communist Reformer Section; Doctor of Philosophical Sciences M.K. Gorshkov, first deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute; and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences B.F. Slavin, head of a department of this institute.

The meeting was conducted by A.A. Ilin, deputy chief editor of PRAVDA and editor of the Party Life Department.

'Our Principal Concern Is How To Preserve the State'

A. Ilin: An analysis of the development of political events shows that with the appearance of new parties questions of how they should cooperate with one another and what collisions and friction might emerge here ultimately arise.

Unfortunately, representatives of the Social Democratic Party, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement and the Democratic Party of Russia, whom we invited, were unable to take part in our present meeting. Some of them—people's deputies—are currently engaged in work in the committees of the supreme soviets of the USSR and the republics. I believe that the comrades will come more readily next time. We see this meeting primarily as an opportunity to get together and attempt to strike up some contacts, shed light on problems that unite us or, on the contrary, separate us, find points of contact and exchange opinions. Particularly on a problem that I believe, is now moving to the forefront—paths of political stabilization in our society.

The processes that are occurring currently are increasingly assuming an extremist nature. True, each party is accusing the other of extremism: There is no shortage of finger-pointing with us today; we are in this respect, perhaps, the leaders in the world community. This is also why we need to assimilate the culture of mutual relations under multiparty conditions. It needs to be considered that some movements, the Russian Democratic Forum, for instance, are setting as their task "removal of the CPSU from the political arena, the disintegration of its ranks and the nationalization of its property." But the goal of the truly democratic forces is to unite for the sake of stabilization of the situation in the country.

V. Zhirinovskiy: The situation today does not permit us to calmly develop like any other country. It is this fact, I believe, that forces us today, perhaps, even within each party, to halt the processes leading to extremist manifestations. The country now needs more than ever to prevent a crisis like that which occurred in 1917.

However, I will not make analogies. But I travel around the country (I have just returned from the Baltic and was recently in Vologda Oblast): The situation is very dangerous. If it develops in this direction, the state will become ungovernable, more, could become an arena of civil fratricidal war. Is this not why September 1990 is so reminiscent of September 1917. When, prior to the October, there remained just one month. And yesterday's fighters against tsarism—the constitutional democrats, social democrats, socialist revolutionaries and Mensheviks, not to mention the Bolsheviks—were unable to agree among themselves.

Is it not like this today? Just try assembling everyone at one "roundtable," if only this one of ours. You will not!

With various excuses the representatives of several parties simply would not come. Some people aspire to take advantage of the crisis for their own ambitious purposes.

I would like to say right away that this is not part of the rules of our Liberal Democratic Party. Although the party—and this should be known—adheres to a right orientation. "Right" in the distribution of forces that is accepted in the world, what is more. In our country "left" has been turned into right just like that. But let us take a look: All parties of the left are connected in one way or another with the workers movement, socialism, reforms and social safeguards. Our party stands considerably further away from this. We are for human rights, an economic system with the primacy of private property and a state based on the rule of law without any ideology.

Further, our principal concern is how to preserve the state. After all, many people have already interred it. Look at the parties' names! "Democratic Party of Russia," "Russian Christian Democratic Movement".... Others are scattered around the republics in all directions. And what about the Soviet Union? The whole world has recognized us precisely thus; we live in a normal state, were born therein and work therein. The graves of our ancestors are here. And there are suddenly forces that are repudiating everything. October 1917 may be criticized, it may be considered a fatal mistake (we, incidentally, consider it such), but denying it and not recognizing it is impossible. In 1940 our state was augmented, and this also cannot be denied. Rightly or wrongly, it happened.

Our party is for the classical version of the state, only classical!

But other parties have, as you know, other views and different programs. So, what, then: confrontation or concord (thus, it would seem, have we designated the subject of the "roundtable")? In my opinion, confrontation is, in general, inevitable because we are different and are guided by different ideologies and different principles. But, all the same, we should all have some common goal, on which we should agree unless what we want is the country's perdition. I believe that three main principles are appropriate here—preserving this state, renewing the economy and solving the nationality question. There could be various approaches here, of course. The communists and socialists are once again, we assume, more for public property. We are for private property. These are different things. But on what is most important—changing the economic system and making it incomparably more efficient and finally ridding ourselves of the Stalin model—we must act together. The same on the nationality issue also.

Only I fear that it is concord that we will not achieve.

Interjection: Is everything so hopeless?

V. Zhirinovskiy: The integrity of the state may be preserved, perhaps, only by a strong center bloc, which our party also is prepared to join. The country's difficult problems may be resolved, I am convinced, if we accept elements of liberal democracy, a liberal economy and a liberal understanding of human rights and the state. You will have noticed that wherever liberal democratic parties are in power, well-being, prosperity, abundance and human rights are observed in full. A living example is Japan. You know that the liberals have been in power there for 30 years, and a majority has voted for them constantly all these years.

Many people are now saying: Give us a multiparty government! This would be even greater chaos. It is sufficient to look at our present multiparty parliament. A one-party government—this is what we need today. But not necessarily one made up only of members of the ruling party. And we are in general opposed to endless demands for resignations. These are the demands of the left. There are all the characteristics of parties of the left here: "Down With the Government!" "Seize Others' Property".... We, the right, are opposed to this because we understand that only under conditions of stability is it possible to secure reforms for the country.

But the parties of the left are in a hurry: "Away With Them, as Quickly as Possible!" Because only under the conditions of such a swift seizure of power could they be successful. A slight delay, and they lose. Because the people will not follow them. The electorate will not follow them.

'It Is Not Logomachy That Is Needed but a Forum for Decisions'

S. Sheboldayev: I would like to attempt, to counterbalance Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy's speech, perhaps, to determine first and foremost the goal we are pursuing.

It is thus, I believe, in the interests of entirely different movements and currents, those represented here today included, to give thought in the present, very serious situation to ways of overcoming the political crisis. I refer not only to the crisis of power, the crisis of the economic system and everything else that ensues but also the people's crisis of trust in political problems in general and in any movements.

You will see that I have in front of me the weekly GORIZONT, with which many people are probably familiar. The August issue. There are some very remarkable figures here. Thus an opinion poll maintains that distrust of the CPSU is currently expressed by 56 percent of those polled. But this is not the most interesting figure. Some 81 percent expresses distrust of other parties and all other political forces together. That is, we have a situation in which no one is believed. Nothing is believed.

I believe that we now need to answer first and foremost the question of how to win the people's trust, that is, in what direction all our political movements and parties should work in order that public trust in us will start to rise.

What might be proposed here? "Roundtables" like the one at which we are currently assembled? A necessary undertaking, of course, but Zhirinovskiy is right when he says that far from all parties are disposed toward such interaction. It is evidently necessary to attempt to pose the task of a "roundtable" not in the sense of logomachy but as an authoritative forum for the formulation of specific joint decsions.

In this connection I would personally and on behalf of our Communist Reformer Section propose for your consideration a problem that is, in my view, cardinal. First, I emphatically cannot agree with Vladimir Volfovich when he maintains that it makes no sense today to speak of any sovereignty of Russia and of the sovereignty of the republics in general. In my view, what is happening is logical. That we need to find the line that prevents this process from proceeding in a ragtag manner, as they say, is another matter. I will not dwell in this connection on the problems of Russia as a whole, but I would like to dwell very briefly on the problems of the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

It has to be said that the way in which it took shape and the situation concerning the unsuccessful attempt to create any action program at all leaves a contradictory impression. In fact, even after the second stage of the congress this party has been left in a position where only the directive body has been formed. Here things have come to a halt. And considering the composition of this body from a purely personal angle—it is, as we can see, quite conservative—it may be expected that the platform that the new party will ultimately formulate will also probably be conservative.

But should we not, perhaps, not be complaining about this and looking for some hostile forces but rather, taking advantage of this? I would propose the following path—forming a new democratic movement within the CPSU in place of the "Democratic Platform," which has now practically ceased to exist. After all, its principal leaders have proclaimed their departure from the party. They are not communists nor, essentially, were they such; they are our party's social democratic wing. Such an initiative would be apropos, I believe.

'The "Russian Revolt" Evoked Fear Both Among the Tsars and Among Progressive Figures...'

B. Slavin: I agree with those who say that we need to stop employing the word "informals." There are no longer any informal organizations—there are parties. The way toward concord and problems of unity of action in the interests of democracy will largely depend on how we understand each of them, their tactics. It is on account of this misunderstanding that we have our disagreements, although we are all for perestroyka, democracy, and justice.

But first a few words about terminology. One hears in the press today that the right are those who wish to go back to, say, the monarchy, the bourgeois system, and so forth. From this viewpoint a whole phalanx of groupings, from "Yedintsvo" through "Pamyat," is to the right of the CPSU, and to the left, the bloc of social democrats and democrats. Pertaining here also are the liberals and the "Democratic Union," which is, seemingly, at the most extreme left pole of our political life; but it is the latter that is becoming a party of the right before our very eyes. That is, the extreme right and the extreme left are joining forces. In rejection of the CPSU, what is more.

This is the essence of the specifics of our present-day political situation. Whereas the European social democrats and liberals have a loyal attitude toward the Communist Party, in any event, recognize it as a subject of history, this is not the case with us, unfortunately. With the exception of Zhirinovskiy's party, all social democrats and democrats have an anticommunist overtone.

If one thinks about it, such a formulation of the question is in no way different from Stalin's formula: Whoever is not with us is against us. In a word, first we oust, then we will see. This is true anticommunism, real, not invented. And it cannot be disregarded. The deepening economic crisis could give rise to that same "Russian revolt" which evoked fear both among the tsars and among progressive figures. It is frightening today also: It would sweep away "reds," "pinks," and "greens". And other forces would come to power. The most diehard: either Stalinist or neofascist. Do I exaggerate? But, after all, these forces exist and today have their own organizations and their own militant "squads." The danger is real. And what about us? We are all the while arguing and debating instead of assembling all democratic forces and pondering how to emerge from the crisis—political, economic, and moral. And, of course, environmental. A further basis for concord is defense of human rights.

'I Have Put No One in Prison; Why and for What Should I Repent?'

I. Antonovich: I would like to say a few words about the Communist Party of Russia Central Committee. It has just been elected, but labels have been pinned on it already: conservatives, reactionaries, liberals.... But we do not have an apparatus even as yet, just a cabinet.

Now about the subjects of our discussion.

It seems to me that a true difference of opinion has not come about in our country. Its way has been barred and it has been supplanted to a considerable extent by a struggle of personal ambitions, which has set in motion a large volume of public emotions and few really valuable ideas. What is the reason for this? The fact that our thinking has been directed toward the retrospective, an evaluation and reassessment of the past and a search for guilty persons, not for the creators of the country's history, particularly at its most dramatic stages. That is, intellectual pluralism has from the very outset been subordinated to personal struggle for influence, prestige and, if you will, for power. Today the multiparty system is a fact. But, unfortunately, only a fact, not a definite force generating ideas and directing society toward specific goals, in accordance with specific programs.

It is not fortuitous that some people have concentrated on criticism of the CPSU: It is easier making one's mark here. But, you will agree, bare criticism is not intellectual work. It has, incidentally, turned out to have had the opposite effect to that intended. Many parties have nothing to offer society.

Generally, none of us has as yet freed himself from the shackles of the old system. Whence the terminology: "party clique," "that fostered an octopus...." But who, one wonders, "fostered" it if not we ourselves. What is the point of us fighting in this way with one another if we wish the country well? No, I am not calling for "consolidation" either: It presupposes a new concrete monolith. It is sufficient for us to be in accord on the basic problems, and there are a multitude of them. But an accord without prior conditions. Why, for example, is the party being called on to repent?

Interjection: There have been various people in the party: Some put people in prison, others were in prison themselves.

I. Antonovich: Precisely. I, for example, have put no one in prison;, why, then, and for what should I repent? Accord needs to be approached sincerely; its purpose is the well-being of society and the comfortable life of the people. We could be united by our attitude toward the market. Let us look truth in the eye: The market economy does not afford equal opportunity for all. This is a fact. And unemployment is an inalienable attribute of the market. Not one modern developed state has resolved this problem. And in this sense the market threatens all of us, and for this reason the question of the social protection of people, particularly the workers, intelligentsia and employees, is coming to the fore. No less acute is the problem of the democratization of society, respect for the law and the assimilation of political culture.

We are being offered models: American, Turkish, West European. Have we not managed to create our own? We have our own path, after all. The basis there is the federation. It is our fulcrum. But some people are once again in a hurry to take from one another, not understanding or unwilling to understand the impending danger of disintegration and chaos. Today people are demanding nationalization of CPSU property. This will allegedly improve the life of the people. But take a city of 200,000 people. What there is party property? One city committee and 10 rayon committees? So these buildings are nationalized. What, then; would the townspeople be living in clover?

Interjection: It is not a matter of property but of depriving the Communist Party of an opportunity to operate.

I. Antonovich: That's right, that is why it is only the CPSU that is being hit, and not a word about trade union property, although it is far more substantial.

Interjection: They are getting to this also.

I. Antonovich: It is this which is dangerous: Once again, as in March 1917, distribution excitement is beginning. From top to bottom. Who knows, perhaps phalanges will emerge who will search the apartments for police officers, but will carry off the covers from the bed.

There has been talk here of a pluralism of ideologies. But there is none nor could there be since there are no ideologies. There is a vacuum of spirituality. Let us confess, comrade colleagues from various parties, we are working away, but paying insufficient heed to the people.

Now about the multiparty system. It is often said that the CPSU was forced into it. Nothing of the sort! Our party made a conscious choice. For a strong and well-organized CPSU the more parties the better. In addition, it is prepared to help all democratic forces organize themselves and determine their own positions. On the basis of the USSR Constitution, of course. The old one now, later a renewed one. But some politicians are shouting: "Let us convene a constituent assembly." This is not serious. We have a democratically elected parliament, and there are the soviets—from top to bottom. Let us help them work for the good of the people.

It is in the soviets that we need to find our place, not outside them.

'The Latest Experiment Is Being Foisted on People'

V. Damye: We leftist "Greens" aspire to the creation of a bloc of the left. You say that this is once again a course toward confrontation and that once again the left is attempting to pull off the bedclothes, attempting to uncouple society, split it and set everyone at odds. But, first, the confrontation about which I speak is a natural confrontation, inasmuch as disputes of ideas within the framework of any society, within the framework of any political structure, are an absolutely normal phenomenon. Second, we do not only reject, we propose also. What do we propose? To be brief, a model of the new democracy. I will now explain exactly what I mean. It has already been said here that a crisis of trust is being observed in our society. I would even call this, proceeding from the worthwhile expression of Western political scientists, a crisis of legitimacy.

In other words, we are in an entirely paradoxical situation. On the one hand the model of representative democracy with us has yet, in general, to have taken shape or is only just beginning to take shape, that is, it is not yet mature. On the other, it is already immature. Strange? But true, nonetheless. Can we emerge from this situation? The experience of the organization of "roundtables" would seem to us very useful, but these have to be "roundtables" at which the representatives of various parties do not simply exchange opinions and indulge in advertising their own programs but elaborate and propose solutions and help their practical implementation.

Together with such a "roundtable" there should further be a referendum: An element of direct democracy, base democracy, as it is called by "Greens" in all countries.

Imagine "roundtable" decisions that are subsequently approved by referendum. They would have, naturally, to be formulated accordingly. It seems to us that one of the first questions that should be put to such a referendum is the further direction of the country's economic development. And we should not, naturally, put two questions, rather, not two answers to one question. I mean the market or that which we have—the command- administrative system, as it has come to be called. No, all possible alternatives should be put to a referendum and put on the ballot. It seems to us that the following alternative could be proposed: A plan based on the broadest possible development of self-management from the bottom, both production and territorial, what is more. Then a combination, a certain synthesis of this territorial and production self-management and the adoption of decisions with the aid of concordance from below. You could, if you like, call this planning or agreement from below—the name is not important. In other words, these are things on which world thought of the left has worked for decades. We, unfortunately, currently know about far from all its developments. We take merely the conservative and liberal schools of political economy and social democratic thought. And completely ignore the elaboration of world left and radical-left thought. We ignore whole schools of political economy. We simply reject them. But they have, after all, existed and continue to exist. That it may be argued whether they are applicable to our country and to what extent is another matter. But this is another question. In any event, there are alternatives, and they also may be put to a referendum as potential answers. In a word, the sole method of leading the country out of this impasse in which it has found itself is the search for new trust among the people, more, new forms of trust.

'It Is Today Politically Profitable to Some People To Portray the CPSU in the Enemy Image'

I. Malyarov: I would like to call your attention to what has been said just now by the chairman of the "Green" Party, and others also. Strictly speaking, our multiparty system does not have a left wing. Left in the meaning of this word as commonly accepted in world political science. Because the place where the left should be is occupied by the CPSU alone. In spite of the attacks on it, it is no longer actually, in my view, a ruling party. N. Travkin was probably right to some extent when he said the "democrats" are the ruling party today since Yeltsin is pursuing their policy. In addition, the CPSU is not in principle a communist party. It contains, generally, people of various convictions, up to and including anarchists and monarchists. The vast majority therein is most likely made up essentially of nonparty people, and from the ideological viewpoint, these are social democrats, in all likelihood. In this sense the CPSU is, strictly speaking, not a party as such, but appears in the form of a certain power structure, which is, alas, being squeezed out of power.

Why do we not have a serious movement of the left? Primarily because the communists have continually advocated a party of all the people. Even in the years of stagnation, when society was already rapidly becoming polarized. At one pole the working people, at the other, an alliance of the shadow economy and the corrupt part of the machinery of state. Perestroyka should, seemingly, have halted this negative process. But the reverse happened. There was a substitution for ideas. Instead of making each person a master in society, the stratum of bosses that had earlier been kept underground was made legitimate and legalized. In this situation the CPSU came to pursue a policy of the defense of "general interests." Whence the conviction that we might now be led out of the crisis by some common efforts and an alliance of all political parties.

Now also we are wondering why our political opposition is working more professionally and competently on the creation of an enemy image. And this image is being created in stages from the party committees, what is more. Next in line are the trade union committees, the leadership of the army and state security.... However much we at any "roundtables" call upon Nikolay Ilich, hero of socialist labor and a former student of the higher party school, to call off the witch hunt, all this will be a voice crying in the wilderness. For it is today politically profitable to some people to portray the CPSU, an influential opponent, in the enemy image.

But the party is still proposing that everyone fraternize. Who should fraternize with whom? Millionaires with workers? But this is an illusion. There has never been such fraternization anywhere nor can there be. Consequently, the question is the form in which the confrontation of different social forces will be realized. In a form of military dictatorship or dictatorship of a left persuasion unrelated to the dictatorship and the power of the working people. No, it seems to me that we are threatened by a rightwing dictatorship of our own latter-day bourgeoisie. But as distinct from the bourgeoisie of Eastern Europe, it could not come to power peacefully—owing to national, cultural, and other traditions. Signs, however, of its bids for power are already in evidence: Interethnic tension has emerged and blood is being shed in a number of regions. Consequently, the alternative to a dictatorship of the right lies in the formation of a political force that really expresses the social interests of the working people. This is, perhaps, the sole version of a peaceful way out of the crisis. The working people can and must take power into their hands. But still they lack a political organization of a left persuasion.

At the same time, however, our parliaments and "municipalities" are still demonstrating total incapability, despite all their numerous speeches and vaunted declarations.

Interjection: A. Sobchak spoke in approximately this vein in the "Fifth Wheel" program on Leningrad television.

I. Malyarov: He forgot to say that bourgeois democracy in the shape of the municipalities has in this case proven

under the conditions of our country utterly without foundation. They are truly incapable. Nonetheless, some people intend breaking up the rayon soviets and other local soviet authorities and establishing a bourgeois dictatorship everywhere.

The forces of the left, on the other hand, are offering, as I became convinced from the speech of Vadim Valeryevich Damye, spokesman for the "Green" Party, an alternative to real soviet power. It consists of the self-management of the people combining the territorial and production principles.

We believe that if today a strong political authority, the authority of the party masses and the work force, shows of what it is capable and if the latter become the main source of the power of the people, as has occurred in the miners' regions, chaos in the country may be averted. The communists should take the path of organization of the working people for struggle for their own interests. See how under the conditions of the market economy of the West the well-being of the workers has been achieved thanks to high self-organization. But we are being told, no, it is no longer necessary building organizations on a class basis. This was in the past. And the official trade unions are being bumped off. These are sluggish, bureaucratic structures, of course. But who will take their place, with what content will the "independent unions" concept be invested? It would be a good thing to thoroughly look into all of this. It should be remembered that many workers have been completely deprived of the habits of participation in political and economic struggle. The party should help them create democratic movements, formulate alternative economic programs and tackle tactical and long-term tasks.

A. Buzgalin: The communists today find themselves in a difficult and quite odd situation. I would like to recall here the fantasy novel of the Strugatskiy brothers "It Is Hard Being a God". It models an extraordinarily instructive situation, in which the opposition, on assuming power, is capable merely for a moment of being a bridge to power for the brownshirts. If this metaphor is transferred from literary to political language, a distressing situation is, it seems to me, taking shape in the country. The once- ruling Communist Party, more precisely, its formal leadership, today in a state of formal rule, but in effect in opposition, is losing power. The blocs of the "Democratic Russia" type with leaders like Yeltsin, Sobchak, Popov, and others that today are coming to the leadership, however, may only be a bridge and springboard for the extreme right.

What follows from this? First, an understanding of the need for as rapid, active, and strong a bloc as possible of the only two mass currents that are capable of averting this rigid version of the development of events. This is a bloc of democratic movements, mainly of a nonpolitical nature.

It should be said that there are in the hands of the CPSU giant material, spiritual, and human resources. If these resources are not being put to work, they should be given up. There are people to whom they may be given. If they are working, but inadequately, they need to be forced to operate considerably better and more efficiently. The apparatus is a hindrance also where it joins forces directly with the bureaucratic elite and the gangocracy. They join forces often in accordance with established traditions, background, personal ties and much else. And the fact that Travkins and their ilk are emerging from the party here is not, in my opinion, fortuitous. There is, as before, a tremendous number of such Travkins sitting in party offices. And they are simply biding their time until they can take revenge and get hold of a pile and occupy a high "democratic" office.

As has rightly been remarked here, the CPSU has no desire to display its will in legislatures and governments, in which there are communists also, which frequently adopt laws and practical decisions aimed against the interests of the working people. Specifically, the Enterprise Act, which paralyzes the possibility of independent actions on the part of the work force councils.

'We Are Duty Bound To Help Constructive Democratic Movements Stand on Their Own Two Feet'

V. Slavin: Is there a rejoinder to the indictment of the CPSU for conservatism, which is coming from the communists themselves? I believe that these charges are somewhat subjective and are geared at times to the stoking of mass-meeting passions. Such a viewpoint can and must be refuted by precise and clear action. For example, support for the democratic movement within the Communist Party itself and the claiming of the intellectual potential of all communists top to bottom.

V. Kuptsov: Were it just "conservatism." A tendency has emerged in the activity of certain parties and movements of late toward a switch from criticism of the CPSU, which is frequently justified and entirely permissible in a democratic society, to its defamation and attempts to heap onto today's communists responsibility for the crimes of Stalin and his henchmen and to portray the Communist Party as an antidemocratic and antinational force. Do the "critics" understand against what number of people they are raising their hand? Each communist has a family, after all. Tens of millions of Soviet people, who will not stand for such an attitude toward them, are, it transpires, being defamed. So this also needs to be taken into consideration if we want civil concord and constructive cooperation.

I would like to emphasize once again that the CPSU aspires precisely to this and sees it as its job to help the soviets master the administration of the country and advocates dialogue and equal partnership with all progressive political forces in the name of the social protection of the working people. In fact, this policy was sufficiently formulated precisely and clearly in the decisions of the 28th congress. As you know, it expressed the party's readiness to unite, support, and defend all who by their honest labor are creating, have created, and will

create the well-being and spiritual values of the people. The Communist Party calls upon its opponents for constructive cooperation, rejecting anticommunism as the actual discrediting and defamation of millions of honest citizens. It needs to be said particularly that the CPSU will emphatically counter the forces that would like to turn our society back—to the bourgeois system or barrack-yard practices—and push in the direction of anarchy and civil confrontation and the uncoupling of the nations and peoples.

As far as the underestimation of the party's intellectual potential is concerned, I fully agree with this way of putting the issue. Truly, we are not using the party's intellectual potential to the extent that this is possible. Why? It seems to me that the long period of our stagnant life, when many problems were solved by command, pressure methods and the customary shout: "or else put your party card on the table," markedly weakened the intellectual potential of the party member and contributed to his loss of the attributes of a political fighter.

V. Bezuglov: The loss of these people was determined to a considerable extent, I believe, by the fact that they went unclaimed for many years and were given no opportunity for self-realization. They now have such an opportunity. However, the ossified party structures are still preventing them giving a full account of themselves.

Here another problem arises: Whereas before they had nowhere to go, now there is somewhere for them to go. I am speaking of the jumping, forced at times, from the ranks of the CPSU to other parties. Some are switching to positions of anticommunism, although they do not in their hearts nurture a hatred either of our ideas or the communists. Such are the fruits of their rejection by the party, more precisely, the party apparatus. This was the case also with certain members of the "Democratic Platform," whose work, they believed, was to no purpose. I believe that the CPSU is simply duty bound to help the democratic movements, which contain constructive potential, stand on their own two feet.

For many years our country really had strict monopolism, and there are now no techniques even for interaction, and we are having great difficulty making contacts. Take today's discussion, say. We are, willy-nilly, looking not for what we have in common, on which we might find points of contact, but for what might distinguish us from one another.

A law on parties is pending. But there are even now the prerequisites for the creation of various associations: a center association, say, a bloc of the left.... And it is easier finding what would unite all between blocs than between individual parties, each of which would want to emphasize its own individuality.

A. Ilin: I believe that your idea should be categorically supported.

A. Kolganov: I have the impression also that the problem of civil concord is now squarely on the agenda. And this is connected not only with interethnic conflicts but also with the future of our political system. Because the question of to whom power really belongs, which parties, and how this party or the other, having assumed this power, will implement radical reforms, interact with other parties, influence the government, and so forth will be posed in the next few years, months even. Some parties are scoring political points currently from indiscriminate attacks on others.

This has nothing to do with political culture. Consequently, it is essential that all the political forces that are currently actually in confrontation in our country have some nominal civilized framework for this confrontation. It is for this reason that extremely urgent significance is attached to the "roundtable" idea. Not in the sense of a sharing of political influence, as this is sometimes understood, but in the sense of the conclusion of something akin to a social contract and agreement on the principles of political struggle and on the fact that the contending political parties and forces should operate on the basis of constitutionality and compliance with particular laws and ethical standards.

M. Gorshkov: There has been talk of political ambitions here. I do not understand what this means. What party does not have aims and purposiveness if it wishes to be effective?

There are the laws and logic of political struggle. We have crossed this threshold. If we want not a puppet multiparty system but a real one, and we are on the eve of such, we need to recognize and prepare to work under such conditions, that is, in accordance with the laws of political struggle. To use the situation to our own advantage, for example, squeeze out competitors, by civilized methods, understandably, and so forth.

The "roundtable" has been discussed here. This idea is already behind the times, in my view. The CPSU does not have the initiative. Twelve to eighteen months ago, when this question first arose, our opponents would have consented to realization of the idea of a search for concord. Today they do not. Why? They wanted it and they insisted on it. Now, however, opponents to whom we might propose a "roundtable" would perceive this as an attempt to shackle and suppress their initiative and force them to give way on something or other. Why should they agree to this? The logic of political struggle would suggest to them a reverse move—they would shun the idea of a "roundtable" for today they are really laying claim to something more.

We will not, I will venture to forecast, arrive at common political accord in the immediate future. But as soon as we approach special, early or other new elections, some forms of political concordance with the laws of political struggle to which each of the political currents and movements here present and not present will agree, recognizing their individual weakness, will begin to emerge from reality itself and suggest themselves. And I believe our party also will be forced to seek some bloc

agreements, forgoing its political interests. Giving up something or other and agreeing intentionally to this lest it lose what is most important—the trust of the majority and its place in parliament.

'The Main Thing Is Seeking To Create an Interactive Mechanism in This Organization or Another and, Particularly, Individual Leaders, Not Looking for Guilty Parties'

V. Lantratov: The following are, I believe, the words of Nikolay Vasilyevich Gogol: "Russia suffers from two problems: lack of roads and a large number of fools." It is a question of the orgy of public consciousness, of which mention has already been made, and of the unpredictable actions that might arise following feverish appeals for the destruction of everything, for which some desperate, to put it mildly, people are calling. The situation in Moscow and the country is such that just one match is needed. This is truly the reality of our social life. But I do not want to theorize but to speak about specific matters. I do not agree with the opinion that has been expressed that many problems are not being tackled in Moscow and that dialogue between various social and political forces is being established with great difficulty. Such work began with us in practice long ago. Many of those present here today even would not argue that our contacts in the gorkom and outside, so to speak, have been of a more or less steady nature: We have conducted "roundtables" and debates, worked together on various documents....

As far as mechanisms of interaction are concerned, there is food for thought here. The party and the movements have their own programs and rules, which, incidentally, to a large extent do not, if studied closely and dispassionately, contradict one another. But an interacting mechanism of this organization or another, individual leaders particularly, is more often than not lacking. What is the problem? Political ambitions or something else, I shall not today venture to judge. It is not even a question of this. The main thing is seeking to create a dependable mechanism, not looking for guilty parties.

But the question goes deeper, in my opinion. We need, as has been said here, to come down to earth for the solution of certain specific problems. I do not agree that we must look for some mythical consolidation;achieving it is simply impracticable. I am for professionals from various party structures meeting and very attentively discussing central, fundamental issues on which agreement is possible.

Yes, there is a left, a right,and a center in our country. And it is a question of finding the balance that might protect us against a social explosion.

A. Ilin: We have not today, perhaps, arrived at any global conclusions. But the fact that opponents have openly had their say and the fact that we are opening some new floodgates is undoubtedly a good thing. And, in addition, I would like to express the following consideration also. We are, in my opinion, forgetting about one function of political parties, which consists of the forecasting of sociopolitical situations. This, it seems to me, is the form and sphere in which not only individual parties might work but agreement and cooperation between different parties and public movements might be achieved. Merely the exchange of information and opinions has been useful. Let this be the start of our cooperation.

Foreign Ministry Official On New Travel Laws

91UF0003A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Sept 90 p 5

[Report on interview with I. Khalevinskiy, first deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consular Administration, by I. Titov; under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "Without a Visa, Then?"]

[Text] [Titov] Igor Vasilyevich, your administration has taken part in drafting the USSR Entry and Exit Law. What changes are there going to be after the law is adopted?

[Khalevinskiy] Here they are in two words: USSR citizens will have the full right to leave and reenter the country; bureaucratic paperwork procedures will be cut down considerably. To receive a foreign travel passport one will only have to go to an internal affairs organ.

There will be several types of documents: a diplomatic passport, an official-use one, and a citizen's passport. The first one will be issued to diplomats and parliament members. The second to representatives of state offices who have an additional right to conduct important negotiations. We want to heighten the prestige of the citizen's passport, to make it a sound document containing more information about its owner.

We participated in drafting the provisions on the passports. They will fully correspond with the international standards which are set, by the way, by the International Civil Aviation Organization. We have practically completed the work on mock-ups of these passports. Information about these documents can be read and verified by a computer.

[Titov] Do you think that after the Exit Law is adopted emigration will grow to a threatening volume?

[Khalevinskiy] I think this process will eventually stabilize itself. To have people flow in both directions is beneficial to both sides.

Scientists, experts, and workers gain ideas and expertise when they go to work abroad. The flow of hard currency earned by the country's citizens abroad is not of the least importance here either.

[Titov] The new law will provide our people with the right to leave the country. Will they have a realistic chance to use it? Will new problems arise due to the increase in emigration?

[Khalevinskiy] You touched upon an important problem. First, the State Bank Notes, Coins, and Medals Administration can supply only 2 million blank passports though we need considerably more. And that means more waiting lines. Secondly, the government will most probably not be able to exchange the money according to the existing norms. In my opinion, we have to decrease the exchange quotas so that more of our citizens can use this right, otherwise some people will travel at the expense of others. In Hungary for instance, they used to allow the exchange of $300 per person a year, but now they only allow $50.

Finally, our international transportation is underdeveloped. The existing transportation infrastructure is totally inadequate in comparison with the level of international standards which we could have achieved.

[Titov] So the main things to have are a foreign travel passport, a ticket, and hard currency. Then you can go anywhere you want?

[Khalevinskiy] Yes you can, in principle, if the other country gives you an entry visa. But most of the developed countries are very strict where it concerns admitting foreign citizens, and especially so when dealing with workers and professionals trying to find jobs in that country. Even if they had signed a contract with a foreign firm, the visa applications would follow a long route through the immigration services and other government offices which may not allow the hiring of a foreigner. They put the interests of the entire society in the first place, rather than those of a private firm. And private firms definitely find it profitable to hire immigrants for low-paying jobs. Many of the West European trade unions, by the way, demand a stricter control over the immigrant workers from East European countries. In other words, it is rather difficult to receive a long-term visa with employment possibilities.

If a foreigner enters a country on a tourist visa or on a private invitation and finds employment illegally, sooner or later he will have an unpleasant confrontation with the police.

Two Newly Registered Papers Publisher's Profiled

PM0510144090 London MOSCOW NEWS in English No 18, 28 Sep-4 Oct 90 p11

[Report by N. Davydova: "Moscow's Maverick Publishers Have a 'Hit' Paper"]

[Text] Among the first publications to be registered with the State Committee for the Press when the new press law came into force were NASHE DELO (OUR CAUSE) and GRAZHDANSKIY REFERENDUM (CITIZEN'S REFERENDUM).

Both papers were founded and are still produced by Olya and Sasha Fedorovskiy from their three-room Moscow flat.

A recipient of the prestigious Lenin Scholarship and originally a member of the Party, Sasha Fedorovskiy was the founder of the USSR's first unofficial organisation back in 1980. He was imprisoned but released mainly through the support of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA journalist Lidiya Grafova, who wrote about his plight. Even so, Sasha found it hard to get work and the couple had to scrape a living by typing graduates' theses.

At first NASHE DELO and GRAZHDANSKIY REFERENDUM were were turned out on a manual typewriter, but by the time of the First Congress of People's Deputies the Fedorovskiys had acquired an electric typewriter with a memory capable of producing up to 3,000 copies overnight. NASHE DELO appeared daily during the congress.

The Fedorovskiys were founding members of the Moscow Popular Front, and GRAZHDANSKIY REFERENDUM still carries the Front's symbol, even though the many Front members who are now People's Deputies show little concern for their unofficial roots these days.

The couple funded both papers themselves. They are only just emerging from the grip of a 28,000-rouble starting loan, obtained at a huge interest rate from an underground loan shark. Today, they employ seven salaried editorial staff. The staff are not particularly well-paid and only receive their full salary if the militia decides not to confiscate any of the 60,000-to-100,000 print run—which is very large for an unofficial publication.

Despite having paid the State Committee for the Press a total of 4,000 roubles for the registration of both publications, the newspapers are still effectively underground publications. Officials in many Moscow districts insist that permission for small-scale retailing can only be granted for vegetables and fruits.

They were banned from selling their newspapers and on one occasion, the capital's criminal investigation officers were sent to prevent the newspaper being distributed.

Correspondents from NASHE DELO and GRAZHDANSKIY REFERENDUM are admitted to parliamentary sessions in Georgia and the Baltic republics, but they cannot get accreditation in Moscow.

If anything, this disadvantage has made them all the more tenacious and quick off the mark. They succeeded where all the official journalists failed in securing an interview with Tikhomirov, the worker who wrote a now famous letter to Boris Yeltsin.

Both publications are leftwing in their outlook. As journalists, the Fedorovskiys regard themselves as "educator", but not out of any great love of pedagoguery. They bombard their readers with facts, devoting 10 out of 12 pages to information which is left to be analysed by the readers themselves.. NASHE DELO and GRAZHDANSKIY REFERENDUM seek to increase the number of

politial activists. They invite people to participate in a dialogue and referendum at grass- roots level.

Olya's and Sasha's papers differ from competing newcomers in one important sense: they began when such activities were expressly forbidden. Theirs was an act of civil courage. Even their relatives turned their back on the couple. "With this kind of occupation, you can't be allowed to have children," they said.

The couple had their second daughter three months ago. It is becoming difficult to live in an editorial office where the telephone never stops ringing. But things have become a little easier since they abandoned plans for a trip abroad and used the hard currency to buy themselves some well-earned peace and quiet in the shape of a telephone answering machine.

Religious Leaders Welcome New Law, Note Flaws

PM0310152790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by S. Oganyan under the rubric "Toward a Rule-of-Law State": "Smiles on Priests' Faces"]

[Text] Will Easter be a public holiday from now on? Will fewer Soviet Jews wish to emigrate? Is there a definite date for a visit to the Soviet Union by the Pope? These and other outwardly unconnected questions were asked yesterday at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center after the country's Supreme Soviet adopted in principle [v tselom] the "Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations." A. Maslennikov, head of the USSR Supreme Soviet Press Service, introduced Soviet and foreign journalists to people directly involved in the elaboration of the new law and its future implementation: USSR People's Deputy A. Sebentsov; Metropolitan Pitirim, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate Publishing Department; A. Shayevich, chief rabbi of the Moscow Choral Synagogue; and G. Komendant, president of the USSR Union of Evangelical Christian Baptists. The synod, it was noted, was incomplete: For reasons beyond their control, representatives of other creeds were unable to take part in the news conference.

To all appearances, the guests were in excellent mood. The metropolitan said something jolly to the chief rabbi, and the stern features of the head of the Evangelical Christian Baptists were animated and welcoming. To be frank, it would have been hard to expect anything else. The law which has been gestating inside the Supreme Soviet during the last nine months is now legal reality. Henceforth, no obstacles will be placed in the way of believers in our country, while oppressive practices and efforts by the state to hamper the activity of religious organizations are ended forever.

By regulating relations between church and state, the new law ensures equal rights for believers and nonbelievers alike. I think one can agree with the statement, made at the news conference, that the new law is a gigantic step forward in the process of democratizing our country and building a rule-of-law state. Although, as A. Sebentsov pointed out, it was not so easy to overcome the numerous misunderstandings and stereotypes when working on the draft law. Journalists were reminded that the final version of the law is vastly different from the original outlines of the draft.

Some imperfections in the document were noted, of course. The chief rabbi, for example, drew attention to what he feels are excessively high taxes on priests. Then there is the problem of drafting for military service believers who, for religious reasons, refuse to take up arms.... Consequently, while stressing the unprecedented nature of the document, everyone agreed that it is transitional. Parliamentarians will return to it from time to time to make amendments prompted by everyday practice.

But now the answers to the most interesting questions. Will the new law lead to a reduction in Jewish emigration? Hardly, the chief rabbi replied, because Jews are not leaving the country for religious reasons but because of two other factors: displays of anti-Semitism and, most important of all, the deteriorating economic situation in the country. As far as Easter is concerned, A. Sebentsov explained, making it an official holiday could offend believers of other religions. The Pope could visit the Soviet Union, of course, metropolitan pitirim said, but we must not forget that he is not only the head of the Catholic Church but also a head of state, and so any agreement for a visit would have to go through state channels.

The problem of enforcing the law was also discussed with great interest. It was pointed out, in particular, that, with union republics declaring their sovereignty, the application of a Union law could be difficult.

Whatever, with the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Conscience, religious communities—which have always exerted an appreciable influence on society—will be given the opportunity to play an even more active role in current processes and bring a healthy influence to bear on them.

Ligachev Memoirs To Be Published 'Next Year'

LD0310082590 Moscow TASS in English 0800 GMT 3 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 3 TASS—Former Politburo member Yegor Ligachev's memoirs will be published next year.

He granted the right to print them to the SIBIRSKIYE OGNI (Siberian Lights) journal, which is based in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk.

State of Economy, Pace of Reforms Pondered

PM0210135390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya: "The Transplant Rejection Effect. Real Social Processes Refuse To Follow Bureaucratic Formulas"]

[Text] The question of the pace of perestroyka has been debated almost from its inception, and it was not for nothing that it was launched beneath the banner of acceleration. The crossfire between the "radicals" and the "gradualists" has, for all intents and purposes, not abated for a single moment since, even though the speed of progress may not have been directly under discussion.

Shortly after the 28th congress, I attended a meeting with a member of the Presidential Council. This is what I understood from his statements: He is fully aware that the moderate, or rather, dilatory tempo of transformations is an enforced tactical decision since, during the five-year-long tug-of-war with the nomenklatura team, the rope has not yet been successfully torn from its hands. But this hardly worries the main ideologists of "revolution from above" too much, since their philosophy of social changes gives preference to evolution and an unhurried, well-founded approach, to natural and organic growth rather than the swaggering full-steam-ahead method. And although I am also impressed by these ideas, a nagging doubt remains: Is it really possible to break out of the trap into which we have fallen by natural means? Is this not an illusion? Society is desperately thrashing about in the snare in which it is caught, in large and small enchanted circles. What is to be done with them if we are not to break them?

In my view, and in our position, to talk about the respectably measured tread of reforms as a guarantee of their soundness is more like putting a brave face on a sorry business to conceal the essence of the problem. The initial variations on the theme of the benefits of gradualism were played when it became clear that acceleration—that cavalry charge against the process of decay which it was no longer possible to hide—was getting stuck in the mud. It was then that deliberations began: It is useless to spur history on; moreover, it is dangerous and harmful to do so.... Events must be allowed to develop naturally.... The apple should be picked only when it has ripened and fallen to the ground of its own accord.

Meanwhile the fate of the unforgettable acceleration had no direct relation to the problem of the pace of reforms, since it was only a prelude to them. Things did not, strictly speaking, get as far as transformations as such. Everything got bogged down around the strengthening of discipline, the struggle against drunkenness, the strictures of state acceptance, and so on. The failure only confirmed that, even given comparatively favorable conditions, when trust in authority had been somewhat strengthened and some hopes aroused, the administrative machinery was no longer capable of functioning. The last attempt to "break through," to whip up economic development by methods differing in no way from the past, ended in confusion—as have, by the way, all other similar "leaps" which leaders of totalitarian regimes all over the world have repeatedly launched to the drumbeats of propaganda. But, having burned their fingers, our authorities adopted a cooler approach not toward their own cheerfully voluntarist, administrative-style fantasies, but toward reforms in general, including political reforms. And they were diligently busy doing so until the summer of this year.

Whenever acute problems emerge in society, there are always plenty of people eager to solve them. "Democratic Russia's" election breakthrough paved B. Yeltsin's way to the "small" presidency. The alternative leader, with the aid of republic parliamentarians, quickly turned the Russian structures of power into alternatives to Union structures. The closed season was at an end. Quitting the CPSU, B. Yeltsin untied his hands from a political point of view. In his speech at the opening of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session, he was already in a position to openly declare that he did not intend to prolong the agony of totalitarian structures. A new political team came out onto the starting blocks, wearing the colors of a social market economy and prepared to demonstrate sprinting miracles. The president accepted the challenge, and consequently the forced pace. Time raced on: The count was now no longer in years, but in weeks, days, and even hours.

Ever since its birth, a nagging presentiment of danger has been hovering over the cradle of perestroyka, and it later materialized in the form of two threats. The first: The restoration of totalitarian procedures through the combined efforts by fundamentalist party apparatchiks, some of the generals, the KGB, and Russian "back to the soil" nationalists tagging along with them. The second: Current affairs writers have described it as "explosion," "civil war," "Romanian option," or "Lebanonization"—frightening definitions, not properly analyzed and rather vague. So, has such an outcome to perestroyka become more realistic or not after five years?

It is difficult to answer this question unambiguously.

On the one hand, we are observing clear symptoms of the growing weakness and the moribund nature of former structures of power. After the elections to republican and local organs of power, the more dynamic section of the party nomenklatura rushed to find cosy jobs in joint enterprises, joint-stock corporations, and cooperatives.

But this happened at the very summit of the Union and republican pyramids. What was the totally dull mediocrity, the faithful drudge, to do? What was to happen to rank-and-file apparatchiks in the provinces, without the anonymity which might have swallowed them in the capital? Indeed, even the "first" [secretary]—powerful and convinced of his own superiority and omnipotence—where would you have him go? You cannot

obtain an apartment in the capital because of the troublemakers at the Moscow City Soviet. The prospect of obtaining a dacha hideaway and private income are also becoming more and more shaky. He cannot just go and play dominoes in the public garden!

Matters thus reached the point of the two "mutinies"—at the Russian [Communist Party] congress and the 28th [CPSU] Congress.

On the other hand, one should not, of course, lull oneself into a false sense of security either. In his notorious article about the "strong hand," A. Migranyan wrote, among other things, that the an instinct for self-preservation was characteristic of the nomenklatura. And he went on to cite Hungary's example: People over there actually, he claimed, were able to modernize the management of the national economy in good time. This is an obvious misunderstanding. The nomenklatura has not demonstrated this reflex in a single East European country. It followed a straight line to the slaughterhouse, committing one stupid act after the other. Obviously its protective instincts had atrophied during its long existence in greenhouse conditions.

But the masses have already found and tested a whole arsenal of means to struggle for social and national rights. I mean the acts of civil disobedience on Georgia's railways, the paramilitary formations in Armenia, the tidal waves of rallies in Azerbaijan, and so on—whatever your attitude toward them might be, you cannot deny their effectiveness. Whenever something crops up, all these measures will be immediately put into operation in the republics. However, since time immemorial, coups have always taken place in the capitals. But now, when the Russian Supreme Soviet session has begun, proclaiming the start of swift reforms, any putsch in Moscow will be seen as a coup aimed not against Gorbachev, but against Yeltsin. So that the political moment—now—is extremely disadvantageous one for willful action by generals. This, however, is not due to the wise tactics of the "gradualists" but to powerful pressure from below. It was thanks to this pressure alone that, in the wake of the two congresses, the president himself did not become hostage to conservative forces.

People have learned a lot in five years and have begun to think differently. Society has been transformed, but has not acquired the capacity for self-development. It is still being rocked by the shockwaves of deadlock. It was precisely because of the long drawn-out "weighing up" of every little step forward that the current unmanageable and inevitable economic collapse, which has provoked a chain reaction in all spheres of social life, was not successfully averted. Shortages have reached the capital, and hit the most painful spots of consumption: medicines, cigarettes, gasoline, and bread.

Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens are emigrating, fleeing the hopeless chaos, while individual republics are taking energetic measures to break away and have nothing to do with this anarchy. Patience has already snapped wherever it had been threatening to snap. Everyone knows the dreaful events I have in mind. Without noticing it ourselves, we have been living in an explosive situation for a long time now. Only so far it had bypassed Moscow, and most of the capital's intelligentsia, aware of the horrors of Central Asia and the Caucuses only by hearsay, was for a long time inclined to assess the overall results of the tactics of containment extremely indulgently.

To this day there hovers in the air an expectation that something unknown (and therefore terrifying) may befall Moscow. What? After all, social explosions happen in a variety of ways. Where, as in Osh or Fergana, people beat their heads against an impenetrable wall and are not allowed to understand what is happening around them or to find a peaceful and reasonable way out, they murder and burn. Not, moreover, those who brought them to this semi-bestial state. Violence, criminal terror, and mass hysteria break out there. The more powerfully they gave in to the contemporary beys, the more powerfully they covered them up, giving assurances that everything is just fine—we were fighting over sexual matters—the more frightening were the consequences.

The "velvet revolution" in Prague and the events in the GDR were different varieties of "explosion," however. Think of the explosion in Poland in 1980, but after all there was neither killing nor burning there. The nature of the explosion depends on the degree of exploitation, on the standard of living, on culture, education, and national ardor. The mass strikes by Russian and Ukrainian miners were also, in my view, mini-explosions. Society had to pay a high price—fortunately not in blood—for the center's connivance with the ministries which had haughtily scorned the obligations they had assumed. I think that subsequently, too, even in the event of severest tension in the country's coalfields, atrocities like those in Sumgait, Osh, and Fergana, are unthinkable.

Localized explosions of varying force may continue to take place. But in Moscow? What could actually happen here to fatally disrupt the course of transformations, especially in view of the hopes aroused by the Russian parliament? Can the situation in Moscow get worse still? Yes, if there are shortages of heat, gas, and electricity in the winter. Yes, if some kind of ecological disaster occurs, something against which nobody is insured, given our slovenliness. Well, what will be the reaction of the inhabitants of Moscow? I can imagine a few stores looted by the lumpen proletariat or criminals, and even arson (as happened recently in Sofia, for example). But all this has happened many times in West Berlin and New York without undermining the fabric of the political system. The social composition of Moscow's inhabitants is such that even in the event of totally unbearable social tension they will, more likely than not, find effective and more or less civilized forms of protest. Surely Muscovites are not less reasonable than their compatriots in Vorkuta or Kemerovo?

The end results of all these hesitations and waiting games have proved devastating. The question arises: Why did the bulk of the cream of our society—intellectuals and politicians who will undoubtedly go down in history and to whom we are all owe so much—display such inexplicable timidity and inconsistency? I have in mind not words, but deeds. Here is my explanation.

When it emerged, back in 1986-1987, that things were going badly awry with the utilization of economic accountability and economic levers and with the electability of directors, a one-sided diagnosis was made. The slowdown was entirely attributed to inertia, to sabotage by apparatchiks and bureaucrats who, it was said, were trying to hang on by hook or by crook to procedures favorable to them. Of course, the nomenklatura contributed its two cents' worth to the growth of the chaos, and thus the wrath of society which fell on its head was justified. But the slowness was also caused by the state of society's "grey matter"—the reform-minded intelligentsia. Its upper echelon—the "children of the 20th Congress"—were driven by the ideals of the Prague Spring, Hungary's reform, and our own conceptions of the times of the first attempts to reform the Soviet economy. In other words, options that fitted the framework of a new model of socialism, its renewal, and so forth.

When the bureaucratic plans first came into contact with reality, it became clear: Either they do not work at all, or have unforeseen effects. Amendments were required until such a time as the compass needle began to point in the true direction of impending changes. For almost four years everything was in motion, and, at the same time, it was not the details that were were being amplified but the very perception of the task that had to be solved, the essence of the economic reforms which had begun. Of course, isolated voices saying that we had been thrashing about in bushes and gullies away from civilization's beaten track for long enough were heard even before. However, it was only sometime between Solidarity's coming to power and the outcome of the parliamentary elections in the GDR that the idea of the inevitable transition to social market economy migrated from the sphere of individual insights which shocked one's neighbors, into the sphere of more or less mass social consciousness.

A spectator's view of events in East Europe facilitated the clarification of the situation in our own country. Up until then a significant part of the intelligentsia were hampered (and some are hampered to this day) in taking an unbiased look at the essence of the reforms the Soviet economy needed by a voluntary self-deception going back to the Prague Spring: Serious transformations, they thought, were possible only through the party. Personal ties, careers, and the habit of privileged access to information developed during the years of voluntary cooperation with the party's central apparatus. It was not easy to throw all this overboard. People were accustomed to their illusions, to which they clung for consolation and self-justification. Many people made up their minds during the Russian congress. Of course, I. Polozkov was not the first apparatchik that knowledgeable people had come across. But he was evidently so typical that he played the role of a sort of mirror, gazing into which the hesitators staggered back and at last cast off their illusions.

One way or another, the collective quest for a real goal is reaching its logical conclusion. Of course, not everyone yet finds the prospect of social market economy indisputable, and the disagreements and the struggle have not yet died away. But those who have accepted this goal can now at least amplify the details of the transformations and elaborate specific steps, without any fear that the task will yet again be formulated differently even before they have completed their work.

This is what it boils down to: For as long as the concepts of reforms remained utopian to a certain extent, calls to urge on their implementation were premature. The "gradualists" who argued against running too fast turned out to be essentially correct in this. First, however, they delayed not only the long-term economic transformations, but also literally everything, even when the goals were obvious. And second, their correctness was accidental. They advocated a moderate pace and deliberately restrained the development of events not because they knew or guessed the truth in advance and were hoping to lead others to it step by step, as the man in the street became increasingly ready to accept it. To justify Gorbachev and his comrades retroactively in this way, for having initially opted for the "Prussian" rather than the "American path" of perestroyka, would mean composing yet another vassal's legend [vernopoddanicheskaya legenda] about the wise omniscience of authority.

The initiators of the "revolution from above" were not and could not have been intellectual and political supermen. Our general secretary has long been showered with reproaches: "Why is it that he did not come up with a concept for perestroyka in good time?" It is not difficult to explain why. M. Gorbachev is reminiscent of a sailor who, thanks to his exceptional energy and organizational abilities has worked his way up to captain of an antediluvian dreadnought which is disintegrating on the move. The new commander climbed onto the bridge, looked around, and saw: Modern aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines at large in the ocean around him. He realized that things are in a bad way, and something had to be done in a hurry. He decided to impose order: To begin with, replacing some of the arrogant, stupid, and roguish senior officers with younger ones, tightening up discipline among the sailors, swabbing the decks, and giving the hull a fresh coat of paint. He also had a distant target: To overhaul the worn-out engine. How? He did not know exactly, but relied on his engineers. The crew's spirits were raised somewhat, but the dreadnought remained the same sluggish, outmoded hulk. And when they started tinkering with the engine, it became altogether clear that it was impossible to repair. They raised up the planking, but found nothing but trash there too. Everything was

hopelessly rotten and rusted away, and water had seeped through the portholes into the holds. And in this extreme, unforeseen eventuality, the captain—unaware of the true scale of the catastrophe even though he had served all his life on the dreadnought—no longer had any plan of salvation.

How is it possible to have seen everything while serving from the rank of sailor to captain with one's own eyes, and yet be unaware? Is such ignorance on the part of the "godson" of Yu. Andropov—the man who should have known if not everything, then at least more than everyone else put together, simply by virtue of the post he had held for so long—conceivable? There is no satisfactory answer to these legitimate questions.

One circumstance should be taken into account: Gorbachev began to operate from within the party. It was his mainstay, but it also limited the horizons of the general secretary's vision. When you find yourself inside a totalitarian system, at its hard core or even close to it, it is difficult to get a bird's eye view of it and understand its functioning. From this point of view, the fates of A. Yakovlev and B. Yeltsin are indicative: A gifted politician who has matured inside the System needs to find himself, if only temporarily, in disgrace, in the position of, if not an outcast, then an outside observer, in order to soberly assess reality and to place another bet.

The party apparatus has created a special exclusive environment with its own traditions, rigorously observed rules of play and conventions, its own ethics and language. It also has its own ideology, worked out down to the smallest detail: This ideology may be illusory, cut off from the realities of the modern world, but internally it is logical and integral and explains what is happening in a way that is enticingly comprehensible. This environment can offer its inhabitants psychological support, confidence in their rectitude, and consequently, spiritual, not to mention material, comfort.

The ideas of the so-called new political thinking disturbed this philosophical idyll, were incompatible with it, and it rejected them. In the eyes of the top party nomenklatura, perestroyka was suicide announced in advance. The first memorable example of self-defense was a kind of ideological Maginot Line, erected on the threshold of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the revolution. These fortifications held out for a week or two, no longer. They were brushed aside, and only the sturdiest tin soldiers still pine for their long-lost redoubts. The next lines of defense were the combination of party and state posts in the hands of one man, a two-tier parliament, "red hundreds," [krasnaya sotnya] "socialist pluralism of opinions," the Article 6 of the Constitution, and much else—it is impossible to remember it all.

At each of these landmarks, Gorbachev engaged in battle—with the aim of later abandoning each of them unnoticedly. The same man, in whose name the ideas of perestroyka and new thinking were proclaimed to the world, fought stubbornly and ably. The key to the paradox lies in the fact that these battles were in no way manifestations of Gorbachev's personal stubbornness. Yes, it is difficult for him to reject a decision once it has been made. But the point is not only, and not so much this: He was defending the source of his strength and authority, the machinery of the implementation of power, not seeing any alternative to it. But whenever an alternative appeared, it was at once "occupied" by another leader.

The procrastination tactics were abandoned only when the question of a shift of power in Russia arose. And at this point, in my view, a puzzlingly dangerous race began.

At the risk of sounding inconsistent, I will voice my opinion all the same. Why was it necessary to adopt the laws implementing the "500 days" at breakneck speed? Why was it that after five-and-a-half years of inaction everything had to be decided in terms of days and even hours? Does it make so much difference whether the proposed package is adopted by 1 or 15 October, or, God forbid, 1 November? What is the hurry now?

It is said that the time factor decides everything. But there will not be any more gasoline, cigarettes, or medicines because laws are examined within three days and not six. An extra week of reflection by deputies will not increase tension, just as the dizzy speeds that have been proposed by legislators will not diffuse it. It is the Russian custom to pause awhile by the roadside.

It seems to me that with the rigidly prescribed schedule of their program (from the first to the 30th day, from the first to the 100th, and so forth) the authors of the "500 days" are putting their necks in the noose. After all, a delay of several days occurred already at the stage of presenting the document, which was agreed between the two presidents. And what will happen when the republican parliaments get involved? And what of our bureaucratic inertia? Of course, everyone understands. Who would dare reproach the kamikazes from the Russian Council of Ministers for performing some important task like the assessment of national [obshchenarodnaya] ownership not in 100 but, say, 115 days? Why drive ourselves into a corner beforehand with schedules compressed to the point of unreality? It is possible to make a whole mass of mistakes through haste. And people—well, they can always tell the difference between a sound worker and a lazy one or an adventurist.

But this is still a fan speaking, not a critic.

Presidential Decree Awards Socialist Leader

LD0410160590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 4 Oct 90

[Text] A decree of the USSR president has been received on posthumously awarding the title of Hero of Socialist Labor to former chief designer Mikhail Ilich Koshkin. In this way, many years later, his outstanding services in

strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Soviet state and his great personal contribution to the development of the T-34 has been marked.

Ryazan Official Denies Paper's Allegations on Coup

PM0510100990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed commentary on and "text" of telegram from L. Khitrun, first secretary of Ryazan CPSU Oblast Committee, under the rubric "From the USSR Supreme Soviet Mailbag": "Falsification"]

[Text] Thousands of letters and hundreds of telegrams are sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet every day. They include quite a few responses to publications in the mass media and in particular recent comments on a "military coup" allegedly being prepared in the country. One such telegram, addressed to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet from Ryazan, caught our parliamentary correspondent's eye. It reaffirms that in the campaign to intimidate Soviet people, several journalists are resorting to falsification and all kinds of conjecture.

We now print the text of that telegram:

"The 26 September 1990 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article 'And Someone Thought Exercises Were Under Way...' clearly falsified events in Ryazan Oblast. The CPSU oblast committee [obkom] bureau did not receive the information from KGB organs mentioned in the article, nothing of the kind was ever discussed, and such questions are not within the remit of the elected party organ. Nor could a party obkom bureau session have been held on 6 September, because at that time the majority of bureau members, the CPSU obkom first secretary and second secretary, the chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee, and the chief of the KGB Directorate were in Moscow where they were taking part in the work of stage two of the Russian Communist Party Constituent Congress.

"The death of military servicemen on 10 September noted in the publication does not correspond to the facts. On that day there were no fatal road accidents in the oblast.

"The Ryazan CPSU Obkom expresses a categorical protest at KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's crude fabrications. We regard this as an attempt to use false information to destabilize the sociopolitical situation, set the Soviet Army against the people, and undermine confidence in the organs of power. We demand an immediate retraction in the mass media and reserve the right on the basis of the Law on the Press in the USSR to appeal to the judicial organs to bring those responsible to account.

"L. Khitrun, first secretary of Ryazan CPSU Obkom."

General Forum of Democratic Forces Postponed

PM1110104090 London MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 19, 5-11 Oct 90 p14

[Interview with A. Murashev, chairman of the Democratic Russia movement's organizing committee, by Marina Podzorova—date and place not given]

[Text] The idea of a general forum of democratic forces has been turned into a need to bring together representatives from progressive republican groups to discuss the reorganisation of the Union.

The concept of a forum has been further modified by different ways in which democrats in the republics reacted to Stanislav Shatalin's radical economic programme.

These differences have pushed the gathering further into the future and reshaped the relations between different democratic forces.

[Podzorova] What is the connection between Democratic Russia and the forum?

[Murashev] The connection is direct. A forum of all democratic forces cannot be convened before the gathering of Democratic Russia, whose constituent conference is planned for late October- early November.

This will also be facilitated by the fact that the leaders of the Democratic Party of Russia, the Democratic Platform and the Social- Democrats have signed an agreement on a political coalition.

Representatives from the republics should be invited to this conference and some preliminary understanding achieved.

A forum can be meaningful only at the highest level. It can't be held without Boris Yeltsin, Gavrill Popov and Anatoliy Sobchak. So it would also be possible to count on the participation of the Baltic presidents. Preliminary talks have been held with the Ukraine, and representatives from Kazakhstan have declared that they intend to participate. Accord expressed in the final document would enable us to pool our efforts.

[Podzorova] How do you envisage this final document?

[Murashev] A rough draft exists, and has been discussed by the Inter-Regional Group. The forum's key problem must be that of nation-state reorganisation. The rough draft states that the Soviet Union does not exist as a single state after the adoption of the declarations of sovereignty.

It speaks about the transition of the economies of sovereign states - members of the future commonwealth - to a market economy, about demilitarisation of the commonwealth, reorientation of the military-industrial complex towards peaceful objectives, and the commonwealth's active inclusion in the world community.

[Podzorova] Addressing the Union government, the rally on September 16 chanted: "Resign!" Isn't that a fairly narrow premise?

[Murashev] The most important thing is to adopt Shatalin's programme. In it there is simply no room for the Union government. It speaks about an interstate committee for the implementation of the reform under the President. Privatisation and other measures for the implementation of the reform have been farmed out to the republics.

Regrettably, the USSR Supreme Soviet is now more conservative than the President. The deputies are discussing the programme without understanding its essence.

I believe that while Gorbachev has not emasculated the programme completely, he has decided to ram it through the Supreme Soviet and is counting more on his special powers.

[Podzorova] The democrats find it hard to reach agreement among themselves. If the forum is delayed, will it not be out of step with developments?

[Murashev] We have managed concerted actions on principal matters. For example, we have seen a united bloc at this year's elections, Yeltsin's election, the political coalition of Russia's three biggest parties, the talks between Russia's parliament and the sovereign republics. The forum has remained one of the last chances for a large segment of the public to believe in something.

[Podzorova] The CPSU-controlled newspapers assure readers that the democrats are planning a violent coup. What do you say about that?

[Murashev] Prokofyev's statement at a recent press conference and Vladimir Petrunya's lampoon in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, are either the products of a sick imagination or provocations, but most likely both.

There are three major parties in the democratic movement, and I've already mentioned the coalition they have formed. Their leaders are People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. Their policies are widely known: they all favour civility, harmony and parliamentary methods of struggle.

New Communist Youth Movement's Aims Outlined

PM1010112590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Sakhonko, member of the Communist Initiative organizing committee, by Lieutenant Colonel A. Kovalev in response to readers' letters and under the "Youth-90: Who's Who" rubric: " 'Are You Not Laughing Too Soon, Gentlemen?'"—date and place not specified: interview opens with two letters and three paragraphs of introduction]

[Text] "The second stage of the Russian Communist Party Constituent Congress was addressed by senior lecturer A.V. Zolotov from the organizing committee of the 'Communist Initiative' youth movement. That was the first time I had heard about this organization. But the speech impressed me. The youth movement's representative believes in communist ideals. That is a rarity nowadays, in my opinion. I began to respect Zolotov and his comrades.

"[Signed] Nikolay Suprunov, Omsk."

"I am familiar with A.V. Zolotov's speech at the Russian Communist Party Constituent Congress. I am sure he is my age. But even if he is not, I still feel sorry for him. He believes in ideas which, wherever you look, have had their day. To the delight of some and the regret of others. So I would like to say: 'Zolotov, wake up, get rid of your outmoded dogmas.'

"[signed] V. Loskin, Gelendzhik."

Besides those two letters the editorial office has received others written by people who were motivated to write by A.V. Zolotov, a young scientist from Nizhniy Novgorod.

I think that it is worth getting to know the "Communist Initiative" movement and its representatives better:

Yevgeniy Sakhonko. Educated in philosophy. A member of the Communist Initiative organizing committee.

[Kovalev] Yevgeniy, why is it called the "communist" initiative precisely?

[Sakhonko] It's a shocking and provocative title for these days, isn't it? Nowadays, of course, the word "commercial" has a more attractive ring. Even in connection with the Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League]. Commerce prevails in it today. Just look at the money our illustrious union is "earning" from erotomania alone through videos, video salons, and all kinds of shows. The "forbidden fruit" of this business "flourishes" most often under cover of the Komsomol. But that is a topic for a separate discussion...

The very word, the concept "communist" is reviled everywhere today. Surprising as it may seem, among the particularly zealous ones you will find quite a few of those who until very recently eagerly "served" communist ideology as fawning Komsomol and party careerists. Now they are hurrying to swell the ranks of the "acolytes of perestroyka" and are striving for a monopoly of the truth. Incidentally, we already have a new caste here—those who control that truth. They pontificate, they preach, they urge, they pass judgment. And we, the servants, must meekly obey...

We despise them. Although they cannot be ignored in the political struggle. They are ready for anything.

My comrades and I believe in communist ideals. They have already lasted centuries. It was not Marx who discovered them and it is not up to us to bury them. As

long as man has existed he has dreamed of the fraternal and just organization of life. And the strength of those ideals is attractive and inexhaustible. Whatever people may say today, they attracted millions of people to build a new world and people accepted and endured many deprivations and burdens to enable those ideals to triumph. It is not the ideals which proved wanting. It was those who rushed ahead of the people and led them. It was the path along which they were led.

This is our standpoint. And A. Zolotov expressed our conviction in his speech.

[Kovalev] Yevgeniy, when you say "we"—are there many of you today or not?

[Sakhonko] How many of us are there...? To be honest, fewer than we would like. But far more than some people would like... Our movement already has several thousand people in it. Besides Moscow we already have centers in Leningrad, Nizhniy Novgorod, Ryazan, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk, Tolyatti, Naberezhnyye Chelny, and other cities...

[Kovalev] The geographical spread is extensive. But what are your movement's organizational structures? Do you operate within the Komsomol committees?

[Sakhonko] Very rarely. I repeat: We are the "communist initiative." Komsomol functionaries, however, avoid such definitions like the plague today, afraid that they may be compromised in the eyes of the "informals." So people have to go underground...

But our organizational structure today is quite simple—it is based on "clubs" and "societies."

[Kovalev] The Komsomol has surely lost its prestige among young people once and for all. So how does your movement intend to win prestige?

[Sakhonko] There is just one path—by concrete work... A banal answer, eh?

[Kovalev] There is no alternative. Even if you have something new to say on this score. What are your aims? Have you yet achieved anything?

[Sakhonko] As a reader very accurately put it in a past issue of ARGO, our younger generation is the "abandoned" generation.

Yet how well it all began. Just a few years ago, the hope of renewing society inspired young people, they looked forward to the strengthening of social justice, they worked to promote that. But something else happened instead, it seems. What kind of social justice is it today when the lives often of millions are becoming worse and worse while the "shady dealers" are getting rich. Young people are disillusioned, they are afraid to face the future.

Young people need a socio-state system of social protection. But at the moment all this is just fine talk.

To be honest, our movement hasn't done a lot yet either in this respect. It has helped some to find work and resolved the housing question for others. Not a lot to write home about. In justification, not that self-justification is our style, we still have to find our feet, our opportunities are limited... We are now finalizing the preparation of an action program. Young scientists—economists, lawyers, and production workers—are taking part.

[Kovalev] Are you considering making contact with young people in the Army and Navy?

[Sakhonko] We've already made contact. With the Main Political Directorate's Komsomol work department, the youth aktiv in garrisons... We received understanding and support. We regard young people's heroic-patriotic education as one of the main areas in our work. Certain forces are now urging a boycott of the fall draft. We are trying to oppose them as best we can.

And we are already gaining strength, believe me. Incidentally, young people come to us asking us to help them join the Komsomol. It seems that many Komsomol committees have been opposing that. Isn't this nonsensical? In a time of breakthrough? Who is trying to break whom? Who will win?

We are optimists.

Comparison of Defense Conversion Program

PM0110113190

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 29 September 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 1 a TASS report entitled "USSR Presidential Council Session". The PRAVDA item has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version published in the 1 October issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT on page 43 under the title "Conversion Program Detailed," revealing the following variations:

Page 43, column one, first complete paragraph, first sentence PRAVDA reads: ...was held here on 28 September. The meeting presided.... (omitting dateline and substituting "on 28 September" for "today")

Same column, paragraph two, sentence two PRAVDA reads: ...important kinds of national economic and consumer goods.

Taking conversion into account, the value of.... (adding passage)

Same column, paragraph three, only sentence PRAVDA reads: ...previous five-year period.

Production and scientific and.... (substituting "production" for "manpower")

Same column, last paragraph, only sentence PRAVDA reads: ...for conversion at every enterprise, that would take.... (substituting "every enterprise" for "other enterprises")

Same page, column two, first complete paragraph, only sentence PRAVDA reads: ...Ministers to supplement and clarify the state program.... (adding "and clarify.")

TV Production Company Plans Expansion

PM1110084590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Candidate of Historical Sciences N.I. Lutsenko, president of "Nika TV" all-Union public television company, by unnamed TASS correspondent in Moscow; date not given: "What Can We Expect From 'Nika'?"—first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] Soviet television's 65th anniversary was marked by the appearance of a new member of the mass media: The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of the Press and Mass Media has registered the country's first independent broadcasting corporation, called "Nika."

It was founded by N.I. Lutsenko, president of the "Nika TV" all-Union public television company, a finalist in the world journalists competition, and a candidate of historical sciences.

[TASS] How does the newly registered mass medium differ from the "Nika TV" television company already well known in our country?

[Lutsenko] We started our activities two years ago as a creative television production association. Then we became a television company, and we are now a corporation. This is not a name game but the economic need to unite all the structures we have created in one organization. During the two years we developed a wide network of regional branches and bureaus, many of which already go on local air autonomously—in Kaluga, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov-na-Donu, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy—in over 40 cities in total. We have now come all the way to the point of going on air on Central Television.

[TASS] And will it be easy for you to do that?

[Lutsenko] It is extremely difficult. Extremely. First, broadcasting requires huge material resources, and it is not just a matter of money. Resources must be invested in professional television equipment which is produced outside our country and in paying for communications facilities. Creative collectives must be formed. However, "Nika" is today probably the only organization to have maintained good relations with the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

[TASS] And does that mean that Central Television will give up its own air time?

[Lutsenko] We have planned joint work with Central Television, specifically a new series of programs devoted to science fiction which will be shown on Channel One. Nighttime viewing is possible—that is after midnight—of both our own original programs and programs from foreign television companies with which we are cooperating.

[TASS] Is there a charge for your broadcasts?

[Lutsenko] Everything we show on Central Television will be free. And if we acquire expensive foreign films and programs, which, in conditions of downright "video piracy," few people can buy now, we will be bound under economic laws to pass on the expense if only partially—via a subscription payment for local cable networks. Incidentally, earlier this year we set up an independent USSR airwave, cable, and satellite television association.

[TASS] And how much will we have to pay?

[Lutsenko] Not more than five to seven rubles a month. That is on average. But much depends on local conditions and the authorities' attitude.

[TASS] Who are the cofounders?

[Lutsenko] They are the "Soyuztelefilm" association, the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the All-Union Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee, the USSR Union of Cinematographers' Association for joint Cinema Initiatives, the "Sovitcom" Soviet-Italian joint financial and commercial company, and, of course, "Nika TV." We have just admitted a new independent television company from Arkhangelsk, which was set up with our participation, as a cofounder.

[TASS] And are you involved only in television?

[Lutsenko] Far from it. That is why the "Nika" independent corporation is called a broadcasting corporation, because it intends to get involved in radio broadcasting in addition to television.

[TASS] Will you be broadcasting only in Moscow?

[Lutsenko] No. Our first listeners will be inhabitants of the Far East, and also of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. And after that will come the European part of the country: Moscow, Leningrad, and the Baltic region.

[TASS] And will there be long to wait?

[Lutsenko] We will be on radio in December and on television from the beginning of next year. We have already held viewers and listeners in suspense long enough.

Moscow Soviet Faces Economic, Tax Problems

PM1010152090 London MOSCOW NEWS in English No 19, 5-11 Oct 90 p2

[Article by Sergey Stankevich, deputy chairman of Moscow City Soviet: "Crop of Troubles for City's Bosses"]

[Text] The Moscow Communist Party committee recently held a meeting with the cumbersome title "On

the declining political situation in Moscow due to unsatisfactory handling of several vital socio-economic issues".

Local paper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA tried to explain that the situation is "difficult and even critical at times" because the party branches are out of touch with ordinary people.

Now, at a time when the Moscow City Soviet and its executive committee are in a weak position, it is essential that communist deputies oppose the prevailing practice of words not being backed up by deeds. So the party bureau proposed that every communist work at least three days on a farm in the Moscow region.

But the fact is that we of the presidium of the Moscow City Soviet have refused to carry out this kind of forced mobilisation. We have embarked on an alternative plan and allocated 10 million rubles of our funds (another five million from the Moscow Regional Soviet) to pay volunteers. Last Saturday we sent 40,000 volunteers for a day's work in the countryside.

The political situation is declining because proposals by the government are constantly being rejected. But the Moscow party officials claim it is not the management system of state and collective farms which is to blame, saying: "The system was good, but the party whip has been removed and look what has happened!"

Ownership, particularly of the land, must be changed for the privatisation programme to succeed. This would cancel the need for emergency measures next year and pompous meetings about the state of the economy.

Because of the USSR Supreme Soviet's delay in deciding on the 500-Days programme, we went ahead and drew up a plan and a budget for Moscow according to the programme endorsed by the Russian Supreme Soviet. Our success will decide the future of the city.

We calculate the amount of tax revenue for the budget at 14 billion rubles, as long as taxes collected in the city remain there and are not handed over to higher official bodies.

Now that Moscow has lost some of its privileges the city authorities will incur serious expenses. As a double capital, of the USSR and of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Moscow deserves appropriate compensation.

Now a working group of representatives is being set up of federal, republican, city and regional bodies, on presidential instructions, to work out new procedures for the capital.

Homosexual Group Registers Campaigning Paper

PM1010144190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 90 p 2

[Report by S. Stupar: "Freedom of Love and the Press"]

[Text] In Moscow, the interdepartmental commission for social associations under the Moscow City Soviet has registered the newspaper TEMA, the publication of the Association of Sexual Minorities.

As student Roman Kalinin, chief editor of the new newspaper, said, this is in fact the organ of the as yet unregistered Libertarian Party and the mouthpiece of Soviet lesbians and homosexuals persecuted by the state and public opinion. The newspaper regards its main task as campaigning for the repeal of Point 1 of Article 121 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Criminal Code ("sodomy"). Roman and his friends believe that this article has been used hitherto to suppress dissidence, and they consider it absolutely essential for themselves to compile lists of people convicted under Article 121 to give them help and support. Roman announced an action in defense of prostitutes that the Libertarian Party is going to mount in the near future in front of the Intourist hotel, involving the free distribution of contraceptives to passers-by. As Roman said, this party is not aiming to win political power.

Democratic Press Group Meets To Discuss Plans

PM1010140190 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 40, 7 Oct 90 p 6

["M.P." report: "'Forum' in Operation]

[Text] In our issue No. 38 six newspapers (BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA, VECHERNYAYA KAZAN, SIBIRSKAYA GAZETA, SMENA, SOGLASIYE, and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI) announced the creation of the "Forum" group and suggested that representatives of other independent publications join them.

As agreed, we met at the Central Journalists' House last Friday to get to know each other. This was apparently one of the first attempts by the independent press to determine how we can cooperate in the general context of the democratic movement. The meeting was initially described as "exploratory" because some prospects are only just being identified—the creation in the future of an independent press association, for example.

At this point the discussion concerned more accessible and specific matters which might help the meeting participants at this time to size up their forces. The initial option proposed was that of organizing a press group to produce weekly bulletins reporting how preparations for a forum of democratic forces are going. These bulletins would help to activate a mechanism for uniting the independent press which has yet to be worked out in detail.

In addition, they could help information which is currently accumulating in various cities to flow from Moscow to the provinces and vice versa. The information links that it is proposed to organize would be capable to some extent of coordinating our actions in preparing for a forum of democratic forces.

The newspapers and magazines represented at the Journalists' House on this occasion were very diverse, big and small, and concerned at the prospect of a paper famine, and it is therefore natural that all technical questions were discussed very heatedly. Should paper and printing industry capacity be requested from the Government of Russia and the Supreme Soviet? Should attempts be made to reach agreement with ministries? Or should we join up with a purely commercial enterprise and go it alone?

As a fragment of a big mirror of the overall situation, the meeting showed that the development of mutual relations between democrat deputies and the democratic press is often difficult. It was noteworthy, for example, that that the USSR people's deputies who participated in the meeting underestimate the role of a diverse independent press—both the Moscow and the provincial press—in the structure of the democratic movement. As for the journalists, they reacted in various ways to some attitudes on the part of deputies which appeared to them somewhat didactic.

DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA, OBSHCHINA, PANORAMA, ALTERNATIVA, GLASNOST, KHRISTIANSKAYA POLITIKA, APREL, DEMOKRATICHESKAYA PLATFORMA (all Moscow), SMENA, PEREKRESTOK, PITERSKIY LETOPISETS, LITERATOR (Leningrad), VECHERNYAYA KAZAN, SIBIRSKAYA GAZETA (Novosibirsk), SIMBIRSKIY KURYER (Ulyanovsk), VOLZHSKIYE NOVOSTI (Volgograd), SOGLASIYE (Vilnius), MOLODEZH YAKUTII, DEMOKRATICHESKIY OMSK.... It was useful to know that the Russian provinces (which were the main areas represented) readily accepted the idea of helping to create a program of interaction among democratic forces while also having available mass information on topics of interest to the entire circle.

The participants also agreed that it is desirable to hold a second meeting of the independent press—which has been penciled in for October.

Moscow Police Chiefs 'Not Keen' on New Trade Union

PM1010123790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 7

[Article by correspondent F. Ivanov: "Trade Union Defends Militiamen"]

[Text] The capital's Lawyers and Law-Enforcement Officers Trade Union staged its first event on the evening of 4 October outside the Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] Internal Affairs Main Administration building at 38, Petrovka Street.

Everyone knows that the militia is not yet capable of effectively protecting us from the rise in crime. Unfortunately, even the militiamen themselves are not protected: either from arbitrary management, or from the bureaucratic system as a whole. The trade union set up a few months ago to represent Moscow's lawyers and law-enforcement officers, which is part of the USSR Sotsprof [expansion unknown], is the first to try to defend the rights of ordinary militiamen. It now has around 200 members—workers with internal affairs organs, the KGB, and the prosecutor's Office. But, clearly, the leaders of these services are not keen on the new trade union's activity. At any rate, as union activists told me, when they appealed to be granted their own press organ, this was refused them. The basis for the decision was a personal order from P. Bogdanov, chief of the Moscow Militia. Those who openly stated that they were taking part in the union's affairs were threatened with dismissal.

Around 30 members of the union brandished placards outside the building at 38, Petrovka Street. They called for glasnost in distributing social welfare among militiamen, coordinating the results of annual job certification reports with the trade union, and stepping up social protection for the militia. It was expected that considerably more people would show up, but many militiamen had received direct warnings from their chiefs that if they went to the rally they would be dismissed.

The chairman of the local trade union committee—M. Pashkin, senior official with the Moscow Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration's Administration for the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation—told this IZVESTIYA correspondent: "We had expected that the Moscow militia leadership would meet us and discuss our demands with us. However, nobody turned up. Admittedly, both P. Bogdanov and L. Belyanskiy, chief of the Internal Affairs Main Administration's Political Administration, came to the entrance and sent their duty officers to see what was happening outside. But they were unwilling to talk to us themselves."

But perhaps there is another angle. After all, members of the new trade union claim that thousands of coupons for the sale of scarce goods worth 1.5 million rubles recently disappeared from the Moscow Gorispolkom Internal Affairs Main Administration. The coupons were to have been distributed among ordinary militiamen. Nobody in the Internal Affairs Main Administration has yet been able to say where they have gotten to. The new trade union is sure that it will get to the truth. And it has guaranteed support: New minister V. Barannikov has spoken out in favor of establishing it within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs system.

Polls Show Most, Least Respected Politicians

LD0610211490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1937 GMT on 5 October in the "Vzglyad" (View) program presents a two-minute report on recent popularity polls. The program presenter says: "The sociological research which 'View' is about to show you was prepared by the Sotseksi Center and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet committee for mass media. Here you see the 'White' list of ithe most popular figures. The experience of sociology in recent years indicates that polls taken in Moscow are representative for the whole country six months later." The video shows the list:

1. Boris Yeltsin
2. Anatoliy Sobchak
3. Gavriil Popov
4. Mikhail Gorbachev
5. Sergey Stankevich
6. Nikolay Travkin
7. Oleg Kalugin
8. Yuriy Afanasyev
9. Eduard Shevardnadze.

The presenter says the "Black" list of least respected political leaders is headed by Ligachev. The video shows this list:

1. Yegor Ligachev
2. Ivan Polozkov
3. Nikolay Ryzhkov
4. Anatoliy Lukyanov
5. Dmitriy Yazov
6. Boris Gidaspov
7. Vadim Medvedev
8. Vladimir Ivashko
9. Yuriy Prokofyev

A ratings list for the popularity of political parties is also shown, but the presenter says it is too early to give it much credence.

Polls show majorities in favor of the resignation of the government and little support for the president's emergency powers.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editor Interviewed

PM1010090490 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 8 Oct 90 p 8

[Interview with KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Editor Vladislav Fronin by Sergio Sergi; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[passage omitted] [Sergi] Why has yours now become an opposition newspaper?

[Fronin] We must agree on our terminology. We hold center-left stances and avoid extremes. We have supported Gorbachev from the outset, even when he was only CPSU secretary general, and we were the first newspaper to publish an interview with Ryzhkov, before he was prime minister. It was a difficult period and he needed support, so we published the interview. Nevertheless I believe that the duty of the press is to objectively reflect the processes within society and people's response to the government's decisions. And if there emerge within the government stances that the people do not like, we provide a platform for those who are dissatisfied, who want to have a say. This is what Gorbachev said: In the USSR the press must assume the role of the multiparty system until the latter is fully established.

[Sergi] Agreed, but why do you not like the prime minister?

[Fronin] I do not dislike Ryzhkov; in fact he is an interesting person. But he is someone who grew up within the command and administer system and is unable to detach himself from it completely. I respect his opinions, but when they become a curb on economic reform, then I believe that he should resign.

[Sergi] Why the attack on his purchase of a dacha?

[Fronin] We want the prime minister to have a good dacha and a good standard of living. There is no question about this. But Nikolay Ivanovich is prime minister, and the things that he does ultimately constitute an example.

[Sergi] But Ryzhkov has issued a denial....

[Fronin] He made a statement in parliament, saying that he wanted to buy a wooden chalet. But he was vague, and now the matter is in the hands of a Supreme Soviet commission. And we have made known our sources of information in that forum.

[Sergi] Would you be willing to attack Gorbachev, too?

[Fronin] It is not our intention to attack Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, or Yeltsin. But we will always report concrete and reliable information.

[Sergi] What if Gorbachev makes some bad moves?

[Fronin] We will inform our readers of it, because for 70 years we lived in a country where our leaders' errors were not mentioned. In such an eventuality we would have to take account of the interests of millions of people, not those of a single individual.

[Sergi] Will your newspaper no longer be the organ of the Komsomol [Communist Youth League]?

[Fronin] No. It will cease to be that. For us, the content of the bottle is more important than what is on the label.

[Sergi] How many extra copies have you been selling since becoming so "liberal?"

[Fronin] Last year our circulation increased from four million to 22 million.

[Sergi] What is a free press?

[Fronin] First and foremost, a full sense of responsibility on the journalist's part.

[Sergi] Does anyone exert pressure on your editorship?

[Fronin] When I started two years ago I noticed less and less pressure from the party and the komsomol. During the current period I feel the influence of the readers—mainly older ones, who do not like certain articles. One day I received by mistake a letter from a subscriber asking the KGB to suspend publication of an inquiry into AIDS. He perceived in an antisocialist conspiracy....

[Sergi] Has Gorbachev ever intervened?

[Fronin] He did call me—this was the first time—on the very day the article about Ryzhkov's dacha was published. He congratulated us on our initiative of organizing in Rome a gathering of Soviet writers who had emigrated to that country. That day the president was due to speak in parliament, and he simply told me that the business of leaders' dachas had to be clarified so that there would be no misunderstandings. I would not want this telephone call to be interpreted as indirect support for our report. It was a coincidence.

[Sergi] Because of your pushiness, do you often encounter refusals, uncooperativeness?

[Fronin] Not very often. But let us not talk in terms of pushiness. We provide information, however unwelcome or welcome it may be.

[Sergi] What rules do you recommend to your editorial staff?

[Fronin] To tell the truth and to be independent.

[Sergi] Does KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA tell the truth?

[Fronin] It does tell the truth, but it is not yet entirely independent.

New Customs Posts on Latvian Border

91P50008 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 11 Oct 90 p 1

[Report by A. Timkov: "The Echo Responds..."]

[Text] Ten customs posts have been opened on the border of Latvia with Russia and Belorussia. Here they inspect automobiles, buses, passengers, preventing the leakage of goods to the east.

Only time will tell how effective this current means of protecting the republic's marketplace is. We only wanted to note that all the measures which are being implemented to achieve this, such as banning foreigners from the sales counters, issuing visiting cards for shoppers, prohibiting the sending of packages, etc. have only evoked retaliatory steps in other regions. The number of goods in the stores, however, has not increased.

CPSU City Committee Headquarters Firebombed

PM1210134790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition p 8

[Unnamed PRAVDA correspondent dispatch under "Tickertape" rubric: "Gorkom Arson Attempt"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk Oblast—An arson attempt has been made by persons unknown on the building of the Chebarkul CPSU Gorkom [city party committee]. Hearing the sound of breaking glass, A. Kachalov, the gorkom duty officer, went down to the ground floor, where he discovered a blazing fire. To all appearances the malefactors had splashed inflammable liquid through the broken window and thrown a lighted match in after it. There was no time to delay— the fire was quickly gaining in intensity. Having called "01," the duty officer (incidentally, an honored veteran of labor and a pensioner) tore down the fire extinguisher and entered into single combat with the uninvited, perfidious "guest." By the time that the fire fighters arrived, the fire had already been extinguished. Criminal proceedings have been instituted into the arson, and an investigation is underway.

PRAVDA Carries Subscription Campaign Results

PM1210131190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Oct 90 Second Edition p 6

[N. Demidov report: "The Price of Glasnost"]

[Text] The sharp rise in the price of paper and other polygraphic materials has at least doubled the prices of periodical publications. Of course, this could not fail to impact on the subscription campaign, as demonstrated by the table published below covering several PRAVDA publishing house newspapers and journals.

Subscription Under Way

However, when analyzing the figures cited it ought to be noted that the degree of readership interest in one or other publication depends not only on the price. In this sense the PRAVDA editorial collective has at its disposal great possibilities for making it a better newspaper, for improving its pattern [forma] and content. An active creative quest is under way and, we are hopeful, in the new year our subscribers will not be disappointed.

[In the following table, column D represents the number of subscriptions accepted in 1989 in thousands of copies; column D represents the subscriptions accepted in 1989 as a percentage of the 1 January 1989 figure.]

Newspaper	Number of subscriptions since 1 January 1990 (in thousands)			Number of subscriptions accepted for 1991 (in thousands)	
	Number of subscriptions accepted in 1989 (in thousands)				
	Subscriptions accepted in 1989(as a percentage of the 1 January 1989 figure				
SELSKAYA ZHIZN	5938.6	907.5	15.3	4846.1	72.9
SOVETSKAYA KULTURA	572.0	56.2	9.8	448.2	66.7
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA	21251.8	4139.5	19.5	16271.4	92.0
UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA	1292.9	98.3	7.6	1126.3	69.7
EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN	712.2	87.6	12.3	574.5	80.2
RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA	919.5	116.2	12.6	732.0	—
DIALOG	1751.4	73.2	4.2	1378.0	—
IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS	684.6	34.1	5.0	519.7	90.3
KOMMUNIST	607.1	50.1	8.3	498.0	53.5
PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN	547.6	37.9	6.9	472.1	58.2
ZDOROVYE	17852.6	2272.0	12.7	—	—
ZNAMYA	978.0	97.1	9.9	750.7	78.7
KRESTYANKA	21671.9	3511.2	16.2	16744.5	81.9
OGONEK	4454.6	402.8	9.0	3251.2	105.5
RABOTNITSA	23778.7	3089.1	13.0	18235.0	89.2
SMENA	3254.7	371.3	11.4	—	—
CHELOVEK I ZAKON	9058.0	542.0	6.0	—	—

As regards PRAVDA, its indicators are as follows: There were 6,870,100 subscribers as at 1 January, the number for next year so far being 504,800 or 7.4 percent. Of course, our collective is alarmed by this and is therefore making efforts to make the newspaper more interesting and richer in content.

A similar situation as regards subscriptions also prevails in other publishing houses. For example, whereas the number of IZVESTIYA readers stood at 9,478,300 as at 1 January 1990, it now stands at 1,070,600 or 11.3 percent. Just over 5 million readers have subscribed to TRUD so far. There were 20 million subscribers in 1990.

It is well known that quite a few new publications have appeared recently. What is the subscription situation there? For example, KURANTY has only 17,500 Muscovite subscribers so far, while STOLITSA has just over 5,000. There have been 2,200 and 1,700 subscriptions taken out for MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS and KOMMERSANT respectively. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY leads among weeklies in Moscow. The number of its readers stands at 42 percent of this year's level.

And one last figure. Some 107,000 persons have proved their loyalty to MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, which is available on subscription for the first time.

These are the initial results of the subscription campaign in the conditions of higher "price of glasnost."

Voronin Forecasts End to Tobacco Crisis

LD1210123890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] The tobacco crisis will be completely overcome soon. This is what comrade Voronin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has said. He announced that all tobacco factories have been put in operation, and inspead of the 800 million cigarettes and papiroses that were earlier produced daily, they have already attained 1,300 million items, thereby exceeding the requirements of all smokers in the country. In addition, the union government has purchased 24 billion cigarettes and papiroses through import channels. To stabilize the operation of tobacco factories, additional equipment and spares are being purchased abroad.

Russian Democratic Party Official Interviewed

AU1110121390 Vienna PROFIL in German 9 Oct 90 pp 75-76

[Interview with Arkadiy Murashev, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, by Kerstin Witt in Moscow; date not given: "Gorby To Retire"]

[Text] [Witt] What, for you, was the most important political event since the spring of 1989 when you were elected as a deputy?

[Murashev] The local and regional elections in the spring of 1990, which resulted in Boris Yeltsin's election as chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, were most decisive. This also changed the situation in the Soviet legislature considerably. Gorbachev must also must take the decisions of the Russian legislature into account if they are not passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Witt] Is this also evident in the current discussion on economic reform?

[Murashev] Of course. Shatalin's radical program only gained significance because of the Russian legislature's endorsement. The USSR Supreme Soviet deputies are beginning to feel superfluous because the republics can now adopt almost all laws. In the commissions one can repeatedly hear the following opinion: "Why are we discussing this at length, the Russian legislature decided everything long ago." There is a sitation of a dual rule between the Kremlin where the central power is located

and the "White House" on the banks of the Moskva where the Russian government and legislature are accommodated. At present, the Russian legislature is busy with wrenching the industrial sector from the union ministries. Despite all attempts at decentralization, 80 percent of the enterprises are still under the central government's control. I think that it will not be possible to stick to this any longer, even if the USSR Supreme Soviet does not agree.

[Witt] Is this competitive situation also the root of the latest conflict between Gorbachev and Yeltsin?

[Murashev] Gorbachev took a great step in Yeltsin's direction when he backed Shatalin's program. However, the rivalry between the two continues to exist. Gorbachev is vacillating and weighs every step in all directions. That is why he is keeping Rhyzkov: If the premier and his ministers were forced to resign, new people might discover many things in the ministry that come near to being crimes.

[Witt] What do you mean specifically?

[Murashev] Far more money than is officially admitted by the Finance Ministry might have been issued. And apparently this summer's gold and diamond sales were also fishy.

[Witt] What is the personal relationship between Gorbachev and Yeltsin?

[Murashev] Yeltsin says that they have made a truce. They had a five-hour discussion at the end of August and since that time they have talked to each other on the telephone almost every day. But Yeltsin does not trust Gorbachev, this is demonstrated by his resistance to the special powers for the president. On the other side there is Rhyzkov, who is now supported by the ultraconservative Russian Communist Party and the Army.

[Witt] What was changed by the 28th CPSU Congress before summer?

[Murashev] The Communist Party is rapidly disintegrating. I recently visited an enterprise in Selenograd. One year ago, the party organization still had 197 members there. Now there are seven, and three of them are pensioners. The situation is like this almost everywhere.

[Witt] Does this mean that the party is no longer a threat to democracy?

[Murashev] It can no longer achieve anything alone. Its bloc with the military-ideological complex is more dangerous. The greatest break took place in cities like Moscow and Leningrad. There are still areas where nothing has changed, for example, in Stavropol, Gorbachev's home town, and in the country where the people have become passive, addicted to alcohol, and are disappointed.

[Witt] How great is the danger of a military coup really?

[Murashev] I do not think that it is currently serious. But if the food supplies deteriorate any more, this might change. There is no tradition of military coups in Russia. There are many different currents in the Army and the KGB, some are also cooperating with the democratic forces. By the way, the call for a strong hand can also be heard in the democratic camp. One of the most frequent demands of Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov is: We have to ensure law and order.

[Witt] But how can order be established? Only with the Army and the police.

[Murashev] The point is constitutional reform. Resolutions of the Moscow soviet were constantly torpedoed by the district soviets. The powers are divided in such a way that nobody has the power to implement the decisions he makes. The whole system is completely ineffective. Gavriil Popov and Anatoliy Sobchak, mayors of Moscow and Leningrad respectively, want to introduce direct elections for the position of the chief of the executive. In this way they expect to get sufficient power to push through the economic reform.

[Witt] Does Popov want for himself the same special powers as Gorbachev?

[Murashev] Yes. The difference: In contrast to Popov, Gorbachev does not want to run in general elections.

[Witt] The people expect the market economy to improve their situation very quickly. What will happen if everything becomes even worse first?

[Murashev] It seems to me that the currently predominant political forces, including Yeltsin, are only temporary figures. So many unpopular decisions will be made that most of them will lose their authority very soon. Afterward, there will be a generation of politicians who advocate even more democracy and even more market economy—people who are still in the background today.

[Witt] Who might they be?

[Murashev] Forces from the anticommunist parties which are now expanding. The Democratic Party of Russia with chess world champion Gary Kasparov or the Social Democrats. The whole generation that was connected with the CPSU will have to go. It would probably be best for Gorbachev if he were to set himself only one goal: the conclusion of the new union treaty. Afterward, it would be best if he were to dissolve the People's Congress and retire. In this way he would go down in history, otherwise his prestige would further decrease.

[Witt] But, as the president, is he not a force that ensures stability and helps to prevent chaos?

[Murashev] In the long run, the Russian legislature must be responsible for stability in Russia. We expect the Russian president to be directly elected as early as in spring. The guarantees for stability in the republics must no longer be given by Moscow. Armenia is a good example. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, new president of the

legislature, is supported by the population to an unprecedented degree, and he can set about stabilizing the situation. The majority of the Russian people do not cling to the preservation of the old empire. The fact that the republics want to become independent makes no difference to them.

Television Production Company Plans Expansion

PM1110084590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Candidate of Historical Sciences N.I. Lutsenko, president of "Nika TV" all-Union public television company, by unnamed TASS correspondent in Moscow; date not given: "What Can We Expect From 'Nika'?"—first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] Soviet television's 65th anniversary was marked by the appearance of a new member of the mass media: The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of the Press and Mass Media has registered the country's first independent broadcasting corporation, called "Nika."

It was founded by N.I. Lutsenko, president of the "Nika TV" all-Union public television company, a finalist in the world journalists competition, and a candidate of historical sciences.

[TASS] How does the newly registered mass medium differ from the "Nika TV" television company already well known in our country?

[Lutsenko] We started our activities two years ago as a creative television production association. Then we became a television company, and we are now a corporation. This is not a name game but the economic need to unite all the structures we have created in one organization. During the two years we developed a wide network of regional branches and bureaus, many of which already go on local air autonomously—in Kaluga, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov-na-Donu, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy—in over 40 cities in total. We have now come all the way to the point of going on air on Central Television.

[TASS] Will it be easy for you to do that?

[Lutsenko] It is extremely difficult. Extremely. First, broadcasting requires huge material resources, and it is not just a matter of money. Resources must be invested in professional television equipment which is produced outside our country and in paying for communications facilities. Creative collectives must be formed. However, "Nika" is today probably the only organization to have maintained good relations with the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

[TASS] Does that mean that Central Television will give up its own air time?

[Lutsenko] We have planned joint work with Central Television, specifically a new series of programs devoted to science fiction which will be shown on Channel One. Nighttime viewing is possible—that is after midnight—of both our own original programs and programs from foreign television companies with which we are cooperating.

[TASS] Is there a charge for your broadcasts?

[Lutsenko] Everything we show on Central Television will be free. And if we acquire expensive foreign films and programs, which, in conditions of downright "video piracy," few people can buy now, we will be bound under economic laws to pass on the expense if only partially—via a subscription payment for local cable networks. Incidentally, earlier this year we set up an independent USSR airwave, cable, and satellite television association.

[TASS] And how much will we have to pay?

[Lutsenko] Not more than five to seven rubles a month. That is on average. But much depends on local conditions and the authorities' attitude.

[TASS] Who are the cofounders?

[Lutsenko] They are the "Soyuztelefilm" association, the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the All-Union Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee, the USSR Union of Cinematographers' Association for joint Cinema Initiatives, the "Sovitcom" Soviet-Italian joint financial and commercial company, and, of course, "Nika TV." We have just admitted a new independent television company from Arkhangelsk, which was set up with our participation, as a cofounder.

[TASS] Are you involved only in television?

[Lutsenko] Far from it. That is why the "Nika" independent corporation is called a broadcasting corporation, because it intends to get involved in radio broadcasting in addition to television.

[TASS] Will you be broadcasting only in Moscow?

[Lutsenko] No. Our first listeners will be inhabitants of the Far East, and also of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. And after that will come the European part of the country: Moscow, Leningrad, and the Baltic region.

[TASS] Will there be long to wait?

[Lutsenko] We will be on radio in December and on television from the beginning of next year. We have already held viewers and listeners in suspense long enough.

Baltic Republics

Savisaar Comments on Current Crises in Estonia

91UN0044A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 19 Sep 90 p 3

["Speech by Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Government of the Estonian Republic, at the 10 September 1990 Supreme Soviet Session": "The Autumn Program"]

[Text] The Estonian parliament and government must recognize that we are moving into the autumn of 1990 under conditions of a profound political, economic, and moral crisis.

The political crisis is seen in the growing divergence of the positions of the political movements and parties. Hopes for a quick and easy gaining of independence have been excessively high, and now that they have started to fade and the motivation for further activity has declined, there is great dissatisfaction. These contradictions have started to be seen in increasingly acute forms, provoking new conflicts that cannot now be dealt with or which in a best case would take much time and effort to deal with.

As an example let me cite the recent action by "Kaitseliit" to set up border markers; we cannot foresee all the consequences of this. I am pleased that the public has assessed this action quite unambiguously. A telephone poll conducted on 5 September in Tallinn showed that the action by "Kaitseliit" was approved by only 18 percent of Estonians and two percent of the representatives of other nationalities, while the position of the government in this regard was approved by 58 percent of Estonians and 80 percent of non- Estonians. Some of those polled—29 percent of Estonians and 46 percent of non-Estonians—knew nothing at all about the "Kaitseliit" action, so their responses were not taken into account in producing the results of the poll.

The worsening of the economic crisis is on the one hand the result of the slow but consistent destruction of the structures of the command economy in the Soviet Union, and on the other to rates of economic reform in Estonia which are too slow. It was proposed that economic reform be accomplished relatively comprehensively and quickly. However, in implementing it we have been unable to achieve either the one or the other.

During the period when we are abandoning one type of economic ideology (the planned economy) and moving into another ideology (a regulated market), our real economic practice, first and foremost economic freedoms, has far outstripped the legal regulation of economic processes.

There has been delay in work on many important laws regulating economic activity in a new way, and on the concepts that clarify the action of future laws—for example, the principles of land reform.

Economic freedoms, first and foremost in the field of entrepreneurial activity as well as the liability and obligations of entrepreneurs have been placed in serious imbalance. As a result, in Estonia's economy we are encountering manifestations of speculation with increasing frequency. Speculation is also being promoted by the inadequacy of economic legislation. It is not the plan that the present economic system should encourage speculation. This is not entirely accurate, for right from the start the moral crisis has favored speculation.

The moral crisis is seen primarily in the fact that people are increasingly unable to withstand the temptation to earn a little extra by dishonest means by taking advantage of their official position or simply when given the opportunity. The moral crisis has embraced all spheres of life, from state employees to workers in industry and trade, including workers at state enterprises and not only people in cooperatives and small-time traders. In this sphere speculation is even greater and is getting worse with time. It is as if a critical mass of people personally involved in this process has now been brought together. It must be recognized that we did not take this into account when we were working on the draft reform, even though if we consider Hungary's experience this phenomena is in the scheme of things.

These three crises that have been named are splitting Estonian society and shaping the ideology of our democratic way of life to such an extent that the following serious question arises: Is Estonian society in general ready in the near future for a radical economic transformation. Or is the state of affairs such that, as some social scientists believe, the people do not want changes that will at first ineluctably entail unpleasantness—for example, price increases—while the Supreme Soviet and government, which for three months have been subjected to groundless criticism in the press and have recently been the targets of insulting attacks, are unable to couch these changes in legislative terms and implement them?

In comparison with the political and economic crises, the moral crisis is perhaps the most serious. When we were drafting the economic reform and individual elements of that reform—ownership relationships, taxes, the land issue, a new administrative system, and so forth—we failed to foresee that a moral crisis would so strongly and clearly involve all of Estonian society. We were unable to foresee that people would begin so quickly and aggressively to take advantage of the dissonances that are arising because the adoption of some laws, including economic regulation, is being delayed (for example, a law on taxes) while other laws (for example, those on freeing wage levels from controls) would be passed immediately, while yet others would be totally put aside or lost so that it is not even possible to explain who lost them. What I have in mind is, for example, the law on entrepreneurial sharing and on exercising the functions of power.

Proceeding from the above, we must alter our tactics. It is essential to strengthen economic control and noticeably tighten sanctions against those who take advantage of present freedoms and under the cover of entrepreneurship engage in obvious speculation and generate superprofits that can in no way be justified.

In the autumn the government will be submitting to the Supreme Soviet for its consideration a set of measures—true, mostly of an administrative nature—that should to some extent balance economic life, which has now been basically driven out of balance. We have been forced to do this because of the delay with respect to economic reform. The legislative formulation of the most important elements of the reform has been too prolonged and is being constantly postponed, and as a result the imbalance in the economy has worsened. The government is trying sometime in the spring or summer, before the summer recess, to pass four laws on taxes and laws on migration, property, the police, the bases of land reform, entrepreneurial sharing, and the exercise of functions of power. You are aware that many of these pieces of draft legislation have in fact not yet even been considered.

The delay in discussing the laws on taxes has led to very serious economic imbalance: Until we have these laws we shall not know the size of taxes and the Ministry of Finance will be unable to complete work on compiling the 1991 state budget. Without a tax base it is impossible to make the income calculations for the budget, and without knowing income it is impossible to plan state spending to maintain the social sphere.

There is a consistent logic in all of this. It takes at least a month from the adoption of tax laws to presentation of the draft budget. It follows from this that it is already unrealistic to be able to submit a draft budget by 1 October.

If there is some reason that the Supreme Soviet is reluctant to make a decision on the draft tax legislation submitted, then there are other possibilities. We can leave the existing law in force or adopt the draft tax laws on private persons, and other tax laws approved in the USSR.

I am concerned also about the privatization program. The government has presented a proposal to privatize small enterprises. We have defined the fields in which this could be started. They include trade, services, and public catering. The criterion for small-scale privatization could be the value of the objects that we have defined up to 500,000 rubles [R]. A proposal has also been put forward to privatize the housing inventory.

I believe that we should initiate privatization now; without a proper master it is impossible to achieve success in the economy. Small-scale privatization will also provide us with the necessary experience. It would be too risky to try to draw up a complete law on privatization and pass it immediately. There is no sense in engaging in the building of theoretical constructs that just hang in the air. It will subsequently be difficult to repeal laws passed and approved from them, even if they are at variance with practice. However, the government has drawn up a general concept for privatization and will be submitting it for consideration, but we believe that any position vis-a-vis this concept would be premature until we have practical experience.

Unfortunately, the government's initiative on small-scale privatization has become bogged down in the Supreme Soviet. In reality, however, privatization is already taking place, but it is independent privatization. The property of state enterprises is being chipped away on a mass scale in the countryside and in the country, and on this basis the embryo of privately owned production is being created with an eye to the future. Or state property is simply being sold off illegally to cooperatives and individual entrepreneurs, and the income derived from sales is being appropriated. It is easiest for production leaders in all fields of the economy to organize such deals.

I would like to draw attention to the following pattern: The longer we delay a decision on political-economic questions, the worse the choice of scenarios from among which we must choose. It can always be claimed that the draft has weak points and there are always more arguments "contra" than "pro," and it can always be shown that the consequences cannot be unambiguously predicted. If we postpone today adoption of the necessary political-economic decisions until tomorrow, we should know that the day after tomorrow will already be too late and that the prerequisites for economic transformations may disappear and it will be very difficult to restore them.

Hence follows the political conclusion, or rather prediction: Whatever we might do now, they will say, does not matter because we will do it wrongly. But I predict that in half a year we will be accused of listening to all this but not taking the steps that could have been taken.

Suffice it to mention two very obvious warnings resulting from delay and the half-heartedness of the reform.

The first concerns purchase checks that we, that is the State Planning Committee at the time, wanted to introduce exactly a year ago in order to stabilize the commodity market. At that time the idea of people's own money was set against this plan and the public sentiment was against it. The plan was turned down, and as a result we have what was warned—growing destabilization of the market. Meanwhile the government program for the Latvian Republic contains the idea of "white money" as a transitional stage to Latvian money, the lat. And the basis of this is purchaser checks.

This autumn the Lithuanians want to introduce a system of purchaser certificates that correspond roughly to what we could have done two years ago, and in a considerably more auspicious economic situation.

The second warning that should serve as a lesson for us issues from the one-sided reform carried out by the previous government and Supreme Soviet, namely they made only those decisions that enabled them to take steps in the economy that were liked by everyone.

For example:

—They freed wages, that is enterprises were given the opportunity to dispose of their money relatively freely. And the incomes of workers in budget establishments rose. This was all justified, but at the same time another essential but quite understandably unpleasant step was not taken, namely introducing new taxes which would have helped to balance the wage increases. Wages rose sharply and immediately prices were freed, but no unpopular steps were taken.

—A law was passed on farmstead economies, but the question of the development of collective farms remained unresolved. Today it must be obvious that peasant farms in their present condition are capable of feeding themselves but not the state.

The explosive formation of farmsteads, which were also made tax exempt for five years, means that we are losing a significant part of our own food base while the uyezds have also lost some of their tax income.

I shall not talk only about our predecessors. We have passed a law on labor service but refused to establish sanctions for deviations from it. As a result spring labor services in 1990 were mainly a fiction, and thus we moved even more deeply into the moral crisis about which I have already spoken, particularly among young people.

Half-hearted reforms have exhausted the limits of the decisions that have been made. If in general we want to talk seriously about economic reform, we must also take uninviting steps: abolish the amendment to price and budget subsidies and introduce new taxes on both entrepreneurial activity and private individuals, and strict sanctions on profiteers and speculators who are ready to advance themselves to the role of flag officers of the market economy.

The delay in the basic elements of economic reform has led to destabilization and caused the so-called muddy water effect. True, big fish can be caught in muddy water in such a way that no one notices. Let me cite just one example. I recently met with a Russian businessman who came from Estonia. He assessed our situation thus: He is very satisfied with the business world. The old barriers have been removed, and we are unable to switch in the new regulators. If this goes on, in six months he will shift enough capital in rubles from the East to buy the entire national economy, and this when privatization has scarcely started. Take this comment as an expert assessment, no more. But it is the expert assessment of a man who knows his business.

I was talking about one of the most serious problems—the totally unjustified procrastination in the reform, and as a result of this economic disproportions. Further, I would like to deal with certain issues that are of great political-economic importance. Their discussion in the Supreme Soviet must also be taken up more quickly.

First there is the question of the banks. The banking business here falls within the competence of the Bank of Estonia, and in this case the government can only signal to the Supreme Soviet Presidium that the formation of the banking system is being delayed, and in our opinion that threatens very serious consequences. No independent savings bank has yet been set up. Until it is, the March decision of Moscow, according to which the savings bank as before is subordinate to the USSR State Bank and saved resources remain both physically and legally at Moscow's disposal, remains in force.

While accusing no one, I would like to remark that the present situation in the banking system in Estonia is not one of the best. The government has told the Supreme Soviet of its proposals on the banking system and on changes in the charter of the Bank of Estonia. I would very much like to hope that they will be adopted as early as September.

Second, there is the reserve backup for the market. If we want to enter into horizontal agreements to exchange goods with the other Union republics, the Estonian Republic must have at its disposal a certain proportion of the commodity resources produced in Estonia. Otherwise we will in no way be able to guarantee fulfillment of contractual obligations to other republics—at the "Pirita-90" wholesale fair state enterprises offered republic output worth only R300 million.

State enterprises are beginning to forget that they are still state property and that the state is their owner. And most enterprises want to sell and exchange their output independently, and also exchange goods for their own workers. This trend can in no way be justified since now, when the anarchy in the Union economy is rapidly impairing our own, we should have a republic reserve stock of essential goods for the market, and not merely satisfy the special interests of workers in particular state enterprises. It is common knowledge that Lithuania has issued a government ukase, and the Moscow Soviet has adopted a decision according to which 12 percent of output produced by Moscow's enterprises is at the disposal of the city itself. We have also gone to the Supreme Soviet with a proposal on principles for the state order, and we hope that they will be accepted.

Third, I would like to talk about certain subjective factors that are increasing the anarchy even more in the present badly organized economic processes. This is the question of the control organs. We have not set up a system of state control here, and no laws on the police or on the representatives of power and entrepreneurial activity have been passed—we have introduced an appropriate resolution at government level. It is as if

some people consider the concept of "control" as a remnant of the period of stagnation. And this worries me. At today's meeting of the government we submitted a legislative initiative on additions to the codes of law in order to tighten sanctions against swindling and speculation. I hope that we will be united in our desire to confirm this resolution.

In conclusion, I would like to list once again the documents that the government has submitted as legislative initiatives. We hope that they will be accepted. They include laws on taxes (including a draft for a turnover tax) and state orders, a law on the police, changes to the banking law, three documents on privatization (concept, entities with fixed capital up to R500,000, and housing), the basis for land reform, and changes to the budget for the fourth quarter (including a reduction of R100 million in payments to the Union budget that we managed to agree with the USSR Ministry of Finance), and in subsidies for meat and milk and so forth. They are followed by a law on strikes, the draft budget for 1991, and documents on the transfer to our own money, establishing economic borders, and so forth. This list of course is not exhaustive.

If anything is to come out of the autumn session it should be tempo. In the present political-economic situation, when things are changing very quickly, Estonia should act more immediately and more actively in pursuing its economic policy. You for your part must find opportunities to accelerate activity in the sphere of economic policy. We in the government want to do the same, and vast untapped reserves are available here.

It is quite understandable that you are aware of the interests of your own electorate and bear responsibility to them. The government understands that most economic decisions will not please your electorate. In fact, who does want prices to rise and incomes to be subject to a progressive tax?

But in addition to responsibility to your electorate you also have a responsibility to the state. You must understand that the economic reform is made up of complex and rapid changes. We must promote stabilization in the economy, and this requires simultaneously [passage indistinct].

RSFSR

Biographer of Boris Yeltsin Interviewed

91UN0010A Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA in Russian No 34, 4 Sep 90 p 5

[Report on interview with Yeltsin biographer Valentin Yumashev conducted by Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya; place and date not given: "I Know More About Yeltsin Than His Own Family...."]

[Text] This year the Riga "Rukitis" Publishing House put out B.N. Yeltsin's autobiography "Confession on a Set Theme." The young Moscow journalist Valentin Yumashev, member of the journal OGONEK editorial office and a correspondent in the recent past of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, worked on it together with the present president of Russia. How was the book put together? What is Yeltsin like "close up?" These and other questions were put to Valentin Yumashev by Yekaterina Mikhaylovskaya, an employee of BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA's Moscow correspondents' center.

[Mikhaylovskaya] How did you make Yeltsin's acquaintance?

[Yumashev] In 1988 I was shooting three films at the Central Documentary Film Studio on my articles in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. The films had absolutely no connection with Yeltsin, they were devoted to youth problems, prostitution, and so forth. At the center of one film was a young hero experiencing a spiritual crisis. And we were thinking: What if we made a gallery of such heroes with their own conceptual path, and then something happened to them? And here I thought about Yeltsin. This was 1988, no one was talking with Yeltsin, no one was meeting with him, and following the 19th party conference, the official press shuddered at the mere mention of his name, and I simply called him up on the direct line—he was at that time chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee—and said: "Boris Nikolayevich, I have an idea for making a film about you." At the studio everyone knew that a film was being made about Yeltsin, but it was shot as a film about the difficult destiny of youth. It was this which was the start of our close acquaintance.

In March, Yeltsin won a triumphant election victory. In April his aide, L.Ye. Sukhanov, told me that the Americans had offered B.N. $150,000 for a book about him. I told Sukhanov since Yeltsin was at that time on vacation in Kislovodsk, where he had flown immediately following the elections: "Lev Yevgenyevich, if you want Yeltsin to be a laughing-stock throughout the world you may conclude this contract, but if you care about your boss's good name you should do everything to ensure that this contract does not come off." Working on OGONEK, I had come across commercial deals of such a kind and knew that $150,000 was simply laughable. I had at that time a very good contact with a well-known Western literary agent who had had books done on Kasparov, Sergey Khrushchev, and so forth. I got in touch with him and explained the situation. He offered $250,000 for the world rights plus separate earnings for publication in each country. I explained this to Yeltsin and he agreed. The contract was concluded, and Yeltsin retained the rights to the sale of this book in the Soviet Union.

It was not at that time a question of me as coauthor, I simply wanted to help Yeltsin. Time was very short; we had signed the contract at the end of May, the manuscript had to be handed over by the start of September. On the final day of the First Congress of People's

Deputies, Yeltsin and I got together and he proposed that I help him write the book.

We met twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays, and during each meeting he would usually record what he had to say on tape. When the manuscript was ready we once again sat down together, over the text this time. It has to be said that he has an accurate, editorial eye and that his corrections were almost always well-chosen. It did not remove the poignancy, and the details remained. His wife literally beseeched him to remove certain details concerning family life, but he left them all the same. There were difficulties involving the presentation of the manuscript; there had been rumors that Yeltsin was writing a book. I do not believe that the KGB was hunting for it specially, but it undoubtedly had an interest in learning what had been written. We tried to make sure that no one could see the manuscript other than myself and him. Only his family—his daughters and his wife—read it, and the finished, edited version at that. I know more about him than his own family. We handed over the manuscript in full at the end of October and the start of November. A warning copy appeared in January. It was translated first by the Norwegians, then the italians, and so forth. It appeared in 15 languages altogether.

[Mikhaylovskaya] What might be expected of Yeltsin in his role as leader of Russia?

[Yumashev] Yeltsin's election is a tremendous plus for Russia. I was convinced that he would be elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet a year ago.

Any struggle of opposites is a good thing in general. The fact that there is Yeltsin and there is Gorbachev, and the fact that there is conflict between them is in itself a plus. On the one hand Gorbachev will now be forced to follow Russia, on the other he will exert a restraining influence. Gorbachev is a brake, and this is good.

To speak of Yeltsin as a man, he is a classic apparatchik of the Brezhnev and perestroyka era with all the minuses associated with this, but he is a simply amazing individual here, simply astonishingly quick to learn. Gorbachev also is developing, if compared with what he was a year ago—the difference is enormous. But in Yeltsin this is simply astounding. Of the vast number of ideas suggested to him by his advisers, he selects precisely the idea that is right today. In general it is most likely a shortcoming when intuition in a politician works so actively, but for Russia and for such a situation as today's it is a plus. He is capable of learning—this is his human attribute. He is not afraid to learn, this is very important for a person who is near 60. He is amazingly fit. He works 16-18 hours a day. This is no exaggeration. He would not otherwise be successful now.

The confrontation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev is forcing both to act as quickly as possible. Yeltsin has to be moving forward the whole time, and Gorbachev cannot let him out of his sight and has to move forward also. Were Gorbachev not to follow Yeltsin and not to play his game, he would be president of the Union within the limits of the Sadovoye Ring Road.

[Mikhaylovskaya] You think that Gorbachev is now playing Yeltsin's game?

[Yumashev] Yeltsin is now the initiator. He feels far better than Gorbachev. Yeltsin now holds more political trump cards, and people are obviously behind him and not Gorbachev. This can be seen if only from the way in which he speaks about Gorbachev. His previous spitefulness has gone. Nor can Gorbachev stand Yeltsin on a purely human level. When it is a question of Yeltsin, Gorbachev makes a tremendous number of mistakes; he makes many mistakes generally, but when it concerns Yeltsin, he makes every possible mistake. Previously Yeltsin's brain also would become clouded at the sound of Gorbachev's name. But new, condescending intonations have emerged since the Russian congress.

[Mikhaylovskaya] Do you believe in the prolonged nature of the union of Gorbachev and Yeltsin?

[Yumashev] I believe that Gorbachev has not much time left, the government will obviously collapse in the very near future. In my opinion, he has a maximum of six months, or nothing left at all.

I believe that of the Yeltsin-Gorbachev pair, Gorbachev will be played out first. It is very difficult for him to perform two roles—president and general secretary—simultaneously. He cannot remain the general secretary of **such** a party. I believe this is what will ultimately finish him.

RSFSR Talks With Other Republics Viewed

PM1110153790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet subcommittee on interrepublican relations, by Yu. Sorokin: "Russia: Foreign Affairs?"; place and date not given]

[Text] Russia has begun vigorous "international" activity within the USSR: It is holding talks with other republics. Nevertheless, in the Russian parliament itself the question has been asked several times: Why are treaties being concluded on Russia's behalf behind the Supreme Soviet's back? I met with Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet subcommittee on interrepublican relations, and put that question to him.

[Shelov-Kovedyayev] We have twice proposed that our concept be discussed at a session, but the deputies lacked either the time or the inclination. Recently the texts of four more or less finished treaties were sent to the parliamentary committees and commissions and we asked deputies for their comments. In addition, two weeks ago the Presidium approved the composition of Russia's official delegation which will coordinate the

texts of the treaties. It included B. Yeltsin; R. Khasbulatov; representatives of the main parliamentary committees; I. Silayev and G. Filshin; representatives of the Council of Ministers; and representatives of the Foreign Ministry. Ultimately the final documents must be ratified by the Supreme Soviet so that it cannot be said that this was done behind its back.

[Sorokin] Four treaties—with whom....

[Shelov-Kovedyayev] With Moldova—as you know it has already been signed, though admittedly we have not ratified it yet. The draft treaty with Estonia has been fully worked out. Then there are Lithuania and Latvia, but matters are more complex there. The ball is in their court, and we are still waiting....

[Sorokin] What do the treaties actually contain?

[Shelov-Kovedyayev] I am not authorized to disclose that. I can talk about the key aspects. At the talks we will try to reach agreement that both sides will pledge themselves to strictly observe human rights in accordance with the generally accepted international norms without allowing any restrictions either on questions of citizenship or in the property and social spheres because some acts by the republics are perceived by the Russian population as discriminatory. Then the renunciation of any territorial claims on one another, and a willingness to build mutual relations on the basis of present-day realities without going back deep into history. The economic articles offer an opportunity to discuss problems of ownership and reciprocal "accounts" in a civilized way, not dismissing them with a simple declaration of sovereignty and absolute control of everything on one's own territory.

[Sorokin] The treaty with Moldova has been signed, but the problem of the Russians in the republic is far from settled.

[Shelov-Kovedyayev] Nevertheless, Moldova has pledged in the treaty with us to guarantee the observance of human rights on its territory. Of course at the moment we have reason to fear that these accords are not being fully implemented. But we intend to insist on their fulfillment and the treaty provides that opportunity.

[Sorokin] A closed session of the Supreme Soviet has been held in Estonia and discussed the draft treaty with Russia. The Russian deputies refused to take part in this discussion and sent their representatives to Moscow to demand that the treaty should not be concluded.. What is your comment on this situation?

[Shelov-Kovedyayev] Estonia actually tried to discuss the treaty even before it had been signed, even though this is not accepted international practice. The outcome of the discussion, however, was quite favorable. Given the very complex situation developing in Estonia today, the concern of the Russophone population's representatives is understandable. They believe that the treaty should not be ratified until Estonia brings all the acts that it has adopted or prepared into line with international legal norms. We find this position less constructive. If a treaty had been concluded in which all these norms were mentioned, we would have been given a kind of "mandate" for an open discussion of the Russian population's problems. We would have a greater opportunity to influence these processes—for example, the opening of our mission in Estonia is envisaged. Otherwise what else can we do? Appeal to the center?

But we cannot make similar demands on Estonia. From the legal viewpoint that would look like an ultimatum. I think that such an ultimatum would make the situation in Estonia worse and that extreme forces would prevail there.

[Sorokin] How does the center regard Russia's diplomatic activity?

[Shelov-Kovedyayev] As far as I can judge, with a mixture of caution and jealousy.

[Sorokin] Are similar agreements with other republics being prepared?

[Shelov-Kovedyayev] We have invited everyone to talks. Relations with the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan are particularly important to us of course. But at the moment there are no major demarches to speak of here. Our delegation is currently in Kiev.

RSFSR Party Reformers Examine Congress

91UN0009A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" representatives on RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee by unidentified RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent; place and date not given: "A Willingness for Compromise"]

[Text] *The debate that developed at the second stage of the constituent congress of the Communist Party of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and its results continue to be extensively discussed in society, evoking the most contradictory comments. Today RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's questions are answered by A. Dmitriyev, doctor of philosophical sciences and chief editor of the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, and V. Lipitskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences and head of a department of the CPSU Central Committee Marxism-Leninism Institute, both members of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee. A significant detail—they became a part of the Central Committee as representatives of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" (Reformer Communist Section).*

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] What from your viewpoint was the most important issue determining the course of the debate at the congress?

[Dmitriyev] Undoubtedly the attitude toward economic reform. Two distinctly different viewpoints were

revealed in the evaluation of the market, what is more, each based on its own value system.

The first contains the traditional notion of socialism based on such values as public ownership of the means of production, distribution according to labor, and limitation of the sphere of operation of commodity-money relations. The supporters of this position consider transition to the market a step backward and a temporary retreat under the pressure of circumstances. We do not share it. Long-term policy cannot be pursued on such a basis. Practice has shown the utter absurdity of the administrative-state structure of the economy.

The other system of views, also emphatically expressed at the congress, may be described as market socialism. This means that the diktat of production efficiency based on diverse forms of ownership, including private, should be firmly established for a lengthy historical period. The new model of socialism could in this case realize the basic values common to all mankind in practice.

It may be said conclusively that the main danger for Russia's Communists now is the conflict between the supporters of the two sides, and particularly the implacability of those who do not see that low production efficiency, extravagance, and the progressive lag behind world progress are more disastrous than the costs, and they are undoubtedly very serious, of the market economy.

But there were at the congress also encouraging aspects which showed the possibility of agreement and the delegates' willingness for compromise.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] The congress gained the firm reputation of a conservative congress. How, in this case, do you explain the election to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of supporters of the "Democratic Platform"?

[Lipitskiy] I see this as a symptom of the changes that have occurred in the political consciousness of many delegates. We by no means disguised ourselves at the congress, we stated our views openly. Representatives of the platforms were highlighted specially on the lists of candidates so the voting was not blind. And during discussion of the candidates Yu. Protasenko of Leningrad, a member of the "Democratic Platform," presented a comprehensive exposition of his position and... was elected, although there were many votes "against" him—642 in fact.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] But will the few radicals who are a part of the new Central Committee and Central Control Commission be capable of achieving anything?

[Lipitskiy] A small but active group of fellow thinkers is currently taking shape in these bodies. It is our intention to contribute to the implementation of a policy aimed at support for market economy reform, constructive interaction with the republic's Supreme Soviet, cooperation with other parties and public movements, and the complete democratization of intraparty life. We consider necessary the speediest and public solution of legal questions arising in connection with the property of the CPSU. Considering all the circumstances connected with the creation of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, we deem it expedient to convene its next congress in 1991, having prepared the party's program and statutory documents for it.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Your "Democratic Platform" colleagues who have severed relations with the CPSU are criticizing you for a policy of appeasement....

[Lipitskiy] The leaders of this wing of the "Democratic Platform," who were in at the founding of the movement, made a decisive contribution to its formation. It is largely thanks precisely to their efforts that the first steps pertaining to the renewal of the party were taken. But their implacability and rejection of any compromise are not, in my view, the best policy. It is now difficult to think of a greater gift to the conservative forces than the departure from the CPSU of progressive people or a refusal to become a part of the elective bodies. The Communist Party remains an influential factor of our social life, and it is far from a matter of indifference in what direction and by what methods this factor operates. Involvement in the formulation and implementation of party policy, and simultaneously democratic control, is what we now see as the mission of the communist reformers.

[Dmitriyev] Of course it should be a question of a fundamental reform of the party, of the formulation of a new model. This means also a new understanding of the principle of democratic centralism where democracy is developed as far as possible, and central control to the extent necessary. It also means emphasis on work among the population through the party clubs. In a word, the modernization, not the "paraffining" of the party. As it is now fashionable to say there is no other way.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Did you hear the voice of representatives of the working class at the congress? How did their relations with the other delegates take shape?

[Dmitriyev] What is happening in society currently is frequently at odds with the interests of the workers who are disenchanted with the impotence of a party which had promised many times over to change the situation for the better. This was heard both at the constituent congress and locally in the party organizations. The instances of workers quitting the party cannot fail to cause concern either.

There are various reasons. One of them is the recognition that the influence of the workers in the CPSU, as in society itself, has diminished, given a simultaneous strengthening of other social groups.

The "clash" of the workers and intellectuals of both a right and left persuasion was noticeable in the course

even of discussion of the program and during the nomination of the party's leading authorities. This situation cannot be ignored. The mood of the delegates who spoke from the "more workers for the party's central authorities" standpoint reflects concern of our society's biggest social group for its future.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] The reaction to the constituent congress has been ambivalent, and among many people even pained. What are your forecasts for the future?

[Dmitriyev] Three versions of the intentions of Communists not in harmony with the spirit and line of the congress have now emerged. The first is an attempt to create an alternative Communist Party of Russia on the CPSU platform. Its weakness is seen to be the fact that one more Communist Party under the conditions of the large-scale departures from the one that already exists would hardly be viable. The second version, which is proposed by a number of party organizations, is direct membership of the CPSU, bypassing the Communist Party of the RSFSR. It is connected with contradictions which are insoluble by the present rules, would lead to a further comminution of forces, and is suitable only for the biggest organizations capable of becoming independent subjects of an agreement with the CPSU in the event of its federalization.

[Lipitskiy] A third way seems to us preferable—the formation in the republic Communist Party of a platform of democratic forces on whose basis it might be possible to prepare for the next congress and ensure the progressive nature of its decisions. Such work has already been started by the "Democratic Unity" bloc which emerged at the congress. We also will continue it. The final word in the debate surrounding the Communist Party of the RSFSR has yet to be spoken.

Fruits of Perestroyka Seen on Sakhalin

91UN0024A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 40, 3 Oct 90 p 10

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff correspondent Valeriy Sharov in the Far East: "Sakhalin: An Island Without Privileges?!"]

[Text] You would agree that, given the violent stream of talk and plans for a transition to a market economy (socialist, regulated, planned, and so on) on the scale of our entire immense country, which have already succeeded in getting us fed up and given plenty of hot air to the undernourished populace, it is interesting to hear that someplace on far-away Sakhalin the creation of this market is proceeding full tilt, without promises of "returning to capitalism" and seceding from the Union, which makes a certain segment of the populace shiver, in keeping with a clearly outlined script by an economist who also got an opportunity to independently "shoot a movie based on it." Instead this is happening amid quite perceptible signs of things new, which anyone may touch with his own hands and even taste by now.

The name of Moscow professor V. Fedorov who recently became head of the local executive authorities is heard most often on the 800,000-strong island: It is heard from the lips of some with faith and hope, and from the lips of others with reserve and doubt. Understandably, the former are a considerable majority; the Muscovite V. Fedorov would not have become the governor of the island otherwise. So far, their hopes have been justified. An appeal by V. Fedorov to the chiefs of joint enterprises and associations that have proliferated in the oblast in recent years was impressive: Either you are going to work in the interest of Sakhalin (generating certain profits for yourselves—in this matter, we are not going to dictate), or this is where we part ways; plundering the resources of the oblast is impermissible. Intrigued by V. Fedorov's plans and proposals, dozens of entrepreneurs from other regions of our country and abroad voyaged to Sakhalin. Early this summer, fresh apricots were sold in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk at quite reasonable prices, and a joint Soviet-New Zealand cheese plant began to furnish its products to Korsakov. To be sure, the price of splendid cheese with fillers also turned out to be splendid, almost 20 rubles per kilo, and initially was shocking. However, given the complete lack of this product, they began to buy it at this price as well. That is a market economy for you! However, the oblast executive committee [oblispolkom], having found an opportunity to reduce the procurement price of milk paid by the plant by a factor of two, reduced cheese prices by a corresponding factor.

V. Fedorov and his team already have more substantial, though outwardly less conspicuous, successes under their belts: the allocation of land to those willing to farm it has begun; the savings bank of Sakhalin has been granted the status of an independent bank with a right to finance promising undertakings on the island without coordinating them with Moscow. A multicommodity Sakhalin exchange has been created, and a government instruction has been secured that authorizes retaining up to 30 percent of the fish produced here to meet the needs of the oblast from this summer on.

The plans of the new governor, the coolness with which he has set out to implement them, and much of what is already happening here gives the impression of a miracle.

What Has Happened

An interlocutor in Moscow with whom I shared my reflections on Sakhalin tried to persuade me: "The renunciation of privileges by the party apparatus of Sakhalin and its policy of democratic transformations in society were exactly the reason for what is happening on Sakhalin. This is what should become the focal point of your article. Here is a headline for you: 'An Island Without Privileges.'"

When I flew to Sakhalin, I headed for the CPSU oblast committee [obkom].

I will admit that I have never seen such obkoms, though I have flown throughout the entire Far East many times

over, and have visited other regions of our country many times. First of all, nobody stopped me at the entrance with questions customary for an establishment of this kind: "Who are you?", "Who are you here to see?", and "Documents!" Many doors were wide open, and there was nobody inside. I went to quite a few offices before I found a group of instructors in one of them.

They told me about the privileges that the obkom gave up voluntarily—a cottage complex at a picturesque lake, a special hotel for highly placed party guests, a hospital and a polyclinic to which obkom and oblispolkom functionaries were assigned. Also, a special canteen in the obkom building for bureau members and, once again, highly placed guests, was closed down, as well as the sale of processed food in the cafeteria and trade in foodstuffs in short supply before holidays.

An impressive list, is it not? And yet... a majority of Sakhalin residents did not pay any attention to what was going on.

Chief of the General Department of the party obkom V. Zverkov observed correctly: "How else? After all, this did not influence in any way the life and welfare of the populace."

It was not all that simple.... We might recount how almost all the contents of the obkom cottages, transferred to the teachers of the oblast as a holiday hotel, were hauled away, leaving only bare walls; how a war and labor veteran, who heard on the local radio that now any veteran may make appointments in the former special polyclinic and went there for this very purpose, was told: "We serve only party veterans," and how a receptionist in the only hotel in the city built with contributions from the oblispolkom and the party obkom responds to telephone calls in a cheerful voice: "The obkom hotel." However, this is not the main point.... The main point consists of events that unfolded on Sakhalin in the spring of 1988, events to which I was privileged to become a witness and an unintentional participant. At the time, my article about them successively failed to be published by three of the then boldest publications of our country. They failed to publish it exactly as a matter of principle ("Sakhalin is hush-hush!"—this is how they repeated to me the words of the editor in chief of one publication concerning this article). Apparently, they were very much afraid at the top that the Sakhalin spark would set a similar fire to all regions of the country that were ripe for democratic transformations. It is very necessary to describe in more detail these instructive, historic days for Sakhalin, but I do not want to do it anymore—there is a proper time for everything. What happened two years ago on Sakhalin, and what lit the spark in the eyes of all kinds of people and intoxicated them with the feeling of freedom, which is unusual in our country, by now has become commonplace almost everywhere. Fortunately, what I saw and went through on the island back then is safely retained in the repository of my memory and helped me to understand subsequent events on Sakhalin.

Profound changes, which occurred here after the people outraged by the undemocratic elections of oblast delegates to the 19th party conference, the abuse by the first secretary of the obkom of his official position, and in general the inhuman living conditions on the island, called the apparatus to account.

Nothing Ever Passes Without a Trace!

This statement was borne out to a considerable degree by the history of Sakhalin and by the course of the democratic renaissance of its life. Indeed, it is history exactly—a chronicle of our perestroyka, if you will, because despite a negligibly short period of time passing since its proclamation in 1985, the time has been quite sufficient to draw up a balance. Every republic, kray, and oblast already have their own history of perestroyka, like the country as a whole. For some of them, this history is outstanding, for some—hardly notable, and for some—even dramatic. In this matter, Sakhalin was very fortunate.

Soon thereafter, the new first obkom secretary lost the election to be a USSR people's deputy to a local journalist in a landslide. Subsequently, the "Democratic Elections" Committee set up in the oblast did such a good job that out of the 28 candidates supported by it, 24 were elected to the Russian and local soviets. At present, democrats account for close to half of the oblast and city soviets; at issue is a very real democratic faction in the island parliament that may adopt or vote down any decision.

Nothing ever passes without a trace, and the party leadership also began to shift in a progressive direction. To be sure, giving up privileges was an impressive step, but on the whole it was window-dressing. Who could have thought that the arrival in the oblast of a new leader with revolutionary economic ideas would be arranged by... the Sakhalin CPSU Obkom?! The obkom faced a real stalemate when the people demanded from it that the life of the oblast be changed, but, alas, the depths of the party apparatus produced nothing revolutionary. Therefore, when an obkom secretary heard about the ideas of V. Fedorov regarding Sakhalin over a dinner at a Central Committee holiday hotel, he immediately jumped at this and invited the economist to the island to discuss his plans in more detail. Soon these ideas appeared on the pre-election banners of the party apparatus as well. All that remained for the population of Sakhalin was to familiarize themselves with these ideas, to listen to the author himself, and to make their choice in favor of... the professor from Moscow.

What Will Happen?

Do you know what is the most striking thing on Sakhalin at present?

No, it is not the New Zealand Edam cheese at 10 rubles per kilo, or the position of the party apparatus, which they themselves describe as "up in the air," or a mighty movement of the democrats who are already prepared to

become a new party, or even the grandiose plans of V. Fedorov to create, without much ado, a real New Economic Policy and a free-enterprise zo - on the island. The actually existing triangular gove..ment arrangement "the governor—the soviets—the obkom" and relations among them are the most striking here.

The old (party) and the just emerging (soviets in which the democrats account for one-half) structures openly fail to accept each other, but are forced to coexist due to current circumstances. The party apparatus treats V. Fedorov with reserve and resentment at the very least because, contrary to custom, they are being ignored by him. The democrats have already passed this stage, and at present they support him. However, they are very apprehensive about the new leader "who is implementing quite a harsh leadership policy trampling down the soviets." For his part, Valentin Petrovich, who must have determined long ago in theory what needs to be done, and shouldered the heaviest burden of the actual restructuring of the entire economic and social system of the island, has to overcome in turn either the lack of understanding or the resistance of one side or the other, while at the same time educating his partners, learning certain things from them, and steering the awkward ship of Sakhalin in uncharted waters. As I see it, this is exactly the main privilege that the island has, fortunately, been deprived of for real—liberation from the loud imperious voice from above saying how to go about things.

Naturally, this simplified model does not encompass the entire variety of mutual relations between structures in existence on the island. Suffice it to say that I did not mention the interests of central establishments in a protracted trench warfare with which V. Fedorov had to become embroiled. However, this most complex and multidimensional process of interaction and clashes of forces existing on the remote island appears to be the best guarantee of movement in the proper direction for Sakhalin.

Situation Among Vorkuta Miners Examined

PM0510140490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Sep 90 p 2

[Report by special correspondent Ye. Losoto under "Topical Reportage" rubric: "Vorkuta. Fall 1990"]

[Excerpts] Vorkuta—I am in Vorkuta for the third time within a year. I was here in October and February, and now here I am again in August.

The first time I encountered sullen suspicions toward all local leaders at all levels: They have taken all the goods into their own hands and stowed them away somewhere, people were saying; we must find them and take them back. Comrades Gorbachev and Ryzhkov were at that time considered by the miners to be like-minded allies. This wave gradually subsided.

In February storm clouds loomed: The miners intended when summer came to "smash the system," without having any ideas about what would happen next or in the name of what good new system they were smashing the bad old one, according to the saying "things can only get better." This time it was the Union government that they suspected of all mortal sins, even of deliberately organizing provocation against the miners.

Each wave bore on its crest the people who best of all expressed the mood in the pit faces and longwalls. These people turned up on strike committees. However, the miners' situation did not change. A new wave rose up and bore aloft new people. This is the third time that I have been here, and every time I discover a new chairman in the strike committee. Where are the previous ones? Some have been swept aside by the wave, others have been carried upward to become deputies, or into the city soviet.

I ask, why did you threaten people that you would "smash the system"? Things are quieter here than they were in the winter. They reply that it is only on the surface that passions have settled down, inside things remain as they were.

The workers see no improvements in their workplaces or in their longwalls. There have been one or two changes in pay, but these have been minor and within the old framework. The same old wage rates, the same plan. Many have realized that you solve nothing through strikes, you only lose from your own pocket; let us organize ourselves and find other forms of action. What other forms of action? "We will choose the moment and hit out." Inclinations in favor of changing the system more actively are emerging. That is what they are saying in the mines and elsewhere.

The outward calm is a sign of trust in Yeltsin, a reaction to his enthusiasm. Some people even equate Yeltsin's promotion with smashing the system. He is now the faith and hope of the unfortunate, lower strata of the working class. The previous people are seen as "spent forces"—the most they can do is not get in the way.

This is the reality which has to be reckoned with. Just estimate the thickness of the stratum we are talking about, with our backward technology, with the huge quantity of heavy physical work! Do you not think that this stratum is thicker than all the other strata of society put together? It was nothing and it remains nothing. And now its time has come to have its say in perestroyka.

You do not know what the voice of the unfortunate strata sounds like? I do not know either. I have not really heard it yet. People said to me at the strike committee:

"If only Yeltsin could succeed! If only he could do something while we still have the situation under control!"

Unfortunately this is not panic. This is the sober understanding of the fact that just one step remains before the

people themselves rise up. Yeltsin has a short time, but not the two or three years for which he is hoping; possibly a year or thereabouts. And Yeltsin is the last to whom time will be given. The next reformers will not be accepted.

The average lifespan of a miner in the polar region is 48 years. Many are killed or crippled at work. The safety practices are not observed. First, because the plan must be fulfilled. Second, because of the pitiful machinery and technology inherited from the prison camp inmates when "safety" did not even come into it since their lives were worth nothing. [passage omitted]

I would just like to know, will things be good for miners in the "market"? A transition to the market is planned in the 500 days program. The miners have already "okayed" this program as they are weary of our present situation.

Strike committee chairman Yushkov is actually preparing for capitalism, although he calls this preparation "social protection in market economy conditions." He expects mines which do not withstand competition to be closed and jobs to be cut.

"What will we do with the people who are fired? Who will give them an apartment? Under the market there is competition in the quality of output. In order to compete, new technology is necessary, workers need to be retrained, the technology of mining and the work style and methods of the management apparatus have to be changed. There will be a growth in crime and poverty. And 500 days is too fast, unrealistic. We do not know how much coal will be needed from us in market conditions. We do not know why our coal is at such and such a price. How are we to transfer to the market in these conditions? Who will retrain the miners? The latest teaching aids and equipment and newly trained teachers are needed. Who will pay? We do not have the means. No one knows where to start. The middle management level in the mines is not prepared for this, they also must be retrained."

I went to see Victor Semenovich Golikov, deputy chief of the "Vorkutaugol" association, a man who I know will not try to pull the wool over my eyes but will tell it like it is.

"We, the economic managers, are not letting the situation out of our control; this means that at least we are able to avoid lowering tempos, but with increasing difficulty. This is because of the general state of affairs in the Union."

B.N. Yeltsin came and named an exact date: 1 January 1991. Full autonomy from 1 January. Each mine is to be the complete master of all its own production. Sell to whom you like for what your like. The price is up to you.

At the "Yuzhnaya" mine he was told: "We need guaranteed supplies."

The answer: "It does not work like that in economics. You are the owners of your output, sell to whoever you want and supply yourselves. We are getting rid of 60 ministries, you yourselves are the owners. We would not manage to smash the command administration system in five years, so we are giving you all autonomy, and we will stop maintaining these ministries. But there will be a tax. In Russia it will be 38 percent of profits, we believe. And how will you fix the price?"

The chief of "Vorkutaugol" association: "It must be raised fourfold over for us to live."

The strike committee chairman: "There will be a chain reaction." (He has in mind the fact that this will boost price increases throughout the national economy.)

The chief of "Vorkutaugol" association: "That is why coal is subsided all over the world."

The mines are a basic sector of the economy. By hiking their prices they would upset the entire old price order. Who would sell them timber and metal at the old prices? No one. A reduction in energy-intensive production processes and a terrible growth in output prices would begin everywhere.

The world market would instantly turn them into a colony, but this time a worldwide one. At the present time we sell coal at $45 dollars a tonne free-on-board—that is to say transportation costs have to come out of this figure; or $38 cost, insurance, and freight (excluding transport costs); and in barter deals which the mines themselves conclude independently according to the new rules we sell it even cheaper at $27 free-on-board.

In Washington a subway ticket costs $5. A pair of training shoes costs something like $30. A reasonably good pair of women's shoes, $70; a sweater; $100. So do the sums. And at the same time work out why the post-industrial countries import raw materials from backward countries while closing their own mines, and what is more advantageous to them: to keep this arrangement or to arrange everything "fairly" so that the Vorkuta miners can live like French rentiers.

What do the mines get through barter exchange? Tape recorders, televisions, fridges, training shoes. And no technology!

I have been asked many times: You say this is not the way to do things, but what is the way? I do not know. My brain has not worked out an economic theory, it is beyond my powers. I do not know what must be done. But I see that the scent of gunpowder has long been in the air, and that in such an atmosphere it is dangerous to smash with a sledgehammer the last remaining support on which the country rests. True, people cannot wait any longer; that I see and know. They cannot wait any longer now. And when things become even worse, will people be able to wait for improvements then? Will it be easier to wait then? Who will end up under the sledgehammer

then? The tobacco store? The city committee? Statues? Anyone who has not got callouses on his hands? The militiaman on point duty?

Now tell me who will fulfill Resolution 608, the pact between the government and the miners signed after the first strikes? There have already been new strikes because of its breakdown. I myself consider this resolution unfulfilled, but that is not the crux of the issue at the moment. The coal ministry—the main executor of Resolution 608—is liable to abolition. In other words, the program of aid for the sector is being thrown out at a stroke. A pretty meager program, but it was hard-won and pretty thorough.

I will remind the reader also of the fact that the so-called developed countries do not allow the price of coal to be increased. They go to any lengths to avoid this, up to and including shutting down pits. Why? Because a blow from under the ground causes an earthquake throughout the whole economy, and they naturally try to avoid this. The coal sector is also subsidized by the state in those countries; but, it must be supposed, soundly and sufficiently subsidized.

I looked in at the CPSU gorkom [city committee], the familiar office of the first secretary but with a different chief in it.

The name of the new chief is Yevgeniy Alekseyevich Tereshchenko. The city party conference lasted nine days, and the Communists rejected all the candidates from the apparatus, unexpectedly promoting industrial worker Tereshchenko, whom I was told is "a good specialist and a good man." No one knows what would have happened to the gorkom if different people now sat on it.

The party is eking out a wretched existence: It scarcely exists in the city at all; its prestige is nil. I was warned that Tereschchenko has sacrificed himself. He takes all blows on his own shoulders. In every auditorium the cry straightway goes up: "Ah, so you are the first secretary!" People whistle on hearing the words "first secretary" even before they know first secretary of what.

Sometimes there is heckling too. The Russian people's deputy of whom it has already been said that he has brought the culture of the capital to the masses, shouted at a rally:

"Raykoms [rayon committees] must be routed!"

And you know what kind of ground all this is falling on....

Tereshchenko told me: "I am afraid to think about next summer. We cannot tolerate automatic weapons or even brawling. Things are in a bad way in the party. I was talking with an ordinary person: I ask why are you hounding a Communist, your comrade? And he answers, why is he paying his dues and maintaining you and your Politburo? At the present time I am involved in explaining that people should not treat rank-and-file Communists spitefully. The communist ideal will never disappear because the idea of a society without exploitation is very attractive. That we have defiled this idea is a different matter.

He came here in 1960. He began as a miner, became a student, and then returned to the same pit, gradually working his way up to the post of director. A miner's son. And now his own son, born here in Vorkuta, works in a pit as a miners' foreman.

"I had a firm belief in the justice of the party's cause. And now this belief is shaken every day. Why does everyone paint everything black?"

I was told that the gorkom nowadays is like a house where someone has died. In actual fact it is far quieter: The corridors are empty and the telephones do not ring.

"The party was strong in deciding economic issues through issuing orders. They could not do anything else. This authority moved away from us and was left just hanging in the air; it did not go to anyone else."

Party organizations in the city are suffering an anarchic collapse. Within the next six months party committees will be withdrawn from the mines. About 2,000 people have left the party in the last eight months. A man from Donetsk came and said that 50 percent of workers there are not paying their dues, but are registered as party members. In Vorkuta there is no mass nonpayment. Either people pay or they leave.

Tereshchenko has stopped transferring money to the obkom [oblast committee] and the Central Committee. From 1 August, 50 percent of dues will remain with the primary organizations, although according to the decision of the congress this should be done only from the New Year. The remaining money he has put to work: He has invested it at interest in a commercial bank and has joined cooperatives as a coparticipant. He is making money for the party! The party is disintegrating materially too, so a material basis must be created for it.

My dear miners! When you prepare to drive out the gorkom too, consider whether you should not think hard before you open your mouths. A journalist is like an elevator between the various floors of society. You sometimes visit the top floors too. Recently I was talking with a certain reformer, a supporter of private ownership.

"And what about the working people?" I ask.

"Your workers will not have anywhere to run to to complain," he replies. "By then there will be no raykoms or gorkoms."

So had you bot better think hard? It is a different matter that it is necessary to make the CPSU remember its origins, that it is supposed to express the interests of the working class. Then perhaps we will not have to panic

because the market is in the offing and the workers have no social protection, not even a trade union let alone a party.

B.N. Yeltsin drove past the gorkom of his former party, and so I realized that Tereshchenko is not welcome among his entourage. I appreciated this all the more when a stranger suddenly came up to me, passed on Tereshchenko's greetings, and offered me a place in his car: The day before I had been afraid that there would be no place for me to travel after Yeltsin. Thank you, but I had already had an offer from a friend of mine, a miner, a fierce opponent of the CPSU and a fighter against the party apparatus. He also is very nice to me and also offered me a lift in his car.

We traveled and traveled, and quarreled the whole way, although politely and within limits. I said that it is wrong to attack statues, and he told me that the Bolsheviks had set this example themselves. I told him: They did nothing of the sort. Who destroyed the pagans' wooden statues? The Bolsheviks or the Christians? It is like the Tatar horde every time. The Chinese curse is right: "May you live in changing times!"

Then I ask: "Then who will the unemployed, unfortunate man turn to?"

And he replies: "Let him turn to the Communists! They got us in this mess, let them help now."

And that is true.

Statute on RSFSR Party Referendums

91UN0002A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[RSFSR Communist Party Regulations governing referendums]

[Text] The most important matters of principle of social development or intraparty life and drafts of most important documents, alternative documents included, will be put to an all-party or local vote referendum. The referendum is a form of exercise of the authority of the party masses.

I. Adoption of the decision to hold a party referendum

Party referenda—in the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]; in republic, autonomous republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon party organizations—are conducted in accordance with the CPSU Rules at the decision of the directive or executive party authority or on the initiative of one-third of the members of the corresponding organization. In the latter case the decision to hold a referendum should be adopted by the party authority not later than two weeks following receipt of the decisions of the party organizations and other associations of communists.

The decision to schedule a referendum specifies its date, the name of the draft document(s), or the specific questions of social or party life being put to the referendum.

The start of the referendum is scheduled no sooner than one month and no later than two months following the adoption of the decision to hold it.

Notice of the holding of a referendum is conveyed to the Communists within a period of three days. The notice specifies the date of the referendum, the full text of the draft documents, or the content of the issue being put to the vote.

II. Discussion of the draft documents and the issues being put to a referendum

Issues put to a referendum are discussed at party meetings (conferences) and meetings of party committees and also in other forums.

Upon discussion of the draft documents (issues) put to a party referendum, each Communist has the right to express his opinion at a party meeting and in the party press and other mass media, familiarize himself with all alternative versions of the decisions, and obtain the necessary advice or explanation.

The party media cover the course of the referendum and present various opinions and proposals of the Communists and the party organizations.

III. Organization of the referendum

For the organization of work on the holding of a referendum the corresponding commissions are formed at all levels:

the Central Commission;

republic, autonomous republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city and rayon commissions;

primary organization commissions.

The commissions are formed within two weeks following notice of the referendum. The procedure of their formation and numerical composition are determined by the corresponding party authorities at the time of the scheduling of the referendum.

The commission necessarily includes representatives of the organizations and associations of Communists that submitted the draft documents or issues for a referendum.

The chairman, his deputy, and the secretary of the commission are elected at a meeting.

The Central Commission for the referendum:

exercises supervision of the course of preparation and realization of the referendum and studies questions of its organization;

establishes specimen ballot papers, the forms of other documents, and the procedure of their manufacture and safekeeping;

examines submissions and complaints about the incorrect actions of the referendum commissions and adopts final decisions in respect to them;

determines the procedure of the submittal of depositions concerning the results of the ballot;

tallies the vote at the referendum and publishes its results.

The republic autonomous republic, kray, oblast, city and rayon commissions:

perform the functions of the Central Commission at a referendum in the corresponding party organizations;

provide the commission of the primary party organizations with ballot papers;

count the vote and present the results of the ballot to the superior commission.

The commissions of the primary party organizations:

compile the voting lists of CPSU members for the referendum;

notify CPSU members of the place and time of the ballot;

ensure the preparation of premises for the ballot;

organize the ballot in the primary party organizations;

examine submissions and complaints pertaining to questions on the preparation of the referendum and the organization of the ballot in the primary party organizations and adopt decisions in respect to them;

count the votes and present the results to the superior referendum commission.

Meetings of the commissions are valid if no less than two-thirds of their composition participates. Decisions are adopted by majority vote of the commission on a show of hands. Members of the commission who disagree with its decision have the right to express a separate opinion, which is appended to the deposition in writing.

The commissions work publicly and openly, and representatives of the party organizations, the press and radio and television, have a right to attend their meetings.

The ballot paper includes the names of the draft documents or the issues put to the referendum. In all cases the ballot paper contains two versions of the answer: "for" or "against".

Expenditure connected with the holding of referenda is borne by the budget of the corresponding party authorities or organizations which sponsored the referendum.

IV. The ballot and the tallying of the results of the referendum

A referendum is conducted by way of secret ballot in the primary party organizations on the days and at the time determined by the commission.

Each Communist votes in person; proxy voting is not permitted. The ballot papers are issued by the commission on the basis of the party organization list upon presentation of a party card. Filling out the ballot paper, the participant in the referendum strikes out one version of the answer: "for" or "against". The CPSU member deposits the ballot paper in the ballot box.

The ballot boxes are opened by the commission of the primary party organizations following the ballot. On the basis of the ballot papers entered the commission determines the total number of communists who took part in the ballot, the number of votes "for" and "against," and the number of ballot papers deemed invalid.

Ballot papers not of the established specimen and also those on which it is impossible to determine the Communist's position are deemed invalid. The commission settles doubts as to the validity of a ballot paper by way of a vote.

The votes are counted by the primary party organization referendum commissions.

The results of the ballot are entered in the deposition. The deposition is signed by the commission members and within 24 hours following the ballot it is delivered to the superior commission. Submissions and complaints that are received and also the commission's decisions in respect to them are appended to the deposition.

On the basis of the depositions of the primary party organization commissions the superior commissions tally the vote in the rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray and republic, autonomous republic party organizations and draw up their depositions of the established form.

The superior commissions may deem the ballot in a party organization invalid on account of violations permitted in the course of the preparation, the ballot, or the counting of the vote.

The positions supported by more than half the members of an organization are binding on the corresponding party authorities and organizations.

The notice of the Central Commission on the results of a referendum in the Communist Party of the RSFSR and also the wording of the decision adopted by the ballot or the content of the issues put to a referendum are published in the party press within seven days following the referendum.

Approved by the Communist Party of the RSFSR Constituent Congress, 6 September 1990.

Western Republics

Snegur Addresses Moldavian Supreme Soviet

90UN2896A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian, 4 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Speech by Mircha Ion Snegur, chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, at the Second Extraordinary Session of the 12th Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet on 2 September: "Let Us Protect Our National Dignity"]

[Text] Lady and gentleman deputies!

Long-suffering people!

This extraordinary session of the Moldovan [Moldavian] Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet is being convened because of the recent aggravation of the sociopolitical situation in the republic. Reactionary, antiperestroyka forces who have put us to the test and exhausted us throughout the year are acting with unprecedented zeal and effrontery.

Today, in a period of great responsibility to our posterity for the fate of this land—when history is giving us the opportunity to become fully-fledged masters of our wealth, to generate genuine national values, and to create a true sovereign state—these forces, in violation of the constitution and other laws of the republic, have entered on a course toward breaking up the sovereign state of Moldavia, and they wish at any price to drive us into economic chaos and to lead us to catastrophe and serious interethnic conflicts. Giving their own interpretation of the laws and decisions adopted by 13th session and the first session of the new legislature, deceiving the masses and capitalizing on the difficulties experienced by the republic national economy through various subversive activities, leaders from Tiraspol, Bendery, Rybnitsa, Kamensk, Komrat, Chadyr-Lunga and other places are striving to further their own unhealthy ambitions to achieve their own personal goals at the expense of the Moldavian people.

They do not like anything that is being done, not only in our republic but also in Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, or other regions. They do not accept the dismantling of the Stalinist model for structuring social life and the creation of a society based on democratic and legal principles; they do not like the transformation of the political system and the establishment of true democracy based on freedom of choice, a multiparty system, and observance of human rights and laws by all citizens; they are against real sovereignty of the people and destruction of the old labor relations that alienate the working man from the property and the results of his activity. They do not like the laws and decrees adopted in the republic during the year, they do not like our language or alphabet, they do not like the history of this people, and they reject its aspiration to freedom and progress.

The only things they like are bread, wine, fruits and vegetables, meat, and other goods produced by the people; all they like are houses, apartments, and dachas built by these people on their own land which has been washed with blood and tears for more than two millennia.

They have liked, and to this day continue to like, to rule these people, but they do not want to learn their language even enough to say "hello" or "goodbye." These are the people who organize innumerable congresses and referendums, repeatedly adopt appeals, hold meetings, commit excesses, allow themselves to rudely insult the people who have taken them in at this difficult time, and they cherish the hope of dividing the land and depriving it of its future.

Things have gone too far, esteemed deputies, and the time has come to separate the wheat from the chaff. The time has come to give an answer to the question posed by all of our people: Does the current legislature have sufficient power to preserve and protect the integrity of the sovereign state of Moldavia or not?

Before answering this question, I should discuss the preconditions for the situation that has been created: When, how, and who initiated the actions for destabilizing our society and destroying the foundations of the Republic of Moldavia?

The process of renewal of the socioeconomic, political, and moral spheres of the life of Moldavia began not in April 1985 which would have been natural, but May 1988. The republic leaders at that time ardently resisted everything new and the aspirations of our people, continuing their old Bolyudian policy of denationalization and dictatorship.

One of the first problems perestroyka placed on the agenda was the problem of giving the Moldavian language the status of a state language and returning to the Latin alphabet. The authorities at the time dragged out the decision for almost two years before the people's patience reached its limit. Participants in the Great National Assembly on 27 August 1989 expressed the will of the majority of the speakers of the Romanian language, voting with both hands for the state language and the Latin script.

The 13th Session of the Supreme Soviet registered this will by the adoption of corresponding laws, having finally created the possibility of restoring the social functions of our language, the language of the people, which gave the republic its name. I would like to ask my comrades from Tiraspol, Bendery, and Rybnitsa what other decisions the 13th congress could have adopted. At this crucial time they should have shown real internationalism and respect for our people. Instead they tried as hard as they could to stand in the way of the work of the 13th session and organized rallies in the style of Tiraspol, Bendery, and Rybnitsa internationalism, as they were described by one of the former infamous party leaders. Actually, this was pseudointernationalism based on contempt and hatred. For the first time in the history of mankind, strikes were organized against the language

and alphabet of the indigenous population. Over the past 200 years Moldavia has been a testing ground for all kinds of experiments—both during the time of tsarism and during the periods of the rules of Brezhnev, Bolyud, and others. Here we should name the people who inspired, organized, and led the illegal actions of recent times: Rylyakov, Smirnov, Bogdanov, Belitchenko, Yakovlev, Blokhin, and others.

The Dnestr "leaders" were then joined by the "leaders" from Komrat, the "Gagauz Khalky" who called for the population to strike without thinking about the fact that, as a result of the nationalization policy being implemented by the center, a great deal of harm was done not only to the native language of the Moldavian people but also to the native language of the Gagauz, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian peoples who, in conjunction with the Moldavians, are the only ones who could solve the problems of their spiritual renewal. Instead of acting jointly, the "leaders" from Komrat called for the creation of territorial autonomy of the Gagauzes with the Russian language as the state language. This is the source of the disintegration in the southern rayons of the republic. Comrades Kuroglo, Kendigelyan, Kalchu, and Topal, here is the expression of your concern for the restoration of the Gagauz language: You are interested mainly in territorial autonomy and the breakup of Moldavia, even if it is into three states, as long as you can occupy higher positions and softer chairs.

After the strikes of last autumn, there followed a number of illegal decrees from the Bendery, Tiraspol, and Rybnitsa city and Rybnitskiy Rayon soviets of people's deputies which were annulled by the previous Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The destructive actions of the leaders from the Dnestr area and their followers from Komrat increased with the first days of work of the first session of the new republic legislature, which was elected democratically in elections in February-March of this year. There was not a single law or a single decree of the Supreme Soviet that was not subjected to doubts or interpreted in a slanted way by the leaders from Tiraspol, Bendery, and Rybnitsa as well as proponents of the "Yedinstvo" movement and the United Labor Collective Council; that would not have to be put through Yakovlev's Stalinist mill; or that would not have to be submitted to various kinds of "experts"—unsolicited advocates from outside the republic—for analysis and presentation of conclusions prompted beforehand.

They tell us frankly that they do not like either the declaration of Moldavian SSR sovereignty, or the conclusion of the commission regarding the political-legal assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the additional secret protocol, or the conclusion of the commission of the Supreme Soviet regarding Gagauz autonomy, or the decree on state power. They speak for all the Russian-speaking population of the republic. Incidentally, recently these leaders have been asserting more and more insistently that the term "Russian-speaking" is offensive. But who other than the Tiraspol and Bendery press and the leaflets of the same origin brought it into use? Recently in an illegal leaflet entitled "Rybnitsa Vestnik" they used another absurd term—the "Russian-talking" population.

I have already said that they do not like the laws and decrees adopted by the First Session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, but I ask myself: If they were to move permanently to the Ukraine, Russia, or Belorussia would they dare to speak out against the declarations of sovereignty or against the decrees on power adopted by the supreme soviets of these republics. I do not think they would for the simple reason that these leaders do not represent either the Ukrainian, or the Russian, or the Belorussian, or any other people. They are the bearers of a clearly outdated worldview and if they cannot turn the clock back, they at least want not to allow us to progress along the open perestroyka path. These leaders think that the history of the earth on which they live begins with their appearance and ends with their departure.

No, esteemed Comrades! Our people have been living here for more than 2,000 years. They have not conquered a single acre of any one else's land, they have never mocked anyone, and they have never degraded anyone. On the contrary, this land where the remains of our ancestors rest in peace have been reshaped many times, and our people have experienced numerous invasions, imperial and imperialist conquests, various experiments, migrations, and other disasters. But each time the people have emerged victorious; they were even able to defend their country when hordes without kith or kin tried to destroy their roots and doom them to extinction.

The republic Supreme Soviet and its presidium have done everything in their power to improve the socioeconomic and political situation in the republic. They have adopted laws and decrees intended to place all of the people's creative potential in the service of the society, and they have approved the program proposed by the government for changing over to a market economy, the purpose of which is to invigorate the republic's economy, to create conditions for free competition among producers of material goods, and to improve the well-being of each citizen of the republic.

During this transition period, when the dismantling of the outdated system is far from complete and when there is still much to do in order to create a new system, leaders of the Dnestr area and Komrat, instead of mobilizing the masses for creative work and eliminating the heavy consequences to agriculture caused by the unfavorable weather conditions, have begun a bitter campaign to discredit the new legislature and the new government—which have only been working for a couple of months—and they are organizing irresponsible measures that are taking the people away from performing their natural duties as citizens of the republic.

Several times the new Supreme Soviet Presidium has annulled the illegal decisions adopted recently by the Bendery and Rybnitsa city soviets, as well as the notorious Gagauz congresses, and beginning on 1 August of this year it declared a moratorium on all actions that can destabilize the sociopolitical situation in the republic. This moratorium is supported by the majority of movements and sociopolitical organizations in the republic and all of our people.

Nonetheless the Komrat leaders have not settled down. They did not settle down even after the legislature considered the question of Gagauz autonomy on which it had been working for more than a year and a half.

In Komrat on 19 August of this year there was a so-called congress of deputies from population points with Gagauz population. The organizers of the congress—the leaders of the former "Gagauz khalky" movement and certain leaders of local soviets—ignored the well-known conclusion of the permanent commissions of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet on national questions and questions of local self-government that was approved by the legislature, from which it follows that Gagauzes living on the national territory of Moldavia do not have the right to territorial autonomy in the Moldavian SSR. The monstrous plans for dismantling the national territory of the Moldavians is tantamount to a direct attempt to destroy the existence of the Moldavian people and the Moldavian state. Things reached a point where this illegal congress even allowed itself to annul the decrees of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet and its presidium. Brazenly falsifying our history, the "congress" gives the Gagauzes the right to the territory of Budzhak, proclaiming the formation of the Gagauz Republic within the territory of Besarabyaskiy, Vulkeneshtskiy, Komratskiy, Chadyr-Lungskiy, and Tarakliyskiy rayons. The Gagauzes, whom the Komrat congress proclaimed to be the indigenous residents of this land, are considered to be free of any political or legal obligations with respect to the Moldavian SSR, and the organs they created claim the right to participate as an independent subject in the process of developing and concluding the Union treaty. An election day was even scheduled for elections to the so-called supreme soviet of the so-called Gagauz Republic, and a central election commission was created. It is intended to develop a mechanism for autonomous functioning of the Gagauz economy with its own financial and banking system and to declare the corresponding territory a free economic zone. In the declaration "On the Development of the Gagauz People and Their Independence From the Republic of Moldavia," the Komrat congress declared the Gagauzes free and independent from the state authority and state administration of the Moldavian SSR, and it declared that they are no longer citizens of Moldavia, remaining citizens of the USSR alone.

The reaction of the Moldavians and all sound-minded people to this exceptionally dangerous and dirty political game is quite understandable. It is sufficient to take a simple survey of the appeals and letters filled with indignation that have been received by the Supreme Soviet or published in the republic press since the congress of the Gagauz deputies to understand that the Moldavian people will never stand for negligently slicing up the land of their ancestors. "How much can you blame them?"; "We considered them our good friends"; "They have crossed all boundaries"; "The circumstances force us"; "Do we have to take any more?"; "A rebuke to specialists in dividing up territories"—these are only a couple of the headlines of protests published in just one newspaper—MOLDOVA SUVERANE.

Deputies of the Yalovenskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, like the deputies of many other soviets who gathered at an extraordinary session, rightly stated that the problem of Gagauz territorial autonomy is a shameless fabrication of certain leaders of the "Gagauz khalky" movement supported by the "Yedinstvo" movement who, under the false slogan of resurrecting the Gagauzes, are actually pushing this nationality into the quagmire of a confrontation whose results are unpredictable.

The soviets of people's deputies of the majority of population points in the republic insist that the instigators of the provocations against the Moldavian people be charged immediately in keeping with the law. It has been suggested an extraordinary session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet be created to consider this question and also the question of revoking the deputy authority of the individuals who organized this anticonstitutional act. It has also been suggested that we create special formations for protecting the territorial integrity of the republic. These proposals and demands directed persistently to the legislature are fairly numerous and are coming in from all corners of the republic. Standing out among them is the declaration of the People's Deputies of the USSR and the Moldavian SSR, deputies of local soviets, and representatives of population points from the southern rayons of the republic regarding the integrity and sovereignty of the Moldavian SSR which says that the aspiration of reactionary forces to dismember the territory of the sovereign state of Moldavia could lead to a dangerous interethnic conflict in the republic. Continuing this idea, allow me to read the appeal to the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet from the Third Session of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Chokan Rayon in the city of Kishinev:

"The long-suffering Moldavian people are experiencing more difficult times today: Our benevolence and patience are again being tested for durability. The decisions of the so-called 'congress' of Gagauzes are the height of shamelessness and effrontery, the apogee of the lack of humanity, responsibility, and gratitude. We are deeply disturbed and shaken by the attempt to break off a significant piece of the body of our ancient land which has been crippled by all kinds of aggressors.

"We recognize that the unsubstantiated claims of the pharisees from Komrat have nothing in common with the aspirations of the majority of Gagauzes who took shelter in our land almost 200 years ago. The brazenness

of the separatists would not have taken them very far were it not inspired and skillfully directed by all kinds of scions from Dnestr area and antiperestroyka forces from the center which we have seen from the efficient preparation and the unconcealed malice in the reporting and declarations of the central media.

"We have put up with enough mockery of everything we hold sacred and beautiful: our language, history, and tricolor flag. It is impossible simply to wipe this spittle from our faces. The state unity and sovereignty of our republic, won through such sacrifice, and the sacred right of the master on this land soaked with the sweat and blood of our ancestors, are being jeopardized.

"We demand from the government of the Republic of Moldavia quick and decisive actions in keeping with laws that have been adopted; we demand that the instigators of anticonstitutional and antistate actions be brought to account.

"We have declared our sovereignty—it is time to back it up with action."

We do not have the right not to react to public opinion because we are speaking about the proposals and demands of our constituents, which are actually a cry of pain from the people who do not want whoever feels like it to continue to mock us; the people who, having declared themselves sovereign, must find within themselves the strength to put their own home in order.

As you know, the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has declared the Komrat congress held on 19 August of this year to be an anticonstitutional organ whose decisions have no legal force. The implementation of the decisions of the aforementioned congress by local soviets of population points with Gagauz population will be regarded as a direct violation of the Moldavian SSR Constitution and other laws of the republic, and this will have corresponding legal consequences.

In keeping with instructions issued by the presidium, the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Committee for State Security, and Procuracy are carefully investigating the circumstances under which the Komrat congress was prepared for and conducted in order to find out who organized it and bring them to account in keeping with the law. I think we can see some of the results of this activity even in today's session.

The republic's population reacted positively to the government decree declaring the "Gagauz khalky" movement illegal. We hope that the majority of Gagauzes living in the republic will respond to our appeal and not be taken in by the appeals of politically irresponsible individuals who value neither the past nor the future of their people and who are prepared to provoke them to a historically irreparable mistake.

I wish to repeat again today what I said in my speech on national radio and television on 23 July of this year: The actions of the destructive forces of the left bank of the Dnestr and the south of the republic are directed in the same channel. How else can one explain the fact that both beyond the Dnestr and in the south of the republic there have been sessions, congresses, and rallies, one after another and all on the same topic, about which they all arrive at the same decisions of not to observe Moldavian laws on the state language and symbols; and they all pursue the goal of dividing up the republic's territory at any price through the creation of various kinds of autonomous units, they appeal to the legislatures of the Union republics to render them assistance and support, and so forth. In reality all the texts of the decrees of the aforementioned local soviets of people's deputies are identical.

A situation has been created wherein the leaders of the corresponding rayon and city soviets and local political movements, having lost all sense of responsibility, are grossly violating the decisions of the highest state authority in the republic. How else can one regard the actions of the leaders from the Dnestr area who, having been warned by the decree of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 29 August about being held legally accountable for their anticonstitutional activities, convened and are conducting in Tiraspol today the so-called congress of deputies of all levels of the left bank of the Dnestr, at which they intend to resolve the issue of the creation of a Dnestr republic. Good Lord, what kinds of soviets do we have here? In this case should we not disband them?

Those who overtly and covertly are impeding our forward movement and the establishment of real sovereignty and true popular rule usually refer precisely to the opinion of the people and claim to speak on their behalf. But the real interests of those destabilizers of the sociopolitical situation are very clear: They are doing everything possible to retain at least some of the structures of the command-administrative system and are thinking up new structures in order to retain their present positions, that is they more concerned about their own hides, about their own advantage, and they are in no way concerned about the interests of those they are supposed to be representing.

One gets the impression that both Gagauzes and the Russian-speaking leaders have gotten used to our decrees that revoke their decisions, they have gotten used to our warnings, and they are continuing their reprehensible antidemocratic and anti-Moldavian activity.

Enough?! There is an end to patience, regardless of how great it may be. We must apply the law before it is too late, apply it with all firmness so as to get rid of the instigators who are leading people into deception and making political capital through illegal and inhuman ways, speculating on national sensibilities, and encroaching on the territorial integrity of our republic.

One of the factors that led to the destabilization of the situation in our republic was the universal legal nihilism.

And the most dangerous thing is that this nihilism has penetrated into all the pores of our society.

Laws must be obeyed everywhere and not just by the rank-and-file citizens but also by all officials, and of course above all by the organs of state authority.

Some people do not understand that nobody is allowed to violate the laws. Today they are permitting violations of the law without thinking about the fact that tomorrow this will strike a blow to their own interests which should be protected by the law.

It has become fashionable for the local soviets of people's deputies to take the liberty of discussing questions not of the best way to carry out one law or another adopted by the high organ of state power but the mechanism for torpedoing them most unconscionably. They look for pretexts and arguments that justify declaring the laws that have been adopted to be contradictory to the interests of one group of people or another. Any decision that is not to the liking of a group of people is declared to be unacceptable and invalid on the territory of the local soviet because it allegedly contradicts the interests of the "Russian-speaking" population or the population that speaks in some other language.

All this is occurring because of our ignorance of legal procedure.

It is time for everyone to recognize that the laws adopted by the high state organ of authority of a sovereign state, which the Moldavian SSR is, reign supreme over all of its territory and have the same force for everyone: for people in Drokiya, and Rybnitsa, and Komrat.

This certainly does not mean that we are unable to understand the ideologists of the territorial autonomies: It is impossible through local referendum to halt the effect of the law on the territory of a local soviet of people's deputies.

I have already said that the local soviets must implement the laws that are adopted and not discuss how correct they are. But unfortunately, esteemed Deputies, when adopting laws that are very necessary and very important for Moldavia we do not always think through the mechanism for their effect and their introduction into the system of legal acts. And without this we cannot ensure their effective application.

The republic's law enforcement organs play an inestimable role in carrying out the laws.

As of today, we can state with bitterness that these organs are not capable of fully performing the functions assigned to them. Thus organs of the militia and procuracy are slow in ensuring observance of law and order in the republic.

We have not yet brought to account the organizers of the strikes in Tiraspol, Bendery, and other cities.

The organizers of the anticonstitutional congresses in Parkany and Komrat have not been made to answer in keeping with the law. And as a result of our passivity we have today's congress in Tiraspol.

So when will measures be taken, Mr. Republic Procurator and Mr. Minister of Internal Affairs?

We could well wait until our Moldavia is broken up into pieces or they begin to auction it off.

Unforgivable slowness.

And where are the results of the activity of the new subdivision of the state security committee for protecting the republic's constitutional system?

I understand how this is explained. I also understand that some of the workers of these organs are simply boycotting the decisions we have made. But Deputies, when we appointed Kostash, Botnar, and Postovan to their positions we placed confidence in them, hoping that they were capable of restructuring the work in the corresponding departments. The situation is such that perestroyka must be accelerated.

One gets the feeling that we have a dearth of personnel; there are few, very few specialists. Where are we supposed to find them when the proper attention has not been devoted to this for decades.

We must state that some of the fairly good specialists are abandoning the law enforcement organs because they are afraid that it will be necessary to learn a couple of hundred words of the language of the people among whom they have been living for decades. Others are leaving these organs because they are sure that when they leave the work will collapse. Do not rejoice, gentlemen. The Moldavian people will find the strength to impose order in their own home no matter what it may cost.

Ladies and gentlemen!

Another issue has arisen that, although it is a part of the future, serves as an occasion for negative reactions on the part of the leaders of movements and the aforementioned population points. I am speaking about the future administrative-territorial reform. Nothing is clear yet. There is not a single decree or even a draft, and they are already frightened by this reform. Again a good thing is being used for bad, underhanded ends. As I have already said up to this point they have been relying on the tricolor flag, the state language, the Latin script, and so forth. Now they have found another "scarecrow"—the word "uyezd" [district] which is being used for destructive purposes. They are bothered by the uyezds which do not yet exist; they are bothered by something that has not even been discussed in the legislature yet. The concept of the "uyezd" was mentioned during the discussion of the Gagauz problem when it was proposed that a Gagauz uyezd be created. That is all. But now the idea of the uyezd and other new administrative-territorial subdivisions has been underscored and is serving as a scarecrow. Who is interested in this and why? The answer is clear.

Indeed, we need to step up our activity in this area and immediately develop the corresponding drafts, publishing them for nationwide discussion in order to draw the necessary conclusions. Deliberately spread rumors and disinformation lead to indecisiveness in the activity of the local soviets. This is a case where one should say outright: Rayon, city, and even rural soviets of people's deputies are not working, and if they are working it is not for the fulfillment of the laws and decrees of the legislature but for torpedoing them and halting their effect on the territory of the republic. What should be done? We must achieve unwavering observance of the decree on state power. In this area the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a ukase that stipulates that the chairmen of rayon and city soviets are relieved of their other functions, that is they are in paid positions. They will receive their wages from the local budget. The problem seemed to have been solved. Now all we have left to do is work. We must work with all possible persistence so that the legislature will feel the help from the corresponding soviets.

The logical reaction to the decisions of the Komrat congress, the actions of the separatists from the Dnestr area, and the consequences for the current and future sociopolitical situation was a demand for extraordinary sessions of a number of local soviets of people's deputies concerning the creation of armed forces. Indeed, in order to maintain order it is necessary to have someone and something with which to do this. In the past similar calls came from the People's Front, the Organization of Democratic Youth, the League of Women, and certain people's deputies at the first session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet. The press and national radio and television developed a broad campaign in this area. They are publishing and reading more and more letters from young Moldavians who are being beaten and mocked in the Army. Many cases of murder and suicide of Moldavian soldiers are being made public. Here are just a few of the demands of the declaration of the Organization of Moldavian Youth, addressed to the Moldavian SSR legislature:

The abolition of service in the Soviet Army, beginning in the fall of 1990 for young Bessarabians;

The abolition of article 77 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldavia, which envisions punishment for refusing to serve in the ranks of the Soviet Army;

The return to their homeland of all young Bessarabians recruited into the Soviet Army.

I think these tendencies are also to be found in the context of the general military reform in the Soviet Union, the concept for which is being developed at the present time. President Gorbachev himself has not yet expressed preference for any particular form. In a recent speech during a visit to the Odessa Military District, he touched upon the national-territorial principle and the extraterritorial principle equally. He thinks it is possible to combine these two principles as well. The time has come for our legislature to speak out on this issue as well. During the process of discussing this problem, we must be guided by the sacred principles of sovereignty and the fact that our republic has been declared a demilitarized zone. The issue should be resolved through the legislature. The corresponding permanent commissions are prepared to offer a draft decree regarding this issue.

There is one more problem. Based on principles of sovereignty and the situation that has developed in the republic, the Supreme Soviet Presidium considers it necessary to introduce the institution of presidential rule in the Republic of Moldavia. The leader of the state should coordinate the solutions to all problems and not be restricted to problems of a legislative nature alone.

This kind of reinforcement of authority is also required by the critical situation that unfortunately we still have not been able to escape. There is a situation in which it is necessary to make immediate decisions without proper discussion of them. The history of our people proves that we are a good, reasonable, and benevolent people, but when times of trial come we must be strong and decisive. Otherwise we shall not escape the mockery of aliens who even becloud the reason of decent people who want to live together with them in peace and harmony.

I ask you to speak out on this problem as well.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that today's session should provide the appropriate evaluation of the current sociopolitical situation. Since the leaders of the south of the republic and the left bank of the Dnestr and the leaders of the local soviets of people's deputies of these rayons have not drawn the appropriate conclusions from the decrees of the Supreme Soviet Presidium—which annulled the anticonstitutional decisions, referendums, congresses, and sessions of city and rayon soviets—it is necessary for the deputies of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet to speak out on this issue.

I ask you to engage actively in the discussion of the question because the illegal actions are continuing. This was also confirmed by certain actions on the day of the holiday "Limba Noastre" [Our Language]. I wish to discuss a couple of its aspects. First, I want to read a telegram.

"Urgent. To the chairman of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Mr. Mircha Ion Snegur. We congratulate our fraternal Moldavian people on their national holiday 'Limba Noastre.' We wish you happiness, prosperity, and success in everything. May the friendship between the Moldavian and Gagauz peoples and other peoples living in our republic live and grow stronger forever. The temporary committee of the Gagauz Republic." Is this not a joke? Just yesterday on national television they showed their actions and hostile attitude toward the Moldavian people. When they saluted the tricolor flag in Nisporeny on the day of the

"Limba Noastre" holiday, I personally watched these clips on television. Here is what happened to our tricolor flag in other places:

"On 31 August at 0830 hours in the city of Chadyr-Lunga, a worker of the PUZhKKh [expansion unidentified] administration of housing and municipal services, D.D. Zirov, removed the state flag of the Moldavian SSR from the building of the rayon procuracy. At the same time about 50 people gathered in front of this building demanding the retirement of the rayon procurator Pintyak. After a discussion with the chief of the rayon internal affairs division, Dmitriyev, they all dispersed." Another news item: "On the night of 31 August in the village of Mayak in Grigoriopolskiy Rayon, an unidentified person stole the Moldavian SSR flag from the roof of shop No 1 of the rayon radio center." "On 31 August at 1430 hours in the village of Sloboziya, a group of about 500 local residents went up to the rayon internal affairs division building, shouted 'Down with the Tricolor' and demanded that the Moldavian SSR flag be removed from this building. After useless negotiations the flag was removed and turned over to the village soviet. Not long before this state flags were removed from the buildings of the procuracy and the people's court." "On 31 August at about 1500 hours in the city of Bendery on Ulitsa Lenina, some unidentified people removed the Moldavian SSR state flag, set it on fire, and left it. A group of up to 300 people who had gathered in front of the store began to shout calls to remove the Moldavian SSR state flag from the buildings of law enforcement organs. As a result of measures taken by rayon internal affairs division workers and the conversation that was held, the incident was settled. Measures are being taken to determine the identities of the individuals who tore down the flag." "On the night of 1 September in the city of Belts on Ulitsa Lenina, 64 unidentified individuals removed the Moldavian SSR state flag from the building of the scientific library of the Pedagogical Institute imeni A. Russo."

These illegal actions, which are supported by certain forces, are not stopping. And the bureau of the Komratskiy Party Raykom must not think that its decision expresses the opinion of all Gagauzes when they assert that the "categorical, ill-considered statements of the republic leaders will lead to an aggravation of the situation." By today's publication even the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia showed that it supports not the proponents of the republic's integrity, but the Gagauz separatists. I ask you, esteemed Comrades, to consider this problem today, keeping in mind the fact that certain forces are stepping up their actions. I notify you that at the request of the Tiraspol separatist leaders, tonight, by order of the USSR deputy minister of internal affairs, a battalion of a militia regiment belonging to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs stationed in Kishinev was sent to Tiraspol to maintain public order and to provide for the necessary conditions for work by the 11th congress of people's deputies of all levels from certain population points of the Dnestr area. Just let anyone try to say that the center has nothing to do with this or that it is not directing the destabilizing actions in the republic. Down with the separatist leaders! Down with the Mankurts [mythical people without memory of ethnic origins—hence internationalists]! Not a single acre of our ancestors' land to satisfy the autonomous ambitions of the newcomers! Preserve the integrity of the state of Moldavia and defend our national dignity. Let us be worthy followers of Shtefan chel Mare.

Moldavian Party Official on Republic Tension

90UN2871B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 7 Sep 90 p 2

[Report on interview with Yevgeniy Sobor, secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee; place and date not given: "Two Steps to the Left, and Not a Step Backward"]

[Text] **The sociopolitical situation in the republic has been greatly aggravated of late. The republic legislature and government are looking for ways to surmount the tension. The Communist Party of Moldova [Moldavia] Central Committee Bureau has expressed its attitude toward the events that are taking place. But its attitude toward the republic Communist Party is equivocal, and the Bureau's position requires the addition of a few details, if one may put it that way. Therefore the editors of SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA addressed a number of questions to Yevgeniy Sobor, secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee, which he kindly agreed to answer. Below we offer for the readers' attention his answers to our questions.**

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Since the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldova there has been in the press an ever increasing flow of critical remarks against the party which, they say, is unable to rejuvenate itself. At the same time the creation of new parties has not justified the hopes for mass entry into their ranks. Should these processes be regarded as the end of the romantic period of democracy?

[Sobor] We must take a sober look at things. During the romantic period you are speaking of, the good intentions of many leaders evoked sympathy, but our voter is very capricious and wants quick changes, but there have been none. And this voter has started to think; he is being plagued by doubts. Has politics not become a prestigious profession here and one that is... fairly well paid. This pragmatism is not all that inoffensive. But still the voter is right: These days none of the political leaders is offering the people the worst kind of life today. But the problem is that good programs require good people to execute them. And this problem of the people who carry them out, according to my predictions, will perhaps be the most crucial problem for any party in the next two or three years. So critical remarks are being made against other parties and movements as well.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Yet even today when the Communist Party of Moldova is not in power, as they say, it is frequently reproached for today's troubles and crises. Why do you think that is?

[Sobor] That is quite natural. There are about 200,000 of us Communists. Our influence in the political sphere is not unquestioned. On the other hand, certain people are coming to the opinion that we want all but to be at the "peak" of the new legislature and government. This is the old psychology of "reaching for the extreme," and I want to emphasize once again that there is no party in the world that would not take national interests into account. Such parties are simply inviable, like man without oxygen.

This is why at the present time, now that we are beginning to develop the regulations and program of the Communist Party of Moldova—about which we could not even dream a year ago—it is very important to take into account the times in which we are living. The main thing is to get rid of our old ideological dogmas and ideas.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Apparently taking national factors into account frightens non-Moldovan Communists. After all, that has never been the case in the CPSU before.

[Sobor] No it has not, and today we are paying very dearly for it. But the national factor is not national egoism or extremism. The Universal Human Rights Declaration suggests to us that we cannot set national interests off against human rights. These two factors must be harmonized, and in the programs of many parties in the West these aspects are simply disclosed.

These aspects will occupy a worthy place in our program as well. Moreover, consensus and the search for ways to national accord will be our main tactic. There is no other path. Violence only breeds more violence. We are on the brink of a civil war and we must prevent it while there is still time. If we do not do this, future generations will be our judges. Therefore I call for the separatist leaders from the south and the Dnestr area to be reasonable and not toy with people's destinies. History will never forgive them for this.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] But calls to use force are being heard from the mouths of many deputies.

[Sobor] Fortunately not all deputies think that way. It is one thing when you use the traditional forms of upholding the Constitution and the laws. Any state, any executive authority should uphold the laws. There are the procuracy, the courts, the militia, and internal troops for this.

It is another matter when you hear the call "To arms!" This is what happened in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Do our mothers really have the same thing in store for them. Can it be that what has happened in other republics recently has taught us nothing?

I like what they did recently in Georgia: Instead of a call to arms, eminent creative workers created a committee for national harmony and immediately held its congress. That is an example of common sense for you!

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Again there are all kinds of discussions of conspiracies on the "right," and just as it was a year ago we are hearing about the idea that Communists have placed obstacles on the path to perestroyka. This can be found in particular on the pages of the press of the Moldovan People's Front.

[Sobor] Moldova is not the only place where these processes are typical. There is a keen political struggle going on. In this situation as never before we need flexible tactics. We must not "drown" in long political disputes and discussions but provide an example for other parties and social movements of the ability to conduct disputes and defend our opinion. There is a struggle of ideas, and you will get nowhere with the strength of your vocal chords and the violence of your language alone. We will never allow ourselves to try that. The intellectual level of the Communist Party of Moldova is high enough to provide an example of political culture.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Nonetheless, many of our opponents think that the conservative party ranks impeding the processes of rejuvenation in the republic are strong. Do you share their opinion?

[Sobor] Yes, I do. And there are conservative forces not only in the party but also in society. And I think we should unite around this "idea," and precisely on a platform of fighting against "right-wing" forces in spite of our ideological differences. Here we should have unity of all parties and movements. The more the "left" can clarify who is who, the more convenient it will be for the "right."

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] There are many reproaches against the Communist Party Central Committee because you are not taking measures against the communist leaders of Tiraspol, Bendery, Rybnitsa, and the south of the republic who are torpedoing the execution of the laws and working in the direction of separatism. How does this problem look for the future?

[Sobor] I think that even a child can see that sanctions are no longer in fashion and are ineffective. As for party measures of influence, extreme measures are taken when political methods have been exhausted. At P.K. Luchinskiy's level in the Central Committee there have been repeated meetings with the leaders of these cities and rayons. I must admit that we have adopted laws on the state language, on the flag, and on sovereignty, but nobody in these cities has done any explanatory work. And Prime Minister Mircha Druk was right when he said in the legislature that we were all worrying about our brothers beyond the Prut and forgetting about the Moldovans of the Dnestr area. Somehow I have not seen representatives of other parties and social formations at meetings with labor collectives in the Dnestr area.

Whether we like it or not, the reality is this: More than 1.5 million people of indigenous nationalities have to be "acclimatized" to the process of national rejuvenation; they must be given guarantees that this process will not infringe upon their rights. If we inform everyone of these two aspects, it will be more difficult for the "irreconcilable" leaders to work and the people will not follow them. This is the tactic we envisage.

Yes, we can also adopt severe measures of party influence, but I am still not sure that they will not raise the tricolor flag in Tiraspol the next day. We need time and then the people will understand what is what. We should not be thinking about sanctions but about the subject of compromise and consensus. I see no other path. But at the meeting at the "Mezone" I did say: If you find a leader who offers an alternative to consensus that is better, you should award him the Nobel Prize.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] But what can help the Communist Party of Moldova in the reorientation of the "irreconcilables"?

[Sobor] Only work with people. We will achieve nothing from a "position of power." We are in favor of political methods and we are inviting all parties and social movements to work together to develop unified tactics in this area. So to accuse the party of "complicity" with "right-wing" forces is, to put it mildly, not nice; and if it is done for political purposes this device is doomed to fail. People will be convinced of this of their own accord. There are things for which to reproach and criticize us. We are still slowly "moving to the left," and that is not to the party's advantage. We are not thinking about becoming a barrier in the legislature on the path to renewal. We do not intend to torpedo government plans for bringing the republic out of its crisis. But that does not mean that we have the right to criticize another idea, to express our opinion on one law or another. I dare say that if in the legislature we do not have a critical interpretation of the draft laws and alternatives, as well as a competitive spirit of views and positions, we will never see renewal. We will remain provincials.

We will be adopting fateful laws. If there are no alternatives, I am afraid that they will be "unworkable" laws.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] You noted that the party is still slowly "moving to the left." But does it not seem to you that the current party workers do not have enough experience in the "left" movement?

[Sobor] I agree that they do not have enough experience. But today we are more emancipated. We have already initiated a direct exchange with other parties. We have already exchanged information with the socialists of Spain and have held a dialogue with the Communists of Argentina. We have before us an exchange of experience with the social democrats of the FRG and the communists of Italy. We are strengthening ties like these, and our goal is the exchange of experience.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] In one interview you said that the Communist Party of Moldova is conducting a centrist policy with its tactics. What is this?

[Sobor] You noted this correctly, but today I would add the words "radical reforms." There are essential differences between the centrist line and the lines of the "left" and the "right," and all the kinds of "ultras" and "extremes." On the basis of a centrist platform it is possible to unite healthy forces and gradually proceed toward a consensus through mutual compromises. Why do we prefer centrism? The fact is that many political movements, perhaps without even noticing are now striving toward authoritarian forms of existence. This is a kind of Bonapartism articulated by the romantic period of democracy. And the day will come when there will be mass disenchantment with such "democracies." Why? Guess for yourself; after all, they have adopted the old methods and the old diseases of the Communist Party which they themselves have already discussed. Therefore I think that centrism is a real guarantee against authoritarian power, and the masses will accept this idea.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] On which nonparty forces does the Communist Party of Moldova wish to rely under the conditions of a multiparty system?

[Sobor] Apparently, it will be necessary to make certain adjustments: We must take in not those who cry out most frequently and loudly but those who think best and act best.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Does it not seem to you that the 28th CPSU Congress has not had its final say about social democracy? After all, many expected bolder steps to meet them half way.

[Sobor] I agree. For some reason we are afraid to admit that Lenin was a social democrat for 20 years of his revolutionary life, and this is where the Communist Party came from. Unfortunately, in our ranks people who have sympathy for social democracy are looked on as ideological traitors.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] But does perestroyka need social democracy?

[Sobor] I personally have no doubt. And the sooner we begin to explain all of our disagreements and points of agreement, the better it will be for perestroyka and for the Communist Party. And we should "move left" in the direction of social democracy, which has something to teach us on the plane of humane and not militarized socialism. Incidentally, they also have good experience in looking for a consensus.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] But do the social democrats want to come together with the Communists.

[Sobor] Apparently we must admit our previous mistakes regarding the social democrats. In the second place, we have one point of support—the socialist idea. In the third place, we must once and for all get rid of the words

"dictatorship" and class approach. These things will make it easier for us to come together.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] But will there not be a merging of Communists with social democrats or vice versa?

[Sobor] Our coming together with the social democrats does not mean "unification" or ideological single combat. We have one goal in cooperating with the social democrats: enrichment of the socialist idea and human rights. They have something to learn about these things.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Many people are asking themselves: Should we not return the name socialist to our party now or call it a party of democratic socialism?

[Sobor] Our party is not psychologically prepared for that. In the minds of many Communists this would be the same as betrayal. Obviously we must conduct active political education. For many Communists are not aware of the social democratic views of Marx and Lenin. But I believe that the time will come, and we prefer to be pragmatic. Nobody is prevented from dreaming, including about the communist ideal.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Many social democratic parties have been created in the country. But some of them do not have the word "socialism" in their programs. What kind of "new" socialists are they?

[Sobor] The "left" and "right" flanks of socialism have already been clearly defined. The former are in favor of the socialist ideal and the latter waver between the liberals and N. Travkin's democratic party.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] We have instituted the post of president in our republic. How, in your view, should the president conduct himself under the conditions of a multiparty system?

[Sobor] Any president of any country knows that there are people behind even the smallest party. Previously everything boiled down to one ruling party. Times are different now. I would suggest that as a part of the institution of the presidency we institute an advisory council for parties and movements represented in the legislature. In my view, such a council would facilitate the president's work of making decisions and achieving national harmony. Incidentally, in Bulgaria Zhelyu Zhelev began his presidency by doing this.

[SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA] Does it not seem to you that the "right-wing" one fine day might decide upon a "resolute battle" under the banner of the difficulties and the deepening crisis?

[Sobor] We must not ignore such a prediction and lose our vigilance. I think we have already taken a step to the left. We need even bolder steps in the direction of the left and not a single step backward. Otherwise, what we were just talking about will come true.

Moldavia's Luchinskiy Discusses Political Climate

90UN2826A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 15 Sep 90 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova, Moldavia, Central Committee, by correspondent O. Grabovskiy; date and place not given: "Policy of Common Sense"]

[Text] Kishinev—[Grabovskiy] Petr Kirillovich, is some in any way substantiated forecast of the social and political situation in the republic possible today? What are its ingredients?

[Luchinskiy] The situation remains complex. Unfortunately, people's hopes for a change for the better have not been justified yet. Although the policy of perestroyka—which is based on common sense and man's primordial aspiration to good deeds—has afforded this opportunity, we are still evidently insufficiently knowledgeable about and take insufficiently into consideration the laws of social development. And no wonder. The instrument with which they come to be known—dialectical thinking—has lain neglected on the dusty shelf of dogmatism since the Stalin times. For this reason the noble socialist idea, formulated by the best minds of mankind, was not only profaned but also discredited.

Well some day mankind may put up a monument of gold to the fact that, while traversing one corridor representing a version of social development, we closed the door, having written thereon: "No Entry!" Meanwhile it has to be stated that totalitarianism has inflicted big losses even on the party which was built into the state apparatus and decided virtually everything via it. On the other hand, the party apparatus merely duplicated the decisions. In addition, this activity completed the circle with the rayon and city party committees. In order to accomplish vital party business it is necessary to go lower—to the primary party organizations. But they were lacking in rights and condemned to the unquestioning approval of directives.

Without feedback stagnation began. We not only failed to acquire new knowledge and experience, but we also lost what had been accumulated. Of course there have always been and will continue to be in the party clever, knowledgeable people and innovative individuals, but in this case I am speaking about the situation that took shape in the party as a whole. For this reason I shall not venture to map out a forecast. What kind of instrument is there to determine it? The corresponding institutes and sociological barometers were formed long ago and have long been in existence in the West. But we have been deprived of this and essentially do not have sociologists and political scientists. True, Academician Zaslavskaya is attempting to do some things, and in our republic we are orienting certain institutes and establishments toward sociopolitical research, but as before we

have an inadequate knowledge of the society in which we live. Is it possible in this case to predict anything?

The reality is thus: people's moods depend on a material basis, sufficiency. An improvement in the state of affairs in the economy is not to be expected immediately. We need to radicalize the reform and move more quickly toward the market. But how? By abandoning everything that has gone before? Consequently revolution, "our last and decisive one" once again? A majority of supporters of the second version has emerged in the last six months, and their numbers even in the state authorities is continuing to grow.

It seems to me that people are tired of such turnabouts and are increasingly coming to recognize the disastrous nature of spasmodic development. But the radicals are stubbornly demanding: remove, alter, throw out the things of yesterday, and together with them socialism—both as an idea and a system. We all went through this ages ago. It is finally time to grow up, separate the wheat from the chaff, and create the conditions for the achievement of harmony in society and mutual understanding. Without this, I see nothing good ahead.

[Grabovskiy] What can you say about the situation of the Communist Party of Moldova and its position in the alignment of political forces in the republic?

[Luchinskiy] Essentially attempts are being made to push us out of the political arena. We appeal to the people: Is it fair if the CPSU, having initiated perestroyka, transferring power to the soviets and the government, wishes to participate in the creation of the country's future? We need to do everything possible to work together with legislature, the government, and social and political forces. We need to think first and foremost about the people.

As far as I can I try to avoid conflicts, arguments, and inflaming tension, believing that this is currently malapropos. But not everyone understands me and even perceives these steps as concessions and a yielding of positions. But can we under present conditions be ruled by personal ambition? Politics is the art of the possible. And alas, our possibilities currently are not that great. What are merely empty store shelves worth? Therefore when people appeal to me not to surrender positions, I ask: Which precisely? A small republic, a small people, and no one is surrendering positions. General struggle! But the ordinary individual, for whom things are now going badly and becoming even worse because of the fighting, has been forgotten.

[Grabovskiy] You are known as a politician devoted to the achievement of concord and dialogue between different political forces. But does this exhaust a politician's arsenal of weapons? What about struggle for public opinion and people's hearts and minds?

[Luchinskiy] We are talking, I think, about different things. The point is that we are endeavoring to achieve consensus on the basis of ideas that society is prepared to accept and realize. But then it happens the other way round also: It accepts but does not realize.... In the dialectic of the struggle and unity of opposites, we have made an absolute of struggle, having forgotten about unity. First of all, we need to sit down at a common negotiating table. Not only the Communists and representatives of various social and political forces and groupings, but also the government and the state authorities. The legislature should be the sponsor of this.

[Grabovskiy] What is the alignment of forces in the republic Supreme Soviet now?

[Luchinskiy] I cannot make a precise evaluation since the elections to it, as well as to other legislatures of the Union republics, were conducted not along party lines but on the basis of the deputies' personal characteristics. That is, haphazardly. First, evidently the parties should have been formed and then the election campaign conducted. Perhaps those who are calling for new elections in our country are right. But we need to be persuaded of the need for them and to agree on when this might best be done. When a multiparty system has been enshrined, the real alignment of forces may be evaluated. But for now it fluctuates, depending on this specific problem or the other.

All of us, party professionals included, lack experience of legislative activity.

But people are grumbling: How can this be; all the problems were in the superstructure, and it has finally been changed. And life has become worse? It is time for all participants in the political argument to grasp that the interests of the people are above all else. And for this reason it is necessary, having cast aside all personal ambition, to come together for two or three years and hold out until the market economy starts to produce results.

[Grabovskiy] Perestroyka is synonymous with revolution. What is your attitude toward its main question—concerning power?

[Luchinskiy] I believe it contains a nuance of outdated ideas. According to the program of the CPSU, its policy is the power of the party masses, the power of the people. The mechanism of this sovereignty is being shaped little by little. But if we remain in the old positions and constantly cling to powers of command, there will once again be a clash from which no good will come to anyone. However, we have proclaimed that we are moving toward a civilized democratic state based on the rule of law! The possessor of power will be determined by the people themselves via the expression of their pleasure at elections. The former word combination "vanguard role" grates on the ear and evokes recollections of the totalitarian past. In addition, such a role is not declared by a party but recognized by the people themselves. And for this reason we need to openly demonstrate our capacity for expressing the interests of the masses. The CPSU should daily and hourly prove to itself and others the right to be the leader, being in the

thick of events together with the other political forces, and offer its versions of a solution of urgent problems.

[Grabovskiy] Your attitude toward the following contradiction: Eight out of every 10 deputies in the legislature of Moldova are communist deputies, but decisions are at times adopted that run counter to the party position.

[Luchinskiy] What we have here, I believe, is an outdated stereotype reflecting the former cult of executant discipline. After all, democratization has proclaimed that a deputy is accountable only to his electorate. Many communist deputies have yet to determine their own position. The Second Congress of the People's Front of Moldova adopted a decision on the impermissibility of dual membership of the Peoples' Front of Moldova and the CPSU. The process of withdrawal from the party following this intensified markedly. But not to such an extent as to justify the anticommunists' expectations. I believe that the situation will be clearer by the end of autumn. Meanwhile more than 3,000 persons have quit the CPSU since the start of the year. But 1,500 have joined it also. A deficit balance, but on the other hand the kind of people who are joining!

A serious contribution on the part of the party to the legislature's activity would be the unification of the communist deputies in factions and clubs. We have forgotten that clubs are a tried and tested form of legislative activity. Not in the plane of confrontation, of course, although even this cannot be ruled out. Say five or six such clubs are formed in the legislature. Interaction between them, benevolent but not without adherence to principle, would assist the formulation of documents and the preparation of public opinion.

[Grabovskiy] During meetings with the work force, particularly on the Russian-speaking Left Bank, you have frequently been rebuked for the passive position of the leadership of the party organization of the republic in its legislature....

[Luchinskiy] Many people had become accustomed to the following situation: The master will come, the master will settle things. Let the party or state leader tell us how to proceed. But now the task is for as many people as possible, the Communists primarily to participate actively in collective discussion and decisionmaking. Should the first secretary of the Central Committee be speaking on all matters as before?

[Grabovskiy] Not on all of course, but on matters of principle, for example during discussion of the Decree on Power, when it was a question of the dismantling of the party authorities in institutions and at enterprises.

[Luchinskiy] There is nothing reprehensible in the decree itself. It is a question here of a normal phenomenon—the handover of power to the soviets, that is the people. We voted point by point. I believe that the one that does not allow party-political leadership at the enterprises was adopted in haste. It is contrary to the constitution—to citizens' rights to associate in political parties.

Opposing this decision, I recalled that in accordance with the CPSU Rules adopted by the 28th CPSU Congress, the Communist Parties of the republics operate within the framework of their republics' constitutions, and that we would live by the same laws as all of Moldova. But I was not understood. Nor was the proposal for a postponement of a decision on this matter until the enactment of the law on parties supported either. But the party committees are not being pulled out of the enterprises. After all, the decree speaks only of the impermissibility of party leadership of the plant management, for example. In a normal market economy it is necessary to be guided by its objective laws.

Although the party committees may remain at the enterprises, it is necessary to assimilate in full the production-territorial principle of the work of the party organizations also. What would we have to lose? After all, 10 years ago we were even calling on the Communists to set an example both in work and in social life. Work at the place of residence affords new opportunities.

It is here that the electoral districts are formed and that the road to the legislature begins—an immense amount of work. It is essential to create party clubs. We are thinking of assigning the first part of the premises of the Political Culture Center formed under the auspices of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee. We see it as having its doors constantly wide open to all Communists and nonparty persons who may conduct debates and hold meetings here; obtain advice from Central Committee and city party committee officials; or simply meet with friends, relax, and watch a film.

It is also appropriate to give thought to how we work with the unions. After all, it is through them that parties operate throughout the world. However, we have forgotten this. Party policy may be pursued via the Communists who are members not only of the unions but also the Communist Youth League [Komsomol], other public organizations, the work force councils, and so forth. In a word, we need to involve ourselves in the creation of party clubs in earnest with regard for the specifics of each district.

There are already examples of the Communists' fruitful work under multiparty conditions. A council of representatives of all public and political forces, movements, and organizations has been created in a village of Brichanskiy Rayon, for example. It incorporates together with the Communists the unions, Komsomol members, the women's council, veterans, believers, and so forth. Discussing current problems of the life of the village, it adopts a collective decision and familiarizes the work force and the citizens with it. There has been no friction in the village. Another village of Chimishliyskiy Rayon, where a similar council has been formed, lives without discord also.

[Grabovskiy] We are approaching a multiparty system, pluralism is thriving, and in places is raging. But how

may we evaluate the ordinance of the republic's government on the disbandment of the "Gagauz Khalky" popular movement? And what is your attitude toward the recent events on the Left Bank, is it the intention to proclaim a Dnestr Republic?

[Luchinskiy] I was in Komrat and spoke with many people. A pile of problems and personal adversities and grievances have built up for people, and national self-awareness is making itself felt at full voice. However, it is necessary to move from the particular to the general. Comrades, I tell them, the situation in the country and the republic right now is quite something! What are you doing, can you not see—you have struck a match to a powder keg. First, is the decision to create a Gagauz republic constitutional? Will this solve all social problems? On the Bujak steppe where Gagauz, Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians, Germans, and representatives of other nationalities have gotten along peaceably down the ages, they arose long ago and will not be removed overnight. Haste and a desire to take advantage of perestroyka is evident.

Take that same secession from Moldova. Was this an issue earlier? For Moldova this was like a bolt from the blue. Stirring people up on the basis of national feelings is easy, but extremely dangerous. However, there is the proposal, on which agreement could be reached, for the Gagauz to be granted national-cultural autonomy which would make it possible to solve many problems, the revival of the language and culture, the development of education, and so forth. A coordinating center could be formed also. Let us act together but in accordance with the law. However, these arguments have not been accepted.

As far as the events that occurred recently on the Left Bank are concerned, it has to be said without going into details of problems arising there—from political through linguistic and connected also with the new official symbols of Moldova—that the acts that are being staged are aimed essentially at unlawful changes in the constitutional arrangement and the undermining of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. The separatist actions of the Gagauz and Dnestr area leaders acting on behalf of the whole population of these regions are contrary to the sovereignty and vital interests of the republic, complicating relations between people, destabilizing the social and political atmosphere to the utmost, and leading to impasse.

In this complex and contradictory situation some Communists and certain party committees locally have been unable to prevent the anticonstitutional, separatist actions and the adoption of unlawful decisions. Forbearance, composure, wisdom when deciding political questions, and a desire by joint efforts to look for ways out of this situation are required of leaders of the republic of all levels more than ever. For a solution of the tightened knot of national problems in the country it is essential to speed up the conclusion of a new Union treaty and the introduction of market relations.

[Grabovskiy] However, the documents of the Second Congress of the People's Front of Moldova—an influential social and political force in the republic—say not a word about the principles of the new Union treaty and propose that the republic rename itself the Romanian Republic of Moldova.

[Luchinskiy] The attitude toward this congress was set forth in concentrated form in the corresponding statement of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee Bureau. The data of sociological research attest that the proposal to rename the republic does not reflect the wishes of the majority of the people and would lead to a further exacerbation of interethnic discord. We advocate the sovereignty of the republic and are opposed to a change of borders in Europe and are convinced that the intentions of all forces denying the right of Moldova to national integrity and sovereignty, as also the separatist tendencies, are contributing merely to an escalation of tension in the republic. Yes we aspire to equal dialogue and the mutual understanding of all political forces and groupings. However, the Communist Party of Moldova emphatically dissociates itself from those who are attempting to defame V.I. Lenin and to slander the party and the socialist system.

[Grabovskiy] On whom can the party now rely, who might serve as its social base? After all, the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldova spoke of the danger of a split along national, professional, and even geographical lines: the Right and Left banks, and now the South also....

[Luchinskiy] I believe that the social base concept, as it was formerly understood, is in need of adjustment. The overall level of development of the worker and peasant is now quite high and approximates that which the intelligentsia possesses. Relations in connection with the means of production, on the other hand, are identical for virtually all—no one is the proprietor as yet. Opportunities have been afforded for people's unification not on a social, professional, or other basis, but on the basis of ideas, platforms, and programs. I believe that there should be no strict, and at times artificial division into workers, peasants, and intellectuals now. Instead it is the business of labor unions to define their ranks by the professional principle, although we are closer to the working class and working peasantry inasmuch as the idea of humane socialism is closer to man the toiler. Incidentally, the intellectual is such also. As a whole, it is a question here of the category of people in need of social protection.

[Grabovskiy] What is your attitude toward the proposal of the Left Bank Communists concerning the convening in the fall of a republic party conference and the formulation of the tactics of a party in opposition?

[Luchinskiy] I am constantly troubled by the question of whether now, in the current acute situation in the republic, we need to be adding fuel to fire and pushing the party toward a split. The Left Bank's idea of creating

its own party organization is based on the idea of autonomy. In Komrat, also, some people are calling for the creation of their own independent Communist Party....

[Grabovskiy] No, the processes occurring in the party, society, the country, and in people's minds currently are not simple. How, nonetheless, does an internationalist become a nationalist?

[Luchinskiy] This is a very subtle, delicate sphere. I acknowledged at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Moldova recently that in the present situation, given this polarization of opinions and positions, I sincerely envy people to whom all is clear.... Let us recall the classics of Marxism: Any phenomenon needs to be perceived in the context of the actual historical situation. And it is such that even comparatively recently people who wished to speak in their native language and write in Latin script were not only persecuted along party lines, but tried and sentenced even. What should we do now? One person considers himself an internationalist, accusing another of nationalism. On what grounds? Where are the criteria? If I ardently love my people, land, customs, then am I a nationalist? I believe that he who merely idealizes his culture, is scornful of any other and calls for the solution of his own problems at the expense of the interests of another people is such.

Naturally, national feelings among all of us are heightened currently, because at moments of profound crisis a people has always turned to its genetic memory, seeking spiritual strength in its depths. Of course the national question has two sides: the progressive—the growth of national self-awareness—and the negative—a clash with the interests of other reviving nations. But this is a question of the overall level of the development of culture and spirituality.

[Grabovskiy] Will not the party repeat the fate of its sisters in the East European countries?

[Luchinskiy] It all depends on the conditions and particular features of the development of this country and of the other. Our party was for a long time the ruling party and, granted all the mistakes and miscalculations, did much that was good. People remember this and for a long time to come will gravitate toward its experience. And the party itself, having been the sponsor of perestroyka, is now also undergoing an agonizing but progressive process of renewal and self-cleansing.

After all, it has not taken up positions of perimeter defense, but has thrown itself wide open to constructive ideas.

The main task for all of us is the revival of the individual man, his courage and his capacity for independently getting his bearings in today's collisions, and opting for a position and defending it. That we are all emphatically breaking with dual morality and general fear is to the immense credit of the party's progressive forces who have acted in the most difficult periods of its history. It is now essential that we all understand that right now is the moment when the fate of each is in his own hands.

Democratization, glasnost, and the new electoral system will make it possible to achieve in the legislature an appropriate reflection of the situation taking shape in society, together find effective ways of solving problems, create feedback between the leadership and the public, and ensure its control over the activity of the upper strata. In a word, to achieve the genuine power of the people. And this being the case, we will assuredly remain loyal to the noble and humane socialist idea. And as long as the dream of universal brotherhood and the aspiration to justice are alive, people will join us and our party will live.

Moldavian Nationalism Sparks Russian Backlash

PM0210143990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Sep 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin under the rubric "Moldova: Political Review": "Who Is Waving the Red Flag There?"]

[Text] On 6 September a number of central newspapers carried a TASS report on the USSR president's meeting with the president of the Moldovan [Moldavia] SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. M.I. Snegur and M.G. Druk "confirmed their conviction that the Moldavian Sovereign Republic can develop successfully and advance along the path of social renewal only as part of the USSR." M.S. Gorbachev in turn said "that he firmly adheres to positions of preserving the republic's integrity as part of a union of sovereign states." At the same time this was added: "Interethnic relations are a particularly delicate matter which demands considered decisions and precise regard for a whole multiplicity of interests and for the consequences of any steps." Although the TASS report did not say a word about either the Gagauz Republic or the Dnestr Moldavian SSR, it was clear to a reader attentively following events in the country what had given rise to the meeting in the Kremlin. It was obviously the emergence of these two new realities of the political situation in Moldova.

The report of the meeting between the Union president and the republic president was greeted with restraint in Tiraspol. Igor Nikolayevich Smirnov, head of the provisional Supreme Soviet of the Dnestr Moldavian SSR, told me:

"We had expected instant recognition of our republic only from the population of the Dnestr region. And we were not mistaken in our expectations here. But in taking this forced step, we were nonetheless counting and continue to count on a certain degree of understanding of our problems on the part of the Union leadership."

The degree of understanding of the present situation on the part of M.I. Snegur, president of the republic, was

expressed quite definitely in his report at the 2 September session. In particular, it includes these points: "Reactionary, antiperestroyka forces... are operating with unprecedented frenzy and effrontery;" "to further their unhealthy ambitions the leaders of Tiraspol, Bendery, Rybnitsa, Kamenka, Komrat, Chadyr-Lunga, and other places are seeking to achieve their personal aims at the expense of the Moldavian people;" "this is the height of shamelessness and effrontery, the apogee of a lack of humanity, responsibility, and gratitude;" and "let someone try to maintain that the center has no bearing on this and does not direct the destabilizing actions in the republic." And the ending: "Down with separatist leaders! Down with mankurts [an allusion to zombie-like creatures]! Not one inch of the land of our forefathers to satisfy the autonomy ambitions of newcomers!"

This was how M.I. Snegur began the "dialogue" with Tiraspol. The legislative majority supported him in still stronger terms relayed throughout the republic.

I observed the reaction to the "legislative terms" while among the addressees, as it were. I think that, if some dignitary of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet were able to follow with his own eyes the destructive impact of his incautious words, which give rise to blind anger and a reciprocal desire to insult and humiliate, then "mankurts," "newcomers," and many other terms that today sometimes slip so easily off the tongue of an angry people's deputy would probably disappear from the legislative lexicon. For we cannot admit the thought that there are people within the legislative body of Moldova with an interest in fanning misanthropy and interethnic enmity, and who consciously insult the human and national dignity of their own fellow citizens.

It is precisely such an emotional response that contains, in my view, one of the keys to understanding the "Dnestr situation." At a certain stage people got the feeling that account had ceased to be taken of them. Why did this feeling arise? Were there real reasons for it? And if it was hypochondria, what caused it? Unfortunately, the Moldavian parliament did not deem it necessary to devote serious attention to these questions. It was evidently thought far simpler to proclaim all the unrest on the Left Bank to be the intrigues of a handful of leading workers fighting for their cushy jobs or else "great Russian" ambitions—they allegedly refuse to learn even a couple of Moldavian words. However, there was cause for discontent and alarm. Dnestr people's deputies have spoken of it repeatedly from the legislative rostrum.

The Left Bank is a major industrial region. The volume of output produced there makes up one-third of the total volume of output in the republic. Consumer goods production makes up 55.9 percent of republican production. More than one-third of Moldova's vegetables are grown in Left Bank fields.... And this despite the fact that just 17 percent of the republic's population lives there. Tiraspol alone puts 550 million rubles [R] into the budget of the Moldovan SSR. But the republic's contribution to resolving the social and economic tasks facing the region is disproportionately small. This is the belief of the Dnestr region's leaders. But whereas until recently particular shortfalls in deliveries of stock materials and consumer goods as well as interruptions in food supplies were viewed in the context of the all-Union situation—i.e. as flaws of centralized planning and defects of the whole system—over the past year both the population of the Left Bank and its leaders have taken a sharply politicized view of all kinds of shortfalls in deliveries and suspiciousness has arisen on ethnic grounds. The Moldovan Supreme Soviet's decision to institute the "tricolor" as the state flag, the law "On the Functioning of Languages," and the Moldavian language's switch to a Latin script acted as the catalyst for stormy mass actions.

Why has the generally good aim of reviving Moldavian statehood and the Moldavian people's language and culture given rise to such a strong wave of indignation in the Dnestr region? Why in fact are its inhabitants so alarmed? Surely it is not really because, as Moldovan President M.I. Snegur said, "they do not like the Moldavian language and alphabet, do not like the history of the Moldavian people, and do not accept the latter's desire for freedom and progress"?

I have visited many enterprises in the Dnestr region, including such ones known throughout the Union as "Moldavizolit" and "Tochlitmash," met with the workers and leadership of the Moldavian GRES [State Regional Electric Power Station], spoken with the rural inhabitants of Slobodzeyskiy Rayon—Russians, Ukrainians, Moldavians.... And not one person has said to me a single bad word about the Moldavian people or their language and culture. On the other hand, there have unfortunately been many examples where ignorance or poor knowledge of the Moldavian language and the Latin script have resulted in insults and unpleasantness for people.

Why has something purely voluntary—involvement with the traditions, language, and culture of another people (and in which civilized country is such involvement accomplished by force?)—suddenly turned out to be a real disaster, and something rigidly compulsory for thousands upon thousands of people?

"At our station," G. Zhelyapov, director of the Moldavian GRES, told me, "21 percent of the workers are Moldavian. Of these, seven percent are engineering and technical personnel. It has so happened that the republic has never trained its own specialists in power generation. And this station was built by specialists from all over the country. Many then remained here. Russian is the language of communication. I would say that everyone here has greeted with enthusiasm the republic's movement toward national revival. The workers themselves displayed initiative and set up circles to learn Moldavian. But then the law on languages came out and obliged Russian speakers to learn Moldavian and to sit examinations, and it generally made it compulsory as it were:

Do it like this and no other way. And attendance at the circles at once fell, and they closed down. The creation of the Dnestr Moldavian SSR was announced 2 September, and the very next day the circles began functioning once again and were busier than ever."

Is this example not food for legislative thought? And in general, why not think about the origins of this thousands-strong army of aggrieved and alarmed people? How is it that an ordinary warehouseman in Kishinev can take the liberty of setting a test in Moldavian for a driver who has come for freight from Tiraspol—according to the testimony of "Tochlitmash" drivers M. Kol and A. Kikhoyal—and such a test, moreover, that you can only flee? How has it come about that precisely the lower classes with criminal propensities have appropriated the right to keep an eye on how the laws of the Moldavian legislature are fulfilled? They and the enthusiastic officials in Kishinev who have switched business correspondence and documentation into Moldavian and the Latin script in a hasty and peremptory manner—thereby overnight making many, many people illiterate—have essentially become "plenipotentiaries" of the new legislative policy for hundreds of thousands of people. For it was certainly no coincidence that the special commission sent by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium last September to ascertain the causes of the month-long strike in which approximately 280 enterprises participated in all, arrived at the conclusion that "the main cause of the strike was the failure of the republic's party and soviet leadership to take timely radical measures against extremists, nationalists, chauvinists, separatists, and instances of outrages upon the Soviet flag and of hysteria in hounding the non-Moldavian-speaking population from the republic's territory." Alas, no action was taken on the lofty commission's warnings.

Most importantly, people have stopped feeling secure. Thugs burst into the Supreme Soviet building and try to beat up deputies from the Dnestr region—the culprits are not found. The Russian youth Dima Matyushin is killed in downtown Kishinev before the eyes of dozens of people—the culprits are not found. Here are recent facts: The headquarters of "Unity" and the editorial office of MOLODEZH MOLDAVII are smashed up, bulldozers destroy the dacha settlement of Bendery enterprise workers—once again with the full connivance of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs. And yet in thoroughly politicized Moldova the government and legislature must make an instant assessment of such facts and do everything to name the guilty persons and to punish them in accordance with the law.

The emergence on the political scene of such new formations as the Gagauz Republic and the Dnestr Moldavian SSR is a glaring symptom of ferment among those terrible processes which might not always be obvious to the eye but which inevitably arise when a policy of national revival is made crudely and hastily without adjustment for national minorities. At the same time, as a rule the lawmaking activity of a republican legislature is of the nature of "revolutionary law," i.e. whatever serves the interests of national revival is legitimate. And the bones of the USSR Constitution are crunched in the vigorous hands of republican legislaturearians. Thus, for example, the Moldavian legislature cast doubt on the legality of the Act of Proclamation of the Formation of the Moldavian SSR of 2 August 1940 because, in the opinion of people's deputies, the USSR occupied Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by force of arms in June 1940. And so people's deputies at all levels in the Dnestr region—delegates to the second congress—in turn decided that such a formulation of the question frees the Left Bank from all obligations to the Moldovan SSR because, prior to 1940, the Moldavian Autonomous SSR was on the territory of the left bank of the Dnestr. Thus the Dnestr Moldavian SSR was proclaimed. The legal nihilism of some gave others the right to improvise in the sphere of the law.

"Least of all," V. Rylakov, a leader of the United Council of Labor Collectives movement in the region, told me, "would I like us to be regarded as obstinate people not wishing to learn Moldavian and master the Latin script. It is a question of altering the political system, of the phased estrangement of Moldavia from the USSR. They are gradually preparing for us the lot of migrants in a multinational state. The Declaration on Sovereign Moldova sees the republic's future outside the USSR rather than as part of the Union. And just look at the decisions of the last MPF [Moldovan People's Front] Congress...."

The decisions of the Second MPF Congress really are impressive. Here are fragments of its resolutions: "The MPF urges the republic's indigenous population to be conscious that it belongs to the Romanian people" and "proposes that the republic's legislature renames the Romanian state formation to the east of the Prut River, giving it the official name of the Romanian Republic of Moldova;" "the Soviet Army penetrated the Romanian territory between the Dnestr and the Prut 28 June 1940 as an aggressive force of the totalitarian Soviet regime and is an army of occupation;" "the MPF Congress demands that all memorials, statues, and busts of Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), leader of the Bolsheviks, be taken down and that all the names of squares, enterprises, establishments, and population centers in the republic which bear his name be changed;" "the present name of Victory Square in Kishinev has nothing to do with our national history; on the contrary, it is a symbol of Soviet expansionism;" and "the MPF deems it necessary to regain the Romanian territories which passed arbitrarily to the jurisdiction of the Ukraine." I will only add that the MPF members and deputies who openly support the MPF program constitute a legislative majority.

...Red flags flutter in the fall wind of the Dnestr region above the roofs of houses, above plant gates and village soviets. Thousands-strong rallies and peasant assemblies. It is no secret that today both the most unshakably orthodox people and the most left-wing radical leaders

can march with identical determination beneath red calico. The color of street manifestations of our will is sometimes deceptive. And the question "Who is waving the red flag there?" now sounds not at all rhetorical.

So what do the red flags on the left bank of the Dnestr really signal today? Maybe to answer this question means looking into the future—our own personal future and that of the whole country?

Meanwhile, almost 700,000 left-bank "republicans," as well as incidentally all inhabitants of Moldova, are waiting and hoping that the words of the USSR president about the perniciousness of confrontation and suspicion in interethnic relations will be heard both in Tiraspol and in Kishinev.

Moldavian Law on President, Constitution Issued

90UN2887A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 9 Sep 90 p 1-2

[Law of the Moldova SSR on Establishment of the Office of President of the Moldova [Moldavia] SSR and on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions Into the Moldova SSR Constitution]

[Text] With the aim of strengthening the constitutional order and sovereignty of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]; consolidating the rights, freedoms, and security of citizens; and improving interaction among the highest organs of state power and government, the Supreme Soviet of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic resolves:

I. To institute the office of president of the Moldova SSR.

II. To introduce into the Moldova SSR Constitution the following amendments and additions:

1. To add to the Moldova SSR Constitution chapter 12 superscript 1 as follows:

"Chapter 12 superscript 1. The Moldova SSR President

"Article 113 superscript 1. The Moldova SSR president is the head of state of the Moldova SSR.

"Article 113 superscript 2. A citizen of the Moldova SSR at least 35 years of age, but not older than 60 years of age, may be elected president of the Moldova SSR.

"The position of president of the Moldova SSR may not be combined with any other job position.

"The president of the Moldova SSR is elected by citizens of the Moldova SSR on the basis of universal, equal, and direct electoral right, under free and secret voting procedure, to a five-year term. The same individual cannot be president of the Moldova SSR for more than two consecutive terms.

"There is no restriction on the number of candidates for the position of president of the Moldova SSR.

"Elections of president of the Moldova SSR are considered to be valid if more than 50 percent of the voters have participated in them.

"In the event no single candidate to the post of president of the Moldova SSR receives more than 50 percent of votes cast, a runoff election will take place between the two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in the election. In a runoff election, the candidate who receives a simple majority of the total number of votes of participating citizens is considered to have been elected.

"Procedure for elections of president of the Moldova SSR is determined by the Law on Elections of the President of the Moldova SSR.

"The president of the Moldova SSR cannot be a people's deputy of the Moldova SSR.

"Article 113 superscript 3. Upon his assumption of office, the president of the Moldova SSR swears an oath at a session of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The text of the oath of president:

"I solemnly swear that I will faithfully serve the people of the Moldova SSR; strictly observe the Constitution and other laws of the Moldova SSR; guarantee the equality, rights, and freedoms of citizens; and conscientiously fulfill the great obligations entrusted to me as president of the Moldova SSR."

An individual elected president of the Moldova SSR assumes his office upon taking the oath.

"Article 113 superscript 4. The president of the Moldova SSR:

"1) is the guarantor of the equality, rights, and freedoms of citizens of the Moldova SSR, and of observation of the Constitution and other laws of the Moldova SSR;

"2) undertakes necessary measures to protect the sovereignty of the Moldova SSR and the territorial integrity of the republic;

"3) represents the Moldova SSR within the republic and in international relations;

"4) ensures the interaction of the highest organs of state power and government of the Moldova SSR;

"5) submits annual reports to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet on the state of the republic, and informs the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet concerning the most important questions of domestic and foreign policy of the Moldova SSR;

"6) submits to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet for confirmation nominations to the posts of Moldova SSR prime minister, chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Court, Moldova SSR prosecutor, and Moldova SSR chief state arbiter; introduces proposals to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet on discharging these officials from

their responsibilities, with the exception of the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Court;

"7) submits proposals to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet on the personnel composition of the Moldova SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee;

"8) introduces the question of resignation or acceptance of resignation of the Moldova SSR Government before the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet; upon coordination with the Moldova SSR prime minister, discharges and appoints members of the Moldova SSR Government with subsequent presentation of these matters to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet for confirmation;

"9) signs Moldova SSR bills into law; has the right to return a law accompanied by his objections to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet within a two-week period for further discussion and voting. If the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet confirms its previously adopted decision through a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Moldova SSR people's deputies, the president of the Moldova SSR will sign the law;

"10) has the right to suspend resolutions and directives of the Moldova SSR Government;

"11) conducts negotiations and signs international agreements for the Moldova SSR; accepts letters of credential and recall of accredited diplomatic representatives of foreign states; appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Moldova SSR in foreign states and international organizations;

"12) presents state awards of the Moldova SSR;

"13) decides matters of Moldova SSR citizenship and the granting of asylum; grants pardons and amnesty to citizens convicted by courts of the Moldova SSR;

"14) determines measures necessary to guarantee state security and ensure social order in Moldova SSR territory; in the event of necessity, declares a state of war or state of emergency, as well as provisional presidential rule in certain regions of the Moldova SSR in the interests of protecting republic sovereignty and the safety of citizens. Legal provisions for a state of war, state of emergency, or presidential rule are established by law;

"15) suspends the activity of local soviets of people's deputies or dissolves them in instances as provided by law.

"Article 113 superscript 5. The Presidential Council of the Moldova SSR operates under auspices of the president of the Moldova SSR. It has the mission of drafting measures for implementing the basic aims of Moldova SSR domestic and foreign policy and providing for the security of the republic.

"Members of the Moldova SSR Presidential Council are appointed by the president of the Moldova SSR. By virtue of his job position, the Moldova SSR prime minister is a member of the Moldova SSR Presidential Council.

"The chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet has the right to participate in sessions of the Moldova SSR Presidential Council.

"Article 113 superscript 6. The president of the Moldova SSR has the right to establish other advisory organs on questions that fall under the scope of his authority, and to determine their composition and tasks.

"Article 113 superscript 7. The president of the Moldova SSR issues ukases based on and in execution of the Moldova SSR Constitution and other Moldova SSR laws, and laws and agreements ratified by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet. These ukases are mandatory in their application throughout the territory of the Moldova SSR.

"Article 113 superscript 8. The president of the Moldova SSR has immunity and can be removed from office only by decision of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet in the event he violates the Constitution or other laws of the Moldova SSR. Such a decision is made by a two-thirds vote of the total number of Moldova SSR people's deputies.

"Article 113 superscript 9. The president of the Moldova SSR can transfer execution of his responsibilities envisaged under points 11 and 12 of Article 113 superscript 4 to the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and the Moldova SSR prime minister, and of his responsibilities envisaged under point 13 of Article 113 superscript 4—to the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Article 113 superscript 10. If the president of the Moldova SSR is for one reason or another unable to further fulfill his responsibilities, his powers are transferred to the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet until a new Moldova SSR president is elected, and if this is impossible to the Moldova SSR prime minister. In this event, elections of a new Moldova SSR president must be conducted within a period of three months."

2. In connection with the addition to the Moldova SSR Constitution of Chapter 12 superscript 1, "The Moldova SSR President," to insert amendments and additions to the following articles of the Moldova SSR Constitution:

1) To add Article 96 Part 3, as follows:

"The powers of Moldova SSR people's deputies of all levels may be terminated by decision of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and the corresponding soviets of people's deputies in the event of systematic digression from participation in the work of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and its organs or the appropriate soviets of people's deputies without valid cause, repeated failure to execute laws and resolutions adopted by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and correspondingly by local soviets of people's deputies, and also for participation in

the work of anticonstitutional organs and their engagement in activity that runs contrary to the Moldova SSR Constitution and other legislative acts of the Moldova SSR."

2) To insert changes to Article 97 as follows:

to add Point 6 superscript 1, as follows:

"6 superscript 1) termination of the powers of Moldova SSR people's deputies in instances envisaged by Moldova SSR legislation";

to remove Point 9;

to renumber Points 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 as Points 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18;

to word Point 9 as follows:

"9) appointment upon nomination of the Moldova SSR president of the Moldova SSR prime minister; confirmation upon nomination of the Moldova SSR prime minister of the composition of the Moldova SSR Government and changes to it; formation and elimination upon recommendation of the Moldova SSR Government of Moldova SSR ministries and Moldova SSR state committees, other republic-level institutions and organizations";

to add Point 19 as follows:

"19) suspension of the activity of local soviets of people's deputies or their dissolution in instances envisaged by legislation";

to add Point 22 superscript 1 as follows:

"22 superscript 1) ratification of USSR laws and other legal acts of the organs of state power and government of the USSR";

to remove the wording "jointly with the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet" from Point 24;

to word Point 27 as follows:

"27) repeal of ukases and resolutions of the Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, ukases of the president of the Moldova SSR, resolutions and directives of the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, and resolutions and directives of the Moldova SSR government."

3) To word Article 100 as follows:

"Article 100. The first session of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet following elections is presided over by one of the Moldova SSR people's deputies most senior in age, and then by the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet or his deputies."

4) To add to Part 2 of Article 101, following the words "of the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet," the words "of the president of the Moldova SSR."

5) To word Articles 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, and 111 as follows:

"Article 102. The right of legislative initiative in the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet belongs to Moldova SSR people's deputies, the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, standing commissions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, the president of the Moldova SSR, government of the Moldova SSR, Moldova SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, rayon and city (republic-subordinated cities) soviets of people's deputies, Moldova SSR Supreme Court, Moldova SSR prosecutor, and Moldova SSR chief state arbiter.

"Also enjoying the right of legislative initiative are social organizations in the person of their republic organs, the Moldova SSR Academy of Sciences, and Moldova SSR Legal Collegium."

"Article 104. The Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, headed by the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, is formed to organize the work of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet. The composition of the Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet includes the first deputy chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, deputy chairmen of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, secretary of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, chairmen of standing commissions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet. Other people's deputies of the Moldova SSR may belong to the Presidium upon decision of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Article 105. The Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet:

"1) convenes regular and extraordinary sessions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet;

"2) accomplishes preparation for sessions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet;

"3) coordinates the activity of standing commissions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet;

"4) repeals decisions of rayon and city (republic-subordinate cities) soviets of people's deputies in the event of their nonconformance with the law;

"5) organizes the preparation and conduct of republic referendums, as well as people's discussions of Moldova SSR draft laws and other very important issues of state life;

"6) ratifies USSR laws and other legal acts of the organs of state authority and government of the USSR, with subsequent confirmation of ukases adopted in their regard by session of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet;

"7) examines issues of giving consent to bring charges against people's deputies by established procedure;

"8) exercises other powers established by the Constitution and other laws of the Moldova SSR, except those that relate to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Moldova

SSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, and president of the Moldova SSR.

"The Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet ensures the publication of Moldova SSR laws and other acts adopted by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and the Moldova SSR president in the Romanian, Russian, and when necessary other languages spoken by the republic population.

"The Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet issues ukases and adopts resolutions.

"Article 106. The chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet is elected by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet from the body of Moldova SSR people's deputies by secret ballot to a five-year term, but not for more than two consecutive terms. He is considered elected if he receives a majority of votes of the total number of Moldova SSR people's deputies. He may be recalled at any time by secret ballot of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, by at least a two-thirds majority of votes of the total number of Moldova SSR people's deputies.

"The chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet is accountable to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet.

"Article 107. The chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet:

"1) submits to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet nominations for election to the positions of first deputy chairman, deputy chairmen, and secretary of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet;

"2) exercises overall direction of the preparation of issues subject to examination at sessions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet;

"3) guides the activity of the Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet issues directives.

"The first deputy chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and deputy chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet fulfill, pursuant to the authority of the chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, the chairman's individual functions and replace him in the event of his absence or inability to fulfill his obligations.

"Article 108. Upon expiration of the term of office of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet retains its authority until such time as the newly elected Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet forms a new Presidium.

"Article 109. The Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet elects from the body of Moldova SSR people's deputies standing commissions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet to conduct draft legislation work, preliminary examination and preparation of issues falling under the jurisdiction of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, to facilitate execution of Moldova SSR laws and decisions adopted by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, and to monitor the activity of state organs and organizations.

"The Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet establishes investigative, auditing, and other commissions when necessary, on any issue, and makes changes in the composition of standing commissions.

"Article 110. Laws of the Moldova SSR, resolutions and other decisions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, are adopted following preliminary discussion of their drafts by appropriate standing commissions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The appointment and election of responsible officials to the Moldova SSR government, Moldova SSR Supreme Court, Moldova SSR Procuracy, and Moldova SSR State Arbitration Committee take place upon decision of the appropriate standing commissions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet.

"All state and social organs, organizations, and responsible officials are obliged to fulfill the demands of standing commissions, to provide them necessary materials and documents.

"The decisions of standing commissions are subject to mandatory examination by state and social organs, institutions and organizations. The results of examination and measures taken must be reported to the commissions within the time frame they have established.

"Article 111. A people's deputy of the Moldova SSR has the right, at sessions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, to present inquiry to the Moldova SSR president, Moldova SSR government, and leaders of organs formed or elected by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet. The organ or responsible official to whom the inquiry is addressed is obliged to deliver an oral or written reply at that session of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet within three days.

"Moldova SSR people's deputies have the right to be released from execution of their business or production responsibilities for the period of time necessary to accomplish their deputy activities in the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and its commissions, as well as among the population.

"A Moldova SSR people's deputy cannot be brought to criminal trial, arrested, or subject to administrative punitive measures without the consent of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, and in the period of time between sessions without the consent of the Presidium of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet."

6) To word Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article 112 as follows:

"1) on instruction of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet or Moldova SSR president, presents conclusions on the conformance of Moldova SSR draft laws and other acts submitted for examination by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet with the Moldova SSR Constitution;

"2) upon the motion of at least one-third of Moldova SSR people's deputies and the Moldova SSR president, presents conclusions to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet on the conformance of Moldova SSR laws and other acts adopted by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet with the Moldova SSR Constitution.

"On instruction of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, provides a decision on the conformance of ukases of the Moldova SSR president with the Constitution and other laws of the Moldova SSR;

"3) on instruction of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and the Moldova SSR president, renders a decision to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet on the conformance of resolutions and directives of the Moldova SSR government, decisions of rayon and city (republic-subordinate cities) soviets of people's deputies, and international and other obligations of the Moldova SSR with the Constitution and other laws of the Moldova SSR;

"4) on instruction of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, Moldova SSR president, chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, standing commissions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, Moldova SSR government, Moldova SSR Supreme Court, Moldova SSR prosecutor, and Moldova SSR chief state arbiter, renders a decision on conformance with the Constitution and other laws of the Moldova SSR of the normative acts of other state organs and social organizations, respecting which prosecutorial oversight is not exercised, in accordance with the Moldova SSR Constitution."

7) To word Article 113 as follows:

"**Article 113.** The Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet exercises control over all state organs subordinate to it."

8) To word Part 1 of Article 118 as follows:

"The Moldova SSR Government has the competence of deciding all issues of state government falling under the jurisdiction of the Moldova SSR that do not come within the competence of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet or Moldova SSR president, according to the Moldova SSR Constitution";

to word Points 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Part 2 of Article 113 as follows:

"4) accomplishes measures to ensure the rights and freedoms of citizens, defend the interests of the Moldova SSR, protect property, and maintain public order;

"5) undertakes measures to provide for the state security of the republic;

"6) accomplishes general measures in the sphere of relations with foreign states, Moldova SSR economic, scientific-technical, trade, and cultural cooperation with foreign countries; takes measures providing for the execution of international treaties of the Moldova SSR;

"7) forms, when necessary, departments, inspectorates, commissions, and other state services under the Moldova SSR Government."

9) To word Part 3 of Article 118 as follows:

"The Moldova SSR Government reports on its work at least once each year to the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, and regularly informs the Moldova SSR president concerning its activity.

"The Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet may, at its own initiative or upon proposal of the Moldova SSR president, express lack of confidence in the Moldova SSR Government, leading to its resignation. A resolution on this question is adopted by at least a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of Moldova SSR people's deputies."

10) To word Article 120 as follows:

"**Article 120.** The Moldova SSR Government, on the basis and in execution of the laws of the Moldova SSR, decisions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, and ukases of the Moldova SSR president, issues resolutions and directives and verifies their execution. Resolutions and directives of the Moldova SSR Government are binding in their application throughout the territory of the Moldova SSR."

11) To word Part 4 of Article 122 as follows:

"Ministries and state committees of the Moldova SSR bear responsibility for the condition and development of spheres of government entrusted to them; within the scope of their competence, they publish acts on the basis and in execution of Moldova SSR laws, decisions of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet, ukases of the Moldova SSR president, and resolutions and directives of the Moldova SSR Government; they organize and verify execution of these acts."

12) To supplement Article 127 with Parts 2 and 3 as follows:

"In instances when local soviets of people's deputies and their executive organs fail to ensure the proper accomplishment of their functions, and also in cases where local soviets refuse to execute the demands of Moldova SSR laws, systematically adopt decisions that contradict the Constitution and other legislative acts of the Moldova SSR or decisions beyond the limits of their authority as envisaged by Moldova SSR legislation, the activity of these soviets of people's deputies is suspended, or they are dissolved by resolution of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet or ukase of the Moldova SSR president. Prior to resumption of activity of the soviets of people's deputies in question or their new election, special forms of direct administration by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet or Moldova SSR president are established for these territories through organs formed by them.

"The Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet and Moldova SSR president also have the right to suspend the activity of local soviets of people's deputies, or dissolve those on whose territories martial law, a state of emergency, or presidential or other special forms of rule have been declared or introduced, over the period these forms of rule are in operation";

to consider the present Part 2 as Part 4.

13) To word Article 169 as follows:

"Article 169. The state anthem of the Moldova SSR is confirmed by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet."

III. To establish that the first president of the Moldova SSR is elected to a five-year term by the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet through a simple majority of votes of the total number of Moldova SSR people's deputies.

Nominations to the office of president of the Moldova SSR for these elections are made by Moldova SSR people's deputies with the support of at least one third the total number of Moldova SSR people's deputies.

IV. This Law enters into force from the moment of its adoption.

[Signed] **Chairman of the Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet M. Snegur**
[Dated] Kishinev, 3 September 1990.

Ukrainian Democratic Platform Principles Stated

90UN2872A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 11 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with V.Ye. Khmelko, cochairman of the republic Organizing Committee of the Democratic Platform, by D. Paniotto; date and place not given: "Socialism Means Movement"]

[Text] **At the end of this fall the Democratic Platform, having broken away from the Ukrainian Communist Party, will be converted into an independent party. Our correspondent met with Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.Ye. Khmelko, cochairman of its republic Organizing Committee and vice president of the Ukrainian Sociological Association.**

[Paniotto] Valeriy Yevgenyevich, those most likely to blame for the CPSU's remaining in the old positions since the congress are in the main not the forces of the right but the preponderant centrists. It is thanks to this majority that a "vanguard" CPSU has been preserved, not a legislative CPSU with all the consequences which would ensue from it. Might it not be true that the withdrawal of the Democratic Platform from the CPSU will render it conclusively conservative and odious?

[Khmelko] I do not believe that there are far greater numbers of centrists than there are those of the right. And it is not even a question of what positions the majority occupies. In our party, owing to its strict hierarchical arrangement, a decision is adopted not by the majority but the directive minority—those who occupy higher positions in the pyramid of power and who determine its positions. And whereas the proportion of conservatives in the party itself is comparatively small, in the structure of power it is considerably greater. The majority of democrats are ordinary dues payers, and their withdrawal could have barely any influence on the policy of the CPSU leadership. But on the other hand, having quit this pseudo-party state structure and having formed their own party, the democrats will be able to more effectively influence the process of democratization of our society.

[Paniotto] In the CPSU the main organizational principle is democratic centralism. In accordance with what principle will the activity of your party be organized?

[Khmelko] On the basis of the principle of democratic polycentrism, I hope. The Coordinating Council supports this position. And I will campaign to ensure support for it on the part of the Democratic Platform of the Ukraine Organizing Committee. The CPSU is built on the undemocratic principle of monocentrism. All power is in the hands of the center, and within the center in the hands of the leader. By changing this principle we attempted to restructure the Communist Party, but we were unsuccessful. And we are now creating a new party based on the consistent separation of the functions of intra-party power. We anticipate that the directive, superintending functions will be in the hands of an executive committee administering resources and personnel potential, control functions in the hands of an auditing committee independent of this executive committee, and the media at the disposal of an editorial-publishing committee. All these committees must be elected on equal terms by the congress and balance one another. If some committee exhibits undemocratic propensities, the two others will be in a position to point this out to it. It is known that the separation of powers principle ensures the preservation of democratic practices in many states.

[Paniotto] It follows from the Democratic Platform program published in RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 3 June of this year that your party will be of a socialist orientation. Articles by representatives of the Democratic Platform in the press do not attest to major ideological disagreements with the theoretical outlines of the present leadership of the CPSU. There were demands for the democratization of the party and removal of the party committees from the KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Army and enterprises, but there were no calls for building modern capitalism in our country although East Europe has already moved in this direction. Do you not think that your party will be unpopular among the masses at large which are fed up to the teeth with any socialism—both that which we have had and that "democratic" socialism to which we are being summoned?

[Khmelko] I am not convinced that, were the population to be polled, the masses at large would express a negative attitude toward any socialism—Swedish for example.

The less so in that in the case of our party of a social democratic focus we are not talking about socialism as a finished model of society. What is meant is a method of shaping society, a principle of living. The socialist character of the practices to which we aspire consists primarily of the democratic nature of the free social creativity of the citizens not only in the political but in the economic sphere also. And this is an appreciable difference from liberal-bourgeois views. Socialism is a mode of activity, movement, development. But that socialist terminology itself may be perceived negatively today, I agree with you. And I do not believe that our party will adopt such terminology. The main task is to cooperate with other parties in promoting the development of the independent activity of all citizens in the economy and policy. In general we intend that all forms of ownership, private included, will compete under equal conditions and the selection will be made by the consumer with his own ruble. But the social state will give the forms of ownership which have not only an economic but also a social effect priority—priority, not a subsidy. The social effect, in turn, will be determined empirically with reliance on public opinion. Of course it is now necessary to replace the state form of ownership with various forms of group, collective, and private ownership. And there can be no question even of their equality under these conditions either. After all, it will be the state which will have to effect these changes, after which there could be reserved to it such sectors as for example, communications, cosmonautics, and defense. And as a result, the restrictions would apply only to state-owned property.

[Paniotto] In some former socialist countries the democratic forces have united with the Communists at elections. Will you join a coalition with any parties, and if so, which?

[Khmelko] We will unfailingly join a coalition because newly formed parties are very small and weak compared with the CPSU. And even after the democrats have withdrawn from it, it will for a certain period of time be distinguished by its scale and influence. Therefore a real opposition to this structure now could only be an alliance of all democratic forces which is currently taking shape. It will unite all parties seeking guarantees of the observance of human rights recognized by international pacts—this is the fundamental, long-term principle—and the formation of a democratic independent Ukrainian state.

The Social Democratic, United Social Democratic, and Democratic parties are closest to us initially. The left socialists and anarchy-syndicalists are not far from us either.

As far as the parties being formed on the Democratic Platform in other republics are concerned, there is the decision of the Democratic Platform All-Union Coordinating Council to hold an all-Union congress at the end of fall, following the formation of parties in the republics. A union of parties adhering to the Democratic Platform, in which the Union authorities will not have superintending power, will possibly be organized there. The Union will adopt decisions only of a recommendatory nature. Each party will be independent, but uniting their intellectual potential and experience they will all have an opportunity to find the most efficient solutions of similar social problems.

Ukrainian Opposition Said To Threaten Order

91UN0014A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov, PRAVDA Kiev correspondents: "Not a Local Battle"]

[Text] **Calls for rallies and civil disobedience threaten to ruin democracy and destroy the republic's economy.**

In daily life one can always find details and features that clearly show all the contradictoriness of the processes that are going on now.

For example, fans of Solzhenitsyn's "Modest Contribution," trying to bring to the broad masses the writer's questionable reflections, to put it mildly, have posted his work "How Are We To Build Up Russia" on the fence. Read it and think about it they say. But an unceremonious hand immediately made a disposition about the section entitled "A Word to the Russians and Ukrainians": "An enemy of the Ukrainian people."

Or there is something else. The people of the Ukraine hold sacred the memory of their legendary partisan-scout, Nikolay Kuznetsov, who worked with boundless valor in the fascist rear. But in Novyy Razdol in Lvov Oblast the city soviet decided to rename the street of Hero of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov. Why did they cancel the scout's feats? It turns out that there arose a need to immortalize the memory of Bandery whose "feats" the Ukrainian people will never forget either.

These two episodes will be enough for an unprejudiced person to get an idea of what is going on in the Ukraine. Incidentally, these are only details. Let us take a look at the processes that are taking place on a broader scale. More than two months ago the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet practically unanimously adopted the declaration of the republic's sovereignty. It was touching to see how the deputies with tears of joy in their eyes congratulated one another on the historic event. But what happened then? One small thing was lacking—the declaration had to be materialized. Judging from the speeches given at the session, it seemed that everyone understood what a large amount of creative work this process would require. But instead of rolling up their sleeves, the opposition "People's Rada" began to take more and more steps that were not directed toward consolidation at all.

And this is what is needed so much in all areas. Take for example the economy. During past months there has been a decline in industrial production. The republic is smelting less metal and mining less coal than a year ago,

and builders and workers of the agro-industrial complex are losing ground. And it is not surprising that economic ties are being broken and contractual discipline is declining. As the republic press reports, commitments to associates have been violated by every fourth enterprise, and in the fuel and energy, machine building, chemical-timber, and construction complexes by almost every third one.

Although the assignment for producing consumer goods has been overfulfilled, the shortage of these kinds of products is not diminishing. Moreover this shortage is appearing in places where it could not have been imagined before. In spite of the record harvest, the rates of grain sales to the state are below last year's—the plan for grain procurements has been significantly underfulfilled. Disturbing news is coming from the fields—more than a million hectares of sunflowers and almost two-thirds of the area planted in potatoes, vegetables, and sugar beets remain unharvested.

And what is especially alarming is that the situation that has been created does not seem to affect the councils of people's deputies. Many of them have stirred up a wave of rallies—why be concerned about satisfying the daily needs of the workers or developing well-considered steps for changing over to the market?

"A very dangerous situation" says the chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, L. Kravchuk. "At a time when the miners are failing to deliver millions of tons of coal, certain deputies are traveling around to the coal mining regions and calling for strikes."

In this economic and social situation, how can one understand and explain the position of those activists who are pushing for further aggravation and are continuing to speculate on the difficulties?

True, in the opinion of a recent "patriot" who is now chairman of the Lvov city soviet and who rechristened himself as "Pan" Bogdan Kotik, the actions and awakening of national self-awareness are no less important "than the development of the economy."

Statistics show that this year's strikes have led to the loss of 10 million man-days in production. The price of the "actions" is much too high. As they reported in the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, more than 1 million rubles' worth of industrial products were not delivered because of these strikes.

With any kind of sensible approach such an impressive figure of damages would have given pause to the men of state who claim to fill the role of expressing the interests of the people. Alas, they value their own ambitious aspirations more. Even the last days of September were marked by persistent inflammatory appeals to conduct all-Ukrainian strikes, demonstrations, and rallies.

Through the efforts of certain mass media, the tension and the unstable situation are being aggravated. They stubbornly insist on discussion—who wants what kind of a Ukraine—and categorically assert "No to the Union treaty," but they predict that "there will be significant changes in the Ukraine in the near future."

"What changes?"

V. Chernovil, chairman of the Lvov Oblast soviet becomes candid on the pages of the newspaper: "If we could succeed in mobilizing the entire Ukraine for such a mighty blow as for example a general political strike, the conservative Supreme Soviet, the government, and its administrative-command system would be swept away. Therefore I would like for the "People's Rada" to be not simply the opposition but a shadow legislature, a structure that is quite ready to take the power in its hands."

The self-proclaimed "democratic" forces are preparing for a revolution, if one may call things by their real names. They are comprised of a multitude of groups, groupings, and even parties. Almost every day there are reports of their creation. Yesterday news came from Terebovlya about the founding conference of a democratic party today from Dnepropetrovsk—about the formation of a people's party.... Each has its own program and its own goals, but the majority of them are united in their anticommunist direction, their denial of the socialist option, and their desire to put an end to the CPSU—the only obstacle on the path to their frequently adventuristic goals. The range of means they use is broad and diverse. Added to rallies, demonstrations, strikes, and acts of civil disobedience are seemingly inoffensive educational symposia, conferences, and festivals. But here is the problem. No matter how you disguise this kind of action, it always amounts to the same thing: "Down with the CPSU!" or "Komunyaku—na gillyaku!" [published in Ukrainian]. And this is not about individual Communists but about all of them, as they say, the whole lot of them. Today this is the path to confrontation, the path to destabilization of the situation, and hence the path to a blind alley.

The position of opponents of socialism who are hostile to the Communist Party have been clearly defined. But what about the Communists and the Communist Party of the Ukraine?

You cannot describe with a couple of words the complexity of the situation in which the republic Communist Party finds itself today. The role of the ruling vanguard, which it played for many decades, did not stand it in good stead. And the fact that from here came the pillars of stagnation who held leading posts in the party and the country contributed to the creation of an extremely unhealthy climate in the republic. What was the cost of merely the status of a zone beyond criticism that the Ukraine "conferred" on Brezhnev and company at one time. Of course all that could not but have an effect on the health of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

We have been witnesses to the destruction of the careers of many followers and champions of the administrative-command system. With the great multitude of inglorious ends to pseudo-leaders they have all occurred in a strikingly similar way. Noncommunists who were well aware of their worth and obliged to have the last word decided their fate. We remember a frosty January night in the Chernigov stadium where, to the accompaniment of whistles and shouts, almost all members of the bureau of the party obkom [olblast committee] relinquished their authority in front of the crowd of many thousands. A degrading situation. There was no sympathy for the "nomenklatura" who had pulled their deerskin caps down over their ears. It was offensive, painfully offensive for the party. And then a wave of such displays moved from Kharkov to Donetsk through Zhitomir and Khmelnitskiy right up to the Carpathians.

Assured of their omnipotence, the usurpers organized attacks on the entire Communist Party of the Ukraine, and sometimes not without success. One hot summer day we saw how the first miners' congress, not without prompting from the outside, demanded that the Communist Party be declared unnecessary to the miners. Then followed the fulfillment of this demand: The party committees began to move out of the coal enterprises.

Delegates to the congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine from all corners of the country called for the miners to be reasonable, but what prevailed at the party forum was a wave of demands to activate the work in the masses, to head the movement for perestroyka, and finally to get out of the trenches. And the speeches were impassioned, the reports were detailed, and the decisions were profound and meaningful, but little changed in the alignment of forces.

Almost every week we had occasion to attend rallies in Kiev—in the Central Stadium or Kreshchatik. We also attended the same kinds of measures in Zhitomir and Vinnitsa.... What attracted our attention? The opposition forces gathered of their own accord and in a frenzy defamed with all their might the Communist Party, Lenin, and Soviet power. And considerably less frequently the party committees would gather their audience and slander their enemies. All this was intended to depict the struggle for the masses. We have a principle well tested by the ideological apparatus—to prove to atheists that God does not exist and to prove to teetotalers that drinking is bad for their health....

In the recent past party workers lived in hothouse conditions. They had no competitors and nobody with whom to argue or "do battle." There was no real opponent, and when the stormy days of perestroyka approached there were clearly not enough people who were able to work in the new circumstances.

Communists at the report and election meetings that are taking place everywhere speak about this with complete candor. Many of the speakers are making radical changes and suggestions regarding the draft of the statute of the Communist Party of the Ukraine which was published previously in the newspapers. It will be approved in the second, concluding stage of the congress which will take place this fall. The majority of Communists are in favor of having the Communist Party of the Ukraine be a part of the CPSU.

Various processes are taking place in the organizational structure of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. In certain cities the rayon party committees [raykoms] are being eliminated and only city party committees [gorkoms] are being created, and in others conversely the gorkoms are being abolished. It is remarkable that the staffs of the raykoms, gorkoms, and oblast party committees [obkoms] are being reduced by 40 percent, and the apparatus of the Central Committee by 45 percent. About 10,000 officials and technical workers are being discharged, being released just because of the reorganization.

Enemies of the Communist Party are thoroughly enjoying it when people withdraw from the ranks of the CPSU. There really are a lot of cases, but not as many as the spiteful critics assert. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine has given us the figures—this year about 50,000 people withdrew from the party. Somewhat fewer are entering, but there are people joining the party ranks. For example, in Mankovskiy Rayon the majority of the 40 people who applied for admission to the party were collect farm [kolkhoz] workers, teachers, and motor vehicle drivers. Even in the western region where things are especially difficult and where activists of the republic Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth and other anticommunist forces are waging a fierce battle against the CPSU, there is an influx of young forces.

...So it has turned out that during the last days of September various kinds of measures were scheduled in the republic: a strike that, by the design of Chernovil and people who think as he does, was to have swept away the legislature, the republic government, and the entire administrative-command system, in a word it was to have destroyed everything down to the foundations.... There will be a Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee Plenum that will discuss the role of party organizations under the new conditions and ways of making Communists more active in the creative process of perestroyka. The session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet will begin on the first day of October. Rallies, demonstrations, and picketing have been scheduled....

The pluralism of opinions has grown into a pluralism of actions. And in the meantime, in the shops of plants and in the fields, work is being done and the approaching winter requires that its rates be accelerated. Will both those who will be involved in the large-scale politics in the hall of the Ukrainian legislature and those who are calling for strikes, rallies, and picketing be filled with everyday but still vitally important concerns? Time will tell.

Ukrainian Trade Union Chairman Interviewed

914F0003A Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Sep 90 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with A. Kovalevskiy, chairman of the Ukrainian trade union council, by TRUD correspondent I. Ostrovskiy: "There Will Be No Concessions"]

[Text] **The congress of Ukrainian trade unions opens on 4 October. It is assumed that a federation of the republic's trade unions will be created. How do its present leaders envision it? Will the very fact of the creation of the federation lead to changes in the lives of the workers? This was the main theme of the discussion between our TRUD correspondent and A. Kovalevskiy, the chairman of the Ukrainian trade union council.**

[Ostrovskiy] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, as a rule the majority of republic branch trade union congresses have ended by their adding the word "independent" to their names. How do you interpret this?

[Kovalevskiy] With respect to trade unions it does not seem to me to be exactly right. Independence from whom? If it is from political parties, the government, or other social associations, this goes without saying. Real trade unions cannot be any other way. Otherwise they could not perform their main function—to represent the interests of the workers and defend them. On the other hand, the trade union centers and their leaders are undoubtedly dependent on those who elected them, the people who support them with their hard-earned money.

[Ostrovskiy] But this is what is surprising. The trade unions no sooner began to actually succeed in protecting the rights of the workers than fierce attacks on them began.

[Kovalevskiy] But what is so surprising? It is all normal. Let us look at the problem you are talking about from the standpoint of the situation that has developed in the country. The CPSU is gradually losing its influence and its real power. The government has no support or authority among the people. The customary economic ties are being violated and centrifugal tendencies are growing. Against this background the trade unions are the only force in certain circumstances that can in any way unite the workers, regardless of their national or regional affiliation. I think that the intelligent minds from government and party circles saw this new reality of life before we did and evaluated it better than we did. Therefore, while we are losing time and sometimes arguing pointlessly, certain forces are doing everything in their power to make sure that the trade unions do not become this consolidating force.

The anti-trade union attitudes of our legislators are even more dangerous. Remember that in the new Law on Enterprises in the USSR the role of the collective agreement is reduced to nothing. In the draft law on social organizations the trade unions are seen as having the same importance as societies of stamp collectors or rabbit breeders. They have adopted what I dare say is a reactionary law on the procedure for resolving collective labor conflicts that, in terms of its anti-labor and anti-trade union direction, has no analogs even in countries with the most reactionary regimes. And what are we to think about their slowness in considering the law on trade union rights?

[Ostrovskiy] If the normative acts that have been adopted are not suitable, what kinds do we need; what are we interested in?

[Kovalevskiy] Above all three independent laws: on parties, on trade unions, and on social movements and associations.

[Ostrovskiy] Our opponents say that there are no such acts in world practice.

[Kovalevskiy] That is wrong. In Sweden alone there are about 20 legislative acts regulating relations among the government, the trade unions, and the workers. Our supreme soviets and governments must understand that trade union legislation is mainly in their interests. In developed countries of the world there is a balance of forces—the government, the trade unions, and the workers. All contradictions are resolved on the basis of laws through agreement. Labor conflicts are rare. They did not arrive at the present balance all at once. Recall the heated, sometimes even bloody class battles of the sixties. Their destructive influence on the society was so great that it became clear to all the opposing sides: Confrontation, strikes, lockouts, police clubs, and water hoses are not the best path. Accord and agreement are more advantageous.

[Ostrovskiy] Incidentally, the people's attitude toward the government is equivocal today....

[Kovalevskiy] I get the impression that the government does not understand the entire depth of the decline of its authority. A study of public opinion in the republic shows that only five percent of those polled fully trust the government, 70 percent have lost confidence fully or partially, and about half think it should withdraw immediately.

Do you remember the political strike of the miners on 11 July and their basic demands? We thought for a long time about whether or not to support it and call for workers of other branches to join with the coal miners in one form or another. We decided not to support it because the 15 months the government had asked for in order to stabilize the economy had not yet passed. But the situation has deteriorated now. The government has let the reins of control pass from its hands once and for all. And it is asking us to believe in it for another 15 months. I can say for certain that if there are more worker uprisings in the republic, the trade unions will not stand on the sidelines this time. We cannot go on like this, as they say....

[Ostrovskiy] Is there really a threat of more collective labor conflicts?

[Kovalevskiy] There is still tension in the coal regions. It is exacerbated by the fact that the governments of the country and the republic do not have a strategy for the development of the Donbass. And yet we are speaking about the fates of millions of workers. There is uneasiness in the mining and metallurgical complex as well. Your newspaper has written about how painful a blow was dealt to the miners and metallurgists by the price reform and the new tax policy. Now a new hot spot has appeared: light industry. Its workers have long been degraded by the lowest wages and the backwardness of the social and domestic sphere. Added to the old troubles is a new one—a raw material shortage as a result of which thousands of people will be left without work this year. This will not happen because of the market but simply because of the mismanagement and shortsightedness of the government. And what is being done in agriculture and the processing industry? In my opinion, each of us can feel how difficult the situation is.

[Ostrovskiy] What do you personally find wrong with the government program?

[Kovalevskiy] The desire to solve problems at the expense of the workers. Promises of full compensation and indexation are not convincing. It is dishonest to equate the subsistence level with the minimum wage. The "consumer basket" proposed by the government is not something that can be bought for 70 or even 170 rubles.

[Ostrovskiy] But you do not like the alternatives either, especially the one with the code name 500 days.

[Kovalevskiy] Let us figure out what privatization of state property means—the purchase of housing and enterprises, on which the authors of this program insist. Who will buy them? And with what? All his life the worker has been paid beggar's wages and has been placated by the notion that he receives housing free of charge. He has long been paying for it with that part of his earnings that the state appropriated without compensation. He must not buy his apartment but possess it free of charge.

The same thing is true of fixed capital. For decades the state has pumped profit out of the factories and plants. Capitalism has never had theft on this scale. The plants and factories were bought long ago and should have been turned over to the labor collectives. It is for the latter to decide what to do with this property—either divide it up into shares for everyone or create a joint stock company. I do not like the antilabor direction of all the programs for changing over to the market.

[Ostrovskiy] Comrades Ryzhkov and Abalkin emphasize that, as a rule, the critics have nothing of their own to suggest....

[Kovalevskiy] We are completing the development of a program of actions that we want to propose to delegates of the congress of trade unions of the Ukraine. A creative group comprised of the leading jurists, legal scholars, and political scientists of the republic, having studied the experience of the world trade union movement, recommends measures that the federation of trade unions of the Ukraine must defend.

We consider the collective agreement to be the main thing. It must stipulate for the workers: wages worthy of the person, civilized working conditions, and healthful conditions for work and daily life. I categorically disagree with the members of the government who reproach our workers for laziness, drunkenness, and poor qualifications. In places where a person is paid normally and his work is organized, people produce excellent results.

[Ostrovskiy] What do you consider to be a worthy wage?

[Kovalevskiy] A wage level that makes it possible for a worker to live like a human being—to provide himself and his family with an apartment, food, clothing, personal and cultural items, and possibilities for education. The government and the employers must provide people with means of labor and raw material, create healthful conditions in production, and conclude with the worker a contract for payment that takes into account his individual peculiarities. These are the goals toward which we want the collective contract to be oriented.

[Ostrovskiy] Can all the things you are talking about be decided at the enterprise alone?

[Kovalevskiy] With our departmental management structure, possibly not. But after all, soon the trade union and the workers will be speaking not with the bureaucrat but with the employer.

[Ostrovskiy] What do you think about the agreements the central committees of the branch trade unions are signing with the departments, and the trade union centers with the governments of the republic and the country?

[Kovalevskiy] There are many disputes about this. My opinion is this: Today we cannot get by without these agreements. We have already tried. We sent a letter to the republic Council of Ministers. We suggested that they think about the possibility of concluding an agreement with the trade union federation. We received this answer: They said that nobody has ever heard of such an agreement and therefore this is not the time to work with it. But if the government is against the agreement this means that we will have to advance unilateral demands. We are trying by all the methods at our disposal to get them fulfilled.

[Ostrovskiy] Could you tell us, if only briefly, about the content of the demands?

[Kovalevskiy] To participate in the revision of labor legislation and come closer to world norms and the basic documents of the International Labor Organization; to revise housing legislation and give priority to individual construction with the issuance of interest-free loans and materials; to carrying out a wage reform based on the

idea that labor is the property of the worker and he must be given the right to sell it under the most advantageous conditions.

In this connection I cannot but mention the thing that bothers me most of all. Our plans for social security presuppose benefits mainly for the weak and powerless. But the money for them should be earned by the strong and capable. This means that the trade unions must fight against ruinous taxation of high earnings and defend the good worker's right to a worthy life.

[Ostrovskiy] What do the trade unions need in order to defend these ideas?

[Kovalevskiy] First of all they need strong local organizations. The branch trade unions are a group of organizations with various rights, independent and free. The regional trade union centers also unite the branches on a voluntary basis for carrying out business in which all workers of the oblast, kray, and republic are interested. If we agree on the creation of a republic federation at the congress and the majority of branch unions and regions approve, we shall also agree on the authority that will be delegated to us. I envision the federation as a free association. The doors are open to everyone. But anyone who wishes to may leave it freely as well. We shall be united only by common goals in the struggle for the rights of the workers.

[Ostrovskiy] Various, shall we say parallel trade union associations are being generated, the socialist trade union for example. How do you feel about them?

[Kovalevskiy] I am in favor of depoliticizing trade unions. The party affiliation of a trade union member is a matter of his own conscience. The trade union and its working organs are not the legislature. There are not and cannot be any political factions here. We cooperate with all parties and political and social movements that have the same goals as we do. We find a common language with the Ukraine Peoples Movement for Perestroyka and Green Peace in everything that pertains to cleaning up after Chernobyl and the ecology.

[Ostrovskiy] And what about the CPSU and the republic Communist Party Central Committee.

[Kovalevskiy] Partnership relations. We do not carry out any commands, and of course we coordinate our own decisions.

[Ostrovskiy] What do you have about attempts to narrowly "specialize" trade unions? For example, some of the miners are demanding the organization of a union of underground workers.

[Kovalevskiy] Personally I am against it. I think it will be difficult for the employers to work with this kind of "trade union movement." But at the same time I agree that various occupational groups have their own interests. Associations could exist for protection of these interests within the trade unions. We have no experience in creating them but we must try. At the same time I am absolutely convinced of the need for a separate trade union for managers and employers. It is inappropriate for the owner of an enterprise or the leader of a joint stock company to be in the same trade union as his hired workers, not to mention being on the trade union committee.

[Ostrovskiy] Allow me a traditional approach. According to your assumptions, will the highest organ of the federation, and the structure, the staffs, and the salaries of the Ukrainian trade union council remain?

[Kovalevskiy] The apparatus is the trade union organization's internal affair. It should be whatever is needed. The structure and staff of the federation will be constructed depending on the functions delegated to us. The decision is up to the federation council. It is assumed that it will consist of equal numbers of members from the regions and branches. The republic has 26 oblasts and 26 branch trade unions. They each delegate five people to the council who will solve all current problems.

I can give my own opinion about salaries. Like the staffs, they will depend on the tasks we are instructed to carry out. We say: We must defend the worker's right to worthy wages. So we will have to fight with the government on an equal basis. And this means the apparatus of the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and many institutions and departments—thousands and thousands of skilled specialists. Who do we have to put up against them? Six instructors from the department for production work and wages. If we are to speak seriously about opposition, we need skilled people. And what experienced jurists and economists will come to here for the "330 RE" instructor's salary? If we find a person who is capable of generating ideas and can carry them out as well, two chairman's salaries would not be too much for him. Wages will be determined not by the position but by the personal contribution and individual qualities of the workers.

[Ostrovskiy] You are 54 years old. You are an engineer by education and you worked as the deputy shop chief of the Kiev Tochelektropribor Plant. Then you were the first secretary of the rayon party committee and an inspector of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee. In 1975, you were elected secretary of the Ukrainian trade union council. So are you a typical representative of the administrative-command system and did you end up in the trade union through party protection? Does this circumstance bother you today?

[Kovalevskiy] Over the decade and a half of my work in the trade unions, my comrades could see that I was an independent person. I form my opinion through my own judgment and not on the basis of the last decree. As for my party work, I do not intend either to justify it or to ask forgiveness. There is no point. I worked as an inspector of the central committee. My duties included monitoring the activity of the Donetskaya and Lvovskaya Oblast organizations. This can be verified in

the archives that contain many of my reports about corruption, nepotism among those in power, and restriction of democracy. It is not my fault that these documents disappeared in the drawers of the large desks and most frequently evoked dissatisfaction on the part of those to whom they were addressed.

[Ostrovskiy] What kind of an apartment do you live in?

[Kovalevskiy] A long time ago, while I was still at the plant, I received a three-room apartment for a family of six. At that time my parents were living with us. Alas, they are no longer with us. My son has married and lives with his family in his wife's apartment—two rooms with neighbors. We exchanged our three-room apartment. Now our daughter has a one-room apartment and we have the usual two rooms.

[Ostrovskiy] What do you do for entertainment?

[Kovalevskiy] I have loved sports all my life. In the winter I used to ski, and in the summer play football. But for a year and a half now I have had practically no free time. I go to work at 0730 and return toward 2100 in the evening. I understand that this kind of schedule is not befitting a modern person, but I have not been able to change it so far. I prefer to spend my vacations out in nature. I do not like health resorts with the commitment to one location and their procedures. I remember last year's vacation when my wife and I took a friend's car and drove through the western Ukraine. We spent the nights in tents in picturesque places and ate whatever God sent us.

[Ostrovskiy] What benefits and privileges do you have?

[Kovalevskiy] We have no benefits in the Ukrainian trade union council. The dining room is for everyone except us and hundreds of Kievans eat there. I have a car assigned to me but that is more of an instrument for work than a benefit. We buy our groceries for the family in stores since Kiev still has somewhat better supplies than other cities of the republic. In a word, we live like many others.

Caucasus

Levon Ter-Petrosyan Comments on Republic Issues

ARMENPRES Interview

NC0810163890 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 5 Oct 90

[Report by Florens Avagyan on Levon Ter-Petrosyan's meeting with the Armenians working at the United Nations prepared for ARMENIAN MIRROR SPECTATOR—all quotation marks as received]

[Text] Yerevan, 5 Oct (ARMENPRES)—"People and groups might have enemies but governments do not," said Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the newly elected president of the Armenian parliament, telling the Armenian-Americans for the first time that Armenia intends to establish economic relations with Turkey.

The Armenian president made this statement upon his arrival in New York on Friday, 28 September.

Yasusi Akashin, the UN secretary general's assistant for disarmament affairs, received him at the UN headquarters. Dzhoys Sulahyan, a member of the UN staff, had organized the meeting.

After a brief ceremony the president held an almost an hour-long meeting with the Armenians working at the UN.

Ter-Petrosyan was accompanied by his assistant Ambardzum Galstyan and by Alik Arzumanyan, director of the press center of the Armenian Pannational Movement. Raffi Ovanesyan, the representative [in Yerevan] of the "Armenian Assembly" was also in the group.

Explaining the new approach toward Turkey, the president said that Armenia is becoming a country and must act like one. "We must establish relations with all our neighbors while not forgetting our demands, the genocide, and those people who were uprooted. We cannot turn this into a political issue. We cannot change the nature of the problem overnight, for a certain mentality exists both in Armenia and Turkey. This change must come gradually," stressed the president.

Enumerating briefly the course of this process, Levon Ter-Petrosyan said that the first step should be the establishment of trade ties with Turkey. That should follow with cultural and eventually political relations. "The government cannot implement policy without the people's assistance. I am sure that we will be in a position to establish such relations," said the president.

Asked by our correspondent if he would meet Turkish President Ozal, who is currently in New York, Levon Ter-Petrosyan said: "Moscow will not decide how this visit is organized. If I want to go to Turkey, which is a next-door neighbor, I will go. Time will tell."

Speaking about the republic's independence, he declared that it was a normal phenomenon after the passage of 70 years and that even if we had not declared independence it would still have been inevitable in view of different processes taking place in the USSR today. Nevertheless, we took certain steps to accelerate independence and prepare for it. It would have been dangerous if they had given us independence when we were not ready for it." He gave the example of 1918 when the Armenian Republic was created and lasted for two years. He stressed that by declaring independence we are not getting ready to sever relations with the USSR. He explained that relations, including political relations, are

desirable not only with the central government but also with the republics. The central government still considers us as a partner.

Commenting about President Boris Yeltsin of Russia, he said: "For us the important thing is Russia and Yeltsin, with whom we had and still have serious relations. Gradually these relations will develop and will also encompass the other republics."

Referring to the insubordinate armed formations and the diaspora Armenians' fear that Armenia might become a new Lebanon, Levon Ter-Petrosyan said: "If the communist regime had survived in Armenia for another few months, a civil war would have been inevitable. Those formations came into existence when the Soviet Army failed to protect the Armenians. They were formal groups and did much for the protection of the Armenians. However these armed groups wanted to use the same military struggle to attain their political objectives. The political proceses should take place within a democratic framework. Those groups failed to get people's support and when the democratic forces came to power the people gathered around the latter and the groups were put under control."

Referring to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh, Levon Ter-Petrosyan described the people living in that region as "staunch and determined" and who could be dislodged from there only by force. Azerbaijan cannot do that. "The Armenians are powerful enough to solve those problems themselves. We will not allow the eviction of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. The best solution for that region has to come through political negotiations and not through military operations," declared the president.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan stressed that the only solution for Nagorno-Karabakh lies in economic, social, and cultural autonomy. It should have its own Armenian Army and should have relations with all the republics.

The situation in the republic is stable now, though the republic faces severe economic difficulties.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan reiterated that they are searching for ways to enter into economic cooperation with the neighbors, including Turkey and Iran.

"The communist party is disintegrating and a federation will take its place. It is necessary to secure certain pledges and agreements so that if Azerbaijan resorts to something the other republics could isolate it. So far Moscow has not punished Azerbaijan. We have already reached an agreement with the Russian Republic and Yeltsin to the effect that in case Azerbaijan reimposes the blockade, Russia will take measures against her.

IZVESTIYA Interview

PM0910192390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, by INTERFAX special correspondents Renat Abdullin and Armen Arushanov in Moscow 8 October: "Levon Ter-Petrosyan: Confrontation Has Exhausted Itself"]

[Text] Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, stopped over in Moscow 8 October enroute to Yerevan after a tour of the United States. INTERFAX special correspondents Renat Abdullin and Armen Arushanov talked with him.

[INTERFAX] First of all we should like to know about the results of your tour of the United States.

[Ter-Petrosyan] My visit was not pursuing any practical aims. It was of a strictly political nature, primarily as a manifestation of the republic's sovereignty, as a breach in its political isolation, and as the start of the pursuit of an independent foreign policy, and second it was the coordination of our efforts with the Armenian diaspora in building a new Armenian statehood.

[INTERFAX] What problems were touched on during meetings with representatives of Congress and the administration?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Basically these meetings were aimed at setting forth the viewpoint of the leadership of Armenia as a sovereign republic—its viewpoint of its future and of the realities now taking place in the Soviet Union. I sought to show that very important changes are taking place in the Soviet Union, that real power is moving from the center to the republics, and that U.S. policy should be reoriented in line with these changes.

I felt my interlocutors' concern in connection with the development of processes in the USSR. As regards the republics belonging to the USSR, the Americans still have no specific position, except for the Baltic republics. The status of the Baltic republics is assessed in a quite different way in the United States since their occupation in 1940 has not been recognized by the world public. With regard to the other republics, the Americans behave in a more restrained manner, more cautiously, wait for the status of the center and the republics to be determined in the USSR.

[INTERFAX] You mentioned that during contacts with U.S. officials you touched on the question of Armenia's future and on the problem of relations between the center and the republics. In this connection we should like to learn your opinion of the idea of a new Union treaty.

[Ter-Petrosyan] Not everything here depends on Armenia. And the prospects of the Soviet Union's development depend on a very great many factors. That is why the declaration on independence adopted by our

parliament had a vague form. It did not state clearly that we are now leaving the USSR or remaining in it. We believe that independence is not a one-off act, it is a process as has been proved by the example of the Baltic republics.

As for our aims, we are seeking full political and economic independence. But for that we have to travel a specific path. Some unions are possible on this path, but not in the form in which the USSR exists today. Ideally we see the Soviet Union in the form of a European Community in which each country enjoys full independence and the central organs have only consultative importance.

To be specific, we do not rule out the possibility of concluding a new Union treaty on condition that there is no new all-Union Constitution or Union legislation or Union government. These are redundant organs.

[INTERFAX] How are relations now taking shape between the republic's authorities and the military in Armenia?

[Ter-Petrosyan] We have very good relations with the Army. The army leadership is pleased that it does not have to interfere in the republic's internal affairs, that the Army is having no conflicts with the people. It welcomes the fact that we are conducting all operations to stabilize the situation in Armenia with our own forces.

[INTERFAX] The most acute question now is the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh and mutual relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Are there prospects for settling the conflict?

[Ter-Petrosyan] The Armenian leadership has a very precise position. The strategy of confrontation pursued by both sides has exhausted itself. We must now switch to a strategy of compromises, political concessions, and political dialogue. We have come out with this initiative. At the very start of my work as chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet I stated that we are ready to sit down at the conference table with Azerbaijan. I have had a telephone conversation with Azerbaijan President Ayaz Mutalibov. Then we had a meeting in Moscow in the presence of Mikhail Gorbachev. So there are grounds for compromises.

The Karabakh problem is a very serious problem for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both republics are concerned at it, and that gives grounds for supposing that the sides are interested in a peaceful settlement of the conflict situation. And the restoration of legal power in Karabakh and the ensuring of the normal activity of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast can serve as the point of departure for compromise. First normal life must be ensured in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

New Armenian Newspaper Published in Yerevan

LD0910181290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 9 Oct 90

[Text] THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA is the title of a new newspaper in the Armenian language. Its first issue was published in Yerevan today. It is a daily sociopolitical publication of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Among the issues published in this edition is an interview with Ter-Petrosyan, the parliament's chairman, a report on the continuing session of the republic's supreme organ of government, and reporting on life in Armenia.

Another parliament newspaper for the Russian-speaking readership is also being prepared.

Alternative Armenian Writers Union Founded

LD0610051590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Oct 90

[Text] A new creative organization, the Union of Armenian Writers [Soyuz Armyanskikh Pisateley], has been set up in Yerevan. Being set up as an alternative to the official writers' organization, it intends to unite literary workers residing in Armenia and also their compatriots living in other republics and abroad. At the founding congress it was decided to publish the organization's own newspaper and literary magazine.

Georgian Journalists Discuss Media Ownership

PM0510145590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel V. Kaushanskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Who Owns the Newspapers?"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 4 Oct—It was precisely from this angle that an enlarged sitting of the Georgian Journalists Union Secretariat reviewed the current structure of the republic's mass media. The situation is such that, as was noted at the sitting, the majority of newspapers published in the republic are organs of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and of oblast, city, and rayon party organizations. The income from their publication is transferred for the most part to the party budget and is in no way reflected in the publishing houses' low level of material resources or journalists' social and labor conditions.

How did they decide to rectify the matter? Above all it was suggested that editorial collectives at oblast, city, and rayon level should decide for themselves who their masters will be in conditions of economic accountability; and here the option of self-establishment is not prohibited. And the newspapers and journals whose income is directly transferred to the CPSU budget were instructed to consider the question of full political and financial independence.

Another innovation was also proposed, dictated by the nascent multiparty epoch. After the elections to the

republic Supreme Soviet scheduled for the end of October, the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee daily newspaper will most probably become a parliamentary organ. And the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee will have to create its own newspaper under the same conditions as other parties.

Georgian Legislation Examines Electoral Rights

91US0009B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 7 Sep 90 p 1

["Ukase of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: On Making Changes and Additions to Some Legislative Acts of the Georgian SSR"]

[Test] For the purpose of strengthening the guarantees securing the voting rights of citizens of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium **resolves:**

to make the following changes and additions to the legislative acts of the Georgian SSR:

I. Georgian SSR Criminal Code

1. Render Article 139 with the following wording:

"Article 139. Prevention of the exercise of the right to vote

"Preventing a citizen from exercising his right to vote by means of force, deception, threats, bribery, or some other way—

"is punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to two years or corrective labor for the same term, or a fine of up to 500 rubles [R]."

2. Add Article 139 superscript 1 to the code as follows:

"Article 139 superscript 1. The dissemination of false information that discredits the honor and dignity of a candidate for deputy and parties participating in the elections

"The deliberate dissemination of false information that discredits the honor and dignity of a candidate for deputy and parties participating in the elections—

"is punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to two years or corrective labor for the same term, or a fine of up to R500.

"These same actions committed with the use of printed or other means of mass information—

"are punishable by imprisonment for a term up to four years or to corrective labor for a term of up to two years, or by a fine of up to R1,000."

3. Add the words: "or with a fine of up to R500" to the sanction of Article 140.

II. Georgian SSR Code on Administrative Infractions

1. Add articles 174 superscript 2, 174 superscript 3, and 174 superscript 4 to the code as follows:

"Article 174 superscript 2. Interference in the work of the electoral commissions that prevents voting in electoral precincts, the exercise of duties associated with the registration of candidates for deputy and the party, the counting of votes in electoral precincts and districts, and the determination of the overall results of the elections—

"is subject to the imposition of a fine on citizens in a sum of up to R50, and on officials, up to R100.

"Article 174 superscript 3. Refusal to submit materials to electoral commissions or nonfulfillment of their decisions

"Refusal to submit necessary materials and data to electoral commissions or nonfulfillment of their decisions—

"is subject to the imposition of a fine on officials in a sum of up to R100.

"Article 174 superscript 4 Agitating on election day

"Agitating on election day for or against a candidate for deputy and parties participating in the elections—

"is subject to the imposition of a fine on citizens in a sum of up to R50, and on officials, in a sum of up to R100."

2. To Article 208 after the figures "174 superscript 1" add the figures "174 superscript 2, 174 superscript 3, 174 superscript 4."

3. In Article 262, replace the figure "174 superscript 1" with the figures: "174 superscript 1, 174 superscript 2, 174 superscript 3, 174 superscript 4."

4. To Article 279 after the figure "174 superscript 2" add the figures: "174 superscript 2, 174 superscript 3, 174 superscript 4."

Add part two to Article 239 as follows:

"The protocol concerning administrative infractions committed under articles 174 superscript 2, 174 superscript 3, and 174 superscript 4 is drawn up by the chairman or a member of the central, district, or precinct electoral commission for the election of deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet."

III. Civil Legal Procedure Code of the Georgian SSR

1. Render Chapter 22 with the following wording:

"Chapter 22

"Examination of complaints of violations of the voting rights of citizens

"Article 240 Filing complaints

"A citizen who does not agree with the decision of a precinct electoral commission concerning his statement of irregularities committed in voter rolls (noninclusion, incorrect inclusion, or exclusion, and also other inaccuracies committed in the rolls), where provided by law can file a complaint against a decision of a precinct electoral commission with the rayon (city) people's court where the commission is located.

"A citizen who is denied registration as a candidate for deputy can file a complaint against the decision of the electoral commission with the rayon (city) people's court where the commission is located.

"A party that is denied registration has the right to appeal a decision of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet to the Georgian SSR Supreme Court.

"Article 241 Conditions of consideration of a complaint

"A people's judge considers a complaint on irregularities committed in voter rolls only in the event that the citizen has made a declaration about correcting an irregularity in voter rolls to a precinct electoral commission and his declaration was denied; the complaint is accepted for consideration no later than five days before elections.

"In the event a complaint about irregularities committed in voter rolls is filed with a rayon (city) people's court without a preliminary filing of a statement to the precinct electoral commission, the people's judge sends the complaint to the appropriate electoral commission with notification of this to the declarant.

"The people's judge accepts a complaint about the denial of registration of a candidate for deputy by an electoral commission, if this denial is appealed in a three-day period after the adoption of a resolution by the electoral commission. The people's judge notifies the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of Deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet of the receipt of the complaint. In the event that the Central Electoral Commission is examining an analogous complaint, the people's judge does not accept the complaint.

"The Georgian SSR Supreme Court considers a law suit concerning the denial of a party registration in the event that it is brought in the three-day period after receiving the denial from the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of Deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet.

"A complaint that is filed after this period has expired, indicated in parts one, three, and four of the present article, is not considered and is returned to the person filing the complaint.

"Article 242. Consideration of a complaint:

"A complaint is considered by the court no later than three days after it is filed.

"The court considers cases concerning the violation of the voting rights of citizens with the mandatory participation of the public prosecutor.

"A complaint about irregularities in voter rolls is considered with notification to the declarant and to the precinct electoral commission, but in the event that the complaint does not affect the declarant but another citizen, this citizen is also notified.

"A complaint about denial of registration of a candidate for deputy or a party is considered by the court with the participation of the declarant, representatives of the pertinent political party, and groups of voters and the electoral commission.

"The failure to appear of persons who are indicated in the present article is not an obstacle to consideration of the case.

"Article 243. Court decision on a complaint:

"The court decision establishing that there are irregularities in the voter rolls is the basis for introducing the necessary corrections to the voter rolls of a precinct electoral commission.

"The court decision declaring the denial of the registration of a candidate for deputy and of a party to be invalid constitutes grounds for registration of the candidate for deputy and the party by the pertinent electoral commission.

"A copy of the court's decision is issued immediately to the declarant, and a copy is sent simultaneously to the appropriate electoral commission.

"A court decision on cases indicated in the first and second parts of the present article is final."

[Signed] G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. V. Kvaratskheliya, secretary of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
[Dated] Tbilisi. 4 September 1990.

Georgia Political Parties Registered, Denied

91US0010A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 5 Sep 90 p 1

[List of parties registered and denied registration for the Georgian Supreme Soviet elections: "In the Central Electoral Commission"]

[Text]

List of Registered Political Parties Participating in the Georgian Supreme Soviet Elections

1. Communist Party of Georgia
2. Association of National Accord of Georgia
3. "Democratic Elections for Georgia" (DAS-i)
4. Georgian Republican Federal Party
5. People's Front of Georgia
6. Georgian Social Democratic Party

7. Party of "Greens" of Georgia
8. Georgian Christian Democratic Union
9. Georgian Union of Free Democrats
10. All-Georgian Merab Kostava Society
11. All-Georgian Society of St. Ilya the Righteous
12. Georgian National Liberal Union
13. Georgian Helsinki Union
14. Georgian Liberal Democratic National Party
15. All-Georgian Rustaveli Society
16. Georgian National Front-Radical Union
17. Georgian Republican Party
18. Ilya Chavchavadze Society
19. Union of Georgian Traditionalists
20. Georgian Party of National Unity and Social Equality
21. Political Union of Mountaineers of Georgia
22. People's Party of Georgia
23. Archil Dzhordzhadze Society
24. All-Georgian Union of Farmers
25. All-Georgian Party of Peace and Freedom
26. Georgian Constitutional Democratic Party
27. Georgian National Christian Party
28. Ivane Dzhavakhishvili Society
29. Democratic People's Front of Georgia

List of Parties That Were Denied Registration

1. Georgian Party of Justice and National Unity, inasmuch as its activity does not apply to the entire territory of Georgia which does not comply with Article 8 of the Law on Elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet.

2. Georgian Progressive Democratic Party, in that according to its statutes a farm organization can also be a member of the party, which contradicts Article 8 of the Law on Elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet.

3. Georgian Peasant Party, inasmuch as its activity does not apply to the entire territory of Georgia, and requirements not envisaged by the law that were established for membership in the party by its statutes, do not comply with Article 8 of the Law.

4. Georgian Labor Party, inasmuch as its activity does not apply to the entire territory of Georgia and it functions according to the laws of the Georgian Democratic Republic, which does not comply with Article 8 of the Law.

5. National Party of the Georgian Demographic Society, because it is not an independent democratic organization and is financed by the Georgian Demographic Society, which does not conform to Article 8 of the Law.

6. The Imereti region "Lemi" of the All-Georgian Society of Social Justice, because its activities do not apply to the entire territory of Georgia, which does not conform to Article 8 of the Law.

7. Democratic movement "Vrastan," inasmuch as its activity does not apply to the entire territory of Georgia, which does not conform to Article 8 of the Law.

8. Union of National Accord and Rebirth of Georgia, inasmuch as its activity does not apply to the entire territory of Georgia and it did not take part in the elaboration of national policy of the republic and in the management of its state and public affairs, which contradicts Article 8 of the Law.

9. Georgian Agrarian Union, inasmuch as it constitutes a union of work collectives that are part of the agro-industrial complex of enterprises, associations, and other economic entities, which contradicts the requirements of Article 8 of the Law.

10. Georgian National Constitutional Alliance, because its statutes envisage collective membership in the party, which does not conform to Article 8 of the Law.

11. The Georgian political organization "Stalin," in that it directs its activity in compliance with the CPSU Program and Rules on the basis of the constitutions of the USSR and Georgia and on Marxist-Leninist propositions, which contradicts Article 8 of the Law.

Denied Parties Appeal

91US0010B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 7 Sep 90 p 1

[GRUZINFORM report on registration of political parties for Georgian Supreme Soviet elections followed by report on interview with Professor Valerian Sergeyevich Advadze, doctor of economic sciences and chairman of the board of the Union of National Accord and Rebirth of Georgia, by ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent Eka Eliava; place and date not given: "Considered Registered"]

[Text] Eight of the 11 political parties and social organizations that were denied registration to participate in the election by the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet exercised their right to appeal the commission's decision to the Georgian Supreme Court. This right, as is known, was granted to them by the new Law on Elections of Higher Organs of the State Authority of the Republic.

As we were informed in the Georgian Supreme Court after a thorough examination of the lawsuits that were brought, the court concluded that there were grounds for registering six political parties and public organizations. These are: the Progressive Democratic Party of Georgia, Labor Party of Georgia, National Party of the Georgian Demographic Society, Union of National Accord and Rebirth of Georgia, Agrarian Union of Georgia, and the Georgian political organization "Stalin."

Commenting on this fact, Irakliy Zhordaniya, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, said: "In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of the republic, all of the aforementioned parties are considered registered."

Thus there will be 35 political parties and social movements in the election campaign for deputy seats in the

future parliament of Georgia. According to the new Law on Elections, they have the right to unite at their discretion into voting blocs whose formation and registration with the Central Electoral Commission ends 40 days before the elections; that is, on 18 September. [end GRUZINFORM report]

The Union of National Accord and Rebirth of Georgia was denied registration for participation in the republic's parliamentary elections. How did events develop further? Our questions are answered by Professor Valerian Sergeyevich Advadze, doctor of economic sciences; chairman of the board of the Union of National Accord and Rebirth of Georgia; USSR people's deputy; member of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and director of the Scientific Research Institute of Economics, Planning, and Management under Gosplan [State Planning Committee] of the Georgian SSR.

[Eliava] What was the reason for the refusal to register the Union of National Accord?

[Advadze] The main motive for the denial is not stated in the decision of the Central Electoral Commission. They simply saw in our union a serious rival for those parties which were already registered and which, however paradoxical it may be, decided the fate of the rest by a show of hands vote.

As for the reasons for the denial of registration that are stated in the electoral commission documents, allegedly it is the incompatibility of our union's activity with Article 8 of the Law on Elections. The meaning of this was interpreted in the materials of the commission which were published in the press. But specifically, the union was denied registration "in that its activity does not apply to the entire territory of Georgia and it did not take part in the elaboration of national policy of the republic and in the management of its state and public affairs, which contradicts Article 8 of the law."

[Eliava] And you filed an appeal with the court?

[Advadze] According to the Law on Elections, a party has the right to appeal a decision to deny to the Georgian Supreme Court. We availed ourselves of this, becoming participants in the first such legal action in the republic.

We presented the argument that the union's activity does not contradict Article 8. The process of creating the union continued over the course of four months. It was finally formed on 29 August at a constituent congress of representatives of all of the regions of Georgia. And according to the rules the union's activity applies to the entire republic. In principle, according to the Law on Elections, the question of registration of our union was to have been decided with the availability of three documents—an application, a program, and the rules.

The chairman of the court was Dzhimi Kipiani, deputy chairman of the Georgian Supreme Court. Our lawsuit was read out, our representative was given the floor, and afterwards a member of the Central Electoral Commission, David Usupashvili, a DASi representative, spoke. There were questions and answers—everything was done very correctly. Everything that had to be said was said, and the arguments of both sides were heard. And on that very day, 5 September, the court announced its decision in our favor. It must be said that Roland Giligashvili, the deputy public prosecutor of the republic, gave us a lot of support. Moreover on all of these days we sensed a lot of support from the public of Georgia which expressed this in numerous letters and telegrams that were addressed to us.

[Eliava] A few words, please, on the union's program. What is your election campaign like?

[Advadze] The platform is actually being worked on now, and it has not been published yet. As for the program, its main provisions are these: We support multiparty parliamentary authority; we believe that a rule-of-law state has to be created, and that the state independence of Georgia has to be established; and we also raise questions about the introduction of a market economy and the resolution of ecological problems and interethnic relations.

[Eliava] You left the ranks of the CPSU. What brought about this decision?

[Advadze] According to the rules, our organization permits simultaneous membership in any party. However, according to the rules a member of another party cannot be on the union's board. The aim is obvious—so that other parties would not influence the formation of the policy of our union. Incidentally, 21 members of the union board left the ranks of the CPSU for this very reason.

[Eliava] You were an active participant in the preparation of the first stage of the congress of the Georgian Communist Party. Is there not now, on the eve of the second stage, a feeling that, since being removed from the work that has been started, you are missing an opportunity to bring it to its conclusion?

[Advadze] Frankly I consider that which I did as a Communist to be useful. The materials prepared for the congress played a positive role in its work. I believe that today the Georgian Communist Party is taking a position on national interests to a greater degree. In the end, I think that it will become independent from the CPSU. But I personally did not like the fact that this process was moving slowly. Meanwhile, it is not possible to stop it, and, so there is no feeling of unfinished work. Moreover, I believe that in our union it is possible to do more for the republic, for the nation, and for the whole population of Georgia.

I want to add that I am available, if any party needs my advice and consultation as a scientist and economist in the interests of Georgia. What is important to me are results and the success of the republic's common cause. In this respect, I am above and outside all parties.

Central Asia

'Mafia,' Informals Blamed for Osh Disorder

90US1333A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent K. Bayalinov: "Osh-1990: Who Are They, the 'Godfathers' of the Pogroms That Shook the Fergana Valley?"]

[Text] Having access to some data, I conducted an experiment in the streets of Osh. I asked dozens of people, those known and unknown to me alike, the same question: In your opinion who are the most influential figures of the city? The names of individual party and soviet functionaries were mentioned, as well as those of enterprise and retail establishment managers. For the most part the answers were similar. However, from among these names only one name, or more precisely one nickname, was on everyone's lips—"Prince."

I am not going to mention his last name, position, nationality, or even age because only legal process may establish the veracity of popular rumors. However this is what I thought: Are these answers not the root cause and the driving force of tragic events that are now known to the entire world?

It has so happened that money has ruled the Fergana Valley—where the territory of Osh Oblast belongs—since long ago. Valuables, real estate, positions, and the benevolence of feudal rulers were bought with money. Commerce afforded a living to the top brass, the latter gave commerce an opportunity to develop, and both of them together lived at the expense of common peasants.

This system which I have described in simplified terms has not changed in the 70 years of communist rule either. However it has become less conspicuous and more refined, perfidious, and universal.

Both party and soviet functionaries and the representatives of the shadow economy, modern nouveau riche who use to their ends the organs of justice and law enforcement, have become the "Godfathers" of the latter-day mafia.

This does not amount to a complete idyll. The appetite for even greater power and privileges causes internecine war, a war of criminal groups, and the settlement of personal accounts. Competition between the old, classical mafia and the emerging new mafia at times leads to acts of violence and distribution of the spheres of interests among clans. Sometimes popular masses become involved in these games. Taking into account the fact that the Asian republics arrived at socialism immediately, bypassing capitalism, the methods of struggle assume terrifying, savagely cruel forms that are characteristic of fanaticism in the feudal epoch.

In 1984 Malov, first secretary of the Kyzyl-Kiya city party committee, hanged himself.

In 1985 Matyev, first secretary of the Osh city party committee, shot himself in his office with a gun given by one of the City Department of Internal Affairs leaders.

In 1986 a militia employee shot the prosecutor of the Uzgenskiy Rayon at point-blank range.

In 1987 Nabiyev, head of department of the Kara-Suyskiy Rayon party committee, was stabbed to death.

In 1988 Arzykulov, assistant procurator of Osh Oblast, drowned in the waters of the Papanskiy Reservoir.

These are only the notorious examples of the heightened background of social instability in southern Kirghizia. Problems, distortion, and the impoverishment of common peasants of various nationalities that have accumulated for years were ignored and not taken into account here, or actually anywhere else. Parity, balance, and a mutual understanding between the corrupt representatives of partocracy and the moneyed class, of those who make policy in the oblast, guaranteed social peace and lack of conflicts in the rich land. However this could not last for a long time, to say nothing of forever. While the elite and the mafia enjoyed their lives, dissatisfaction with the lack of social protection and rights ripened among the people, both the Kirghiz and the Uzbek. The land began to give way under the feet of the powers that be. A revolutionary explosion was becoming imminent. This is where we may open the main card—due to well-known reasons, including those of history, an absolute majority of the representatives of partocracy (70.8 percent) are Kirghiz, whereas those of "commercial capital" (84 percent in the city of Osh) are Uzbek. To my mind this is where one of the root causes of the bloody conflict needs to be sought.

The fruits of double-dyed nationalism ripened on the young tree of national self-awareness in an environment where the weakening of the center and its inability to manage the affairs of the Central Asian republics ultimately became a reality. The situation was exacerbated by a general economic crisis in the country, the growth of unemployment in the republic and the oblast—in Osh Oblast alone, more than 60,000 people do not have permanent employment—and rampant crime. Dubious kinds of formations began to proliferate on the crest of this wave; concepts of national exclusivity began to be fostered by one side, and autonomist impulses by the other. In elections to the republic Supreme Soviet, voters gave their votes in favor of the ethnic backgrounds of candidates rather than the candidates themselves.

At a certain stage doubts gave way to convictions and turned into hatred because nationalist propaganda persuaded them day after day that their neighbors were the root cause of woes and the tragic situation. The plan was successfully implemented: The wrath of the people was deflected from the actual culprits and they were set on one another. The war of the shacks began whereas the palaces and their residents did not suffer. The greatest blasphemy is that a narrow, restricted circle of people augmented their wealth by people's woes—robbing them

of their assets; confiscating proceeds and goods on the eve of the pogroms; and even by the rampage of nature and elemental calamities, using the war—this is how they refer to the bloody interethnic conflict in the oblast—as a screen. Here is just one example.

On 14 July, mountain lakes inundated the valley after protracted floods. According to initial data, 113 farms were under water. Somewhat later, the number of farms in an official summary report increased to 500, and the quota of the damages suffered to 1 million rubles. In a peculiar manner, an avalanche destroyed the four-room house belonging to Abdullayev, born in 1963, who has a residence permit for an altogether different address in the village of Iski- Naukat purchased from the chairman of a collective farm [kolkhoz]. Some food for thought: A brother of the injured party is the director of the Public Catering Administration of Naukatskiy Rayon Consumer Society. Another brother is the chief accountant of a brick plant. An uncle is chairman of Naukatskiy Rayon Executive Committee, Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] people's deputy—the one who signed the summary report on the damage sustained by the rayon. It would be all right—after all, there is no law against having relatives—if it were not for this last: Not one of the adjacent houses was damaged by the flood. Even most of the houses that were half submerged remained standing on their feeble foundations. At present an even more magnificent villa is being erected at an accelerated pace, at the expense of the state and with materials paid for with state funds, where the house used to be, which we might surmise was destroyed by something other than a flood.... There is nothing that you can conceal from the people. However they are afraid to discuss this outloud, to say nothing of giving written statements; they are afraid of the venality of the courts and officials.

Returning to the topic of mysterious coincidences, I would like to ask several questions which are not at all rhetorical.

Why has an investigation into the incidence of theft and padding at the Osh Cotton Fabric Combine been under way for three years now, and yet the total damage inflicted on the state has been decreasing with every passing year?

Why are some rayon committee secretaries and ministers accompanied by various supply procurers and trade officials on their business trips to Moscow? What do certain highly-placed individuals from the oblast and the city rayon committees of the party have to do with trade, considering that they actually select and appoint the directors of restaurants, storage facilities, department stores, and large retail outlets?

Answers to many questions could have been given in a timely manner had the center and the republic authorities taken an interest in the situation of the superficially "happy" Kirghizia. Far from it! Even during the difficult, dramatic days when curfew was in effect in Frunze, when army patrols became masters of the streets, and when people continued to die in Osh, former Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo A. Biryukova stated with pathos at the 19th congress of the republic Communist Party: "I have visited Kirghizia many times, and I visited Osh Oblast as recently as two weeks ago. I will be absolutely frank. I have a firm impression that the process of renewal in the republic party organization on the whole is developing in the necessary direction, on the path of perestroyka and healthy democracy, despite certain difficulties and problems." Incidentally, the first secretary of the Kirghizia Communist Party Central Committee, currently a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, also states frequently that before the Osh events the republic ranked among the first in the country in terms of the rate of development and stability.

This was the sociopolitical situation that preceded the Osh tragedy. Many people knew for a long time that a corrupt segment of the partocracy has intertwined with the commercial and industrial mafia. However, they came to a parting of the ways: They failed to share power in the environment of perestroyka imposed on them from above. The quarreling "friends" began to appeal to their peoples. The scent of blood was in the air.... There were instances when representatives of the two clans fanning the flames of conflict aided their compatriots with weapons and food, money and clothing, shielded murderers and marauders, and plied young hooligans with vodka and drugs.

Whose money paid for producing videotapes; manufacturing and disseminating pictures, leaflets, and posters; and dispatching petitioners and messengers to Frunze, Tashkent, and Moscow for the sole purpose of defaming "the enemy" and casting him in an unfavorable light?

Was the war planned for 4 June? Both yes and no. Yes, because 4 June was the deadline for an ultimatum by Kirghiz young people concerning the allocation of land parcels on the ill-fated kolkhoz field. However, it was already clear that the Uzbek segment of the population of the city was coming out against this. Given mutual distrust, the field of discord on the imeni Lenin Kolkhoz acquired truly strategic significance.

No, because 4 June was due to pure chance. Blood could have been spilled on the 25th, the 27th, or any other day of June. Once preparations had been made by both sides, a little spark would have sufficed. Prescient people took their leave and left the oblast together with their families. Mothers took their children back from day-care centers and nurseries. Everybody went on with the expectation and foreboding of something terrible.

In the last days of May, 1,500 Kirghiz students residing in private-sector apartments ended up in the street within two days. During these days tension peaked. Had the authorities imposed a state of emergency and curfew there could have been no victims, or at least there would have been far fewer of them. What stood in the way of this? Was it the fear of deflating the myth about the

happy republic, "the most tranquil and conflict-free?" However, it burst like a bubble anyway. Was it the imperfection of legislation? The authorities have never bowed to the law which they authored to begin with. Apparently an answer should be sought in a crisis from the authorities themselves, in view of the inability of leaders with stagnant thinking to control a crisis situation.

Instead the apparatus almost succeeded in an attempt to exploit informals to its ends. "Osh Aymagy," a volunteer organization of Kirghiz young people for building individual housing which was created on 10 March and to which 12,000 homeless belonged, was a creation of the oblast party committee [obkom]. Its leader, Kambaraly Bektemirov, suited everyone, and most importantly did not interfere in politics. This is why he was given space with a telephone line—meanwhile the land was actually distributed by the city authorities. The apparatus needed to find a counterbalance to the local chapter of the republic's People's Front, a quite intellectual force with clearly stated goals and tasks.

K. Bektemirov himself admitted to me: "Until 4 June, we obediently carried out all the assignments of the obkom."

After 4 June, the situation changed: "Osh Aymagy" was accused of every mortal sin and treated on par with the former People's Front, which was transformed into the Democratic Movement "Kirgizstan." A powerful blow was struck at the informals. The puppet organization "Osh Aymagy" fell apart like a house of cards and its leader, abandoned by his yesterday's masters, made himself scarce.

The corps of officialdom sought to kill two birds with this action: to strangle the democratic movement throughout Kirghizia and to find "a scapegoat."

It is easy to conjecture who was behind the Uzbek "Adolat," technically headed by the watch repairman Rustam Mirakhmetov.

After 4 June, the opposition of the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks was cast as a struggle between "Osh Aymagy" and "Adolat." Supposedly the nationalists and the informals were to blame for it all. In general, there is a degree of truth to it. However the whole truth was not spoken—who stood behind these organizations? Were they not erstwhile "inseparable friends" bound by mutual guarantees—the corrupt segment of the apparatus and the commercial and industrial mafia?

They often ask whether the leadership knew about the massacre being prepared. Could it be that the massacre caught them by surprise?

From January on, the Osh Obkom received nine Administration of the State Security Committee [UKGB] documents on the status of the sociopolitical situation in the oblast. It was also communicated that extremist groups had stepped up their activities.

In February, a report was sent to the party echelons on numerous manifestations of nationalism on the eve of the elections of Kirghizia's people's deputies when the most powerful political weapon was employed—nationalism, order of seniority, kinship, and associations of compatriots, and calls for rallying on the basis of ethnicity and tribal affiliation.

In essence, no attention was paid to this information. Moreover, some leaders of the oblast and the rayon echelon themselves contributed to the exacerbation of the interethnic opposition by the aforementioned methods while fighting for parliamentary seats.

On 3 April, reports on an illegal action being prepared that involved seizing land parcels, and which was largely provoked by the bungling of the authorities, crossed the desks of the former first secretary of the party obkom and chairman of the oblast executive committee. The scale and form of the operation being prepared were more extensive than in Frunze.

In late April, the UKGB informed superior echelons about the causes of periodic group clashes between teenagers and young people that ended in interethnic strife.

In May, the UKGB named the true leaders and inspirators of individual informal organizations whose actions had a nationalist tinge.

The strange thing was that until quite recently the apparatus had used the organs of state security extensively for identifying all kinds of free thinkers and dissidents and for collecting "compromising evidence" against the undesirables, whereas on this occasion it completely ignored the warnings and the reports on pogroms and disturbances being prepared. Moreover, U. Sydykov, the new Obkom First Secretary, referred to the above memoranda as "crib notes that nobody needs." Yet UKGB Chief A. Mameyev incurred his unbridled anger by failing to provide a list of... a 4,000-strong crowd of women holding a rally on the square in front of the obkom building. As a result, A. Mameyev fell out of favor and was subsequently dismissed from his position.

The functionaries of leading structures who were personally responsible for the interethnic conflict, the grave blunders, and the distortions in socioeconomic and cadre policy suffered less than anyone else. In keeping with the established practice of replenishing the supreme nomenklatura with those who have been trained in the largest oblast, Obkom First Secretary R. Kulmatov got a promotion, becoming A. Masaliyev's first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic shortly before the bloody drama. After the tragedy, he also became a member of the Kirghizia Communist Party Central Committee Politbureau. However, his conscience prompted him to resign, whereas N. Chepelev, former chairman of the oblast executive committee and at present second secretary of the Central Committee, does not consider himself guilty at all.

The following fact is instructive: An extraordinary government commission headed by Prime Minister A. Dzhumagulov rendered a verdict on the guilt of Obkom First Secretary U. Sydykov and Second Secretary N. Davydov, whereas a party plenum defended both of them, thus ignoring public opinion and the conclusions of the commission. Moreover N. Davydov soon became first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. K. Uzakov, first secretary of the Kara-Suyskiy Rayon party committee and A. Satyvaldiyev, chairman of the executive committee, the very ones who hid in the Rayon Internal Affairs Department when a rayon judge was being raped and killed, became deputy chairman of the oblast agro-industrial committee and chief of department of the oblast water management administration respectively. A. Sydykov, first secretary of the Osh city party committee, remained chairman of the same soviet of people's deputies. Zh. Asanov, first secretary of the Uzgenskiy Rayon party committee, was confirmed as director of a confectioneries plant, and T. Borombayeva, his deputy at the rayon soviet, as chairman of the oblast Znaniye Society....

Indeed truth is stranger than fiction—all of this happened after a political evaluation of the Osh events was made, even with a delay of two months, at the August plenum of the Central Committee.

At a time when rapid transformations are in progress in our country, we must state with bitterness that Kirghizia is one of the few Union republics in which processes of renewal and catharsis develop at an extremely slow rate: The command-administrative methods of leadership, dictation of the party committees to the soviet organs, suppression of criticism, and stringent control over the mass media are the same. Suffice it to say that, in essence, the supreme echelon has not been renewed after the April CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 1985.

Meanwhile acts on creating three new oblasts are being prepared in the hope that serious fighting for positions will extinguish passions surrounding the operation of the Central Committee Bureau and its cadre policy. An attempt is being made to split people's deputies and members of the Central Committee along the still persisting tribal lines. Having lost the support of the populace of Osh Oblast after the well-known events, the leadership of the Central Committee is betting on individual power-hungry leaders of the rayon echelon. Nervousness and flip-flopping between the extremes—the recent underestimation of ethnic problems and current unilateral concessions—are increasingly felt in the actions of the leadership.

The Osh tragedy claimed more than 300 human lives. Four hundred and eleven houses were burned, as well as 54 shops and state offices and 89 cars. Damage inflicted on the state came to 85 million rubles.

The wounds of profound resentment and the enmity of the two neighboring peoples will take a long time to heal. Hundreds and thousands of people are abandoning domiciles of long duration and leaving for unknown destinations. More than 2,000 Russians who are uneasy about the future have left the oblast. The Kirghiz from Uzbekistan are swapping their apartments with the Uzbeks from Kirghizia. People are spurred on by fear. Metal doors and window shutters made of sheet iron and crowbars or cut steel bars in lobbies have become an integral part of existence in Osh.

However life has not come to a halt. The burned houses of the Uzgen Uzbeks are being built back. The plundered apartments of the Kirghiz in Cheremushki Microrayon, now known to the entire world, are being made comfortable. The refugees are returning to their native hearths.

An investigation into the Osh events is under way. However, it would be naive to believe that it will reveal the main instigators of the tragedy.

Vladimir Ivanovich Kalinichenko, chief of the USSR Procuracy investigative team, admitted bitterly: "Mafia will remain unscathed, nobody will dare do anything to it." He does not doubt that the fat cats of underground business and the latter-day landlords and tribal chiefs with party membership cards in their pockets are the real culprits.

Only rank-and-file rapists, marauders, and murderers will end up in the dock, and then just some of them. Nobody will ever initiate a criminal case involving homicide when there is no corpse, or when unidentified bones are all that remains of a corpse. Meanwhile such cases are many.

The investigative team has approached the authorities several times with a demand to drain the Shakhranoat Canal in Kara-Su into which bodies were dumped, according to dozens of statements by witnesses. However this still has not been done. Dozens of the dead were buried in Uzgen without an inquest, and a mere bottle with a piece of paper containing information on the sex, the place the corpse was found, and the nature of visible wounds is the only testimony and the only piece of evidence.

Understandably, dozens of murderers are at large and will remain unpunished. At present, the situation of the investigative team is catastrophic. The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs details its employees for two to three months. What may be accomplished within this period of time if one employee is swamped with dozens of criminal cases? The decisions of the Supreme Soviets of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and now also the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to recall their investigators from Kirghizia may altogether bring the work of the USSR Procuracy team to a halt.

By 10 September, more than 120 people suspected of murder, arson, and pogroms were arrested. We would be lucky to close even these cases. These are not my words. This is what V. Kalinichenko said. Not a single report, to

say nothing of cases, has been referred to the investigative team by the Internal Affairs Administration and the UKGB in this entire time. In response to a request for detailing two typists, the authorities allocated... two staff positions for typists. Go and find them yourselves....

The group feels undisguised pressure to speed up the investigation brought to bear by the authorities. Apparently someone is in a hurry to have all the i's dotted. It is expected that many cases referred to the courts after the investigations are completed will end in acquittals....

The national-territorial delineation of Central Asia in 1924, which arbitrarily drew borders between the Turkic peoples, planted the seed of discord. The once existing ethnic commonality was artificially disunited with a view to avoiding consolidation on the grounds of the then frightening pan-Turkism. An invisible line, a boundary ran through where the Uzbek and the Kirghiz used to live together in peace.

The young nations were named socialist, and the idea of socialist construction was made paramount instead of the binding impact of omnipresent capital.

The rich and respected merchants of yesteryear were forced to change their occupation. Over time their progeny turned from potential Morgans, Duponts, and Rockefellers into crooks and mafiosi who came to bankroll the corrupt segment of the new authorities. The general social, economic, and political crisis of the system of noneconomic coercion impoverished nine-tenths of the population. A social explosion became imminent, a revolution that threatened to destroy the entire political superstructure of the local regime which in a number of cases was intertwined with the commercial and industrial mafia.

However this did not happen. The conflict was skillfully diverted into an ethnic dimension.

...The battles died down. The new Osh Oblast Internal Affairs Administration Chief General M. Abdurakhmanov, a representative of the administration, met with the real and powerful leaders of the opposing side: By all signs the sides made mutual concessions. A lull set in. If nothing happens in October and November when farm work is completed, in February and March with the beginning of spring, and in June with the anniversary of the events, it will be possible to say safely that the sides have come to an understanding....

Masaliyev Discusses Osh Clashes Cause, Effect

90US1344A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Sep 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with A. Masaliyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee, and chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet, by Yu. Razgulyayev; date not given: "After the Osh Disaster"]

[Text] Frunze—[Razgulyayev] Absamat Masaliyevich, our conversation is taking place after the completion of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of Kirghizia and the 28th CPSU Congress. In the republic this coincided with serious disturbances which were brought down on Kirghiz citizens by the July events in Osh Oblast. Today it is simply impossible to sidestep them and remain silent about them.

[Masaliyev] I agree with you. The interethnic conflicts in the south of the republic have left their mark and forced many people to evaluate things in a new way. Of course, one could regard them as a continuation of a long string of ethnic conflicts which began back with Nagornyy Karabakh. They can say that they were not the first. But regrettable as it may be, one must admit that the cruel outbreak was quite unexpected.

The Kirghiz and Uzbeks have been living next to one another for centuries. They have very similar lives, customs, and languages. Thousands of families have been formed by mixed marriages, so there can be no talk of any age-old roots of hostility. But still the conflict occurred.

[Razgulyayev] Does this mean that the local authorities and the party and soviet workers were not on top of the situation and did not know the mood of the people?

[Masaliyev] A detailed analysis of the tragic events and the in-depth investigation we have just conducted revealed many serious mistakes and omissions in the solutions to personnel, socioeconomic, and ideological problems on the part of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs in the oblast. "Concerned" about their own well-being, certain leaders covered up cases of interethnic disagreements and aggravation of tensions. Their ethnic sensibilities took the upper hand over their interethnic duty.

The Central Committee plenum at the end of August, and then the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party, gave a political evaluation to the tragic events. They noted the indecisiveness and confusion of the Osh Party Obkom [oblast committee] Bureau and the oblast soviet of people's deputies, as well as other oblast organs that were unable to remove the tension from the sociopolitical situation and contributed to the destructive activity of the extremist associations which were trying to satisfy their own ambition against a background of interethnic discord.

The Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee, and the government of the republic are taking resolute measures to stabilize the situation. Several first secretaries of party committees and chairmen of ispolkoms [executive committees] were relieved of their duties and expelled from elective organs, and law enforcement organs were seriously reprimanded. There was a new election for chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast executive committee]. The old chairman and one other obkom secretary were replaced by ethnic Uzbeks.

There is one peculiarity of this shuffling of personnel. We were forced to correct the mistakes and distortions we made in the recent past. This is only one example. Uzbeks comprise more than one-fourth of the entire population of Osh Oblast and 18 percent are Communists. But there were only a few of them in the administrative organs although representatives of this nationality predominated in a number of branches, for example trade, public catering, consumer services, and transportation.

[Razgulyayev] But at the rallies where the disturbances began other issues were also raised....

[Masaliyev] Yes, the immediate cause of the conflict was a dispute on a kolkhoz [collective farm] field near the city of Osh. The conflict broke out against the background of the day-to-day dissatisfaction of young people who had lost hope of receiving an apartment or even a roof over their heads. In Osh alone there are thousands of young people like this, frequently with families. The majority of them come from semipermanent tribal villages and are severed from their roots and help from older people. In their aspirations to acquire a plot of land at any price, in order to build their own homes, they expressed their pain and indignation, not without "help" from certain forces.

[Razgulyayev] In this connection I want to ask you another, perhaps not very pleasant question. In your speeches and reports recently you have been giving figures which show overfulfillment of plans and high growth rates as well as "shifts" in the national economy, including in housing construction. But real life and the dissatisfaction of the people have revealed that there is nothing to be proud of here yet....

[Masaliyev] Still there have been changes for the better in the republic in recent years. Take just the per capita consumption of food products. For example, over the past four years meat consumption has increased by 11 kilograms and milk consumption by almost 100. The construction of hospitals, schools, and kindergartens has increased by a factor of 1.5. The number of apartments being introduced has increased as well. Why not tell about this and about the collectives that are succeeding?

Of course we are not satisfied with what we have achieved, and a five to 10 percent increase will not rectify things. We must put other levers to work, and we understand this. Recently the republic Council of Ministers adopted a decree concerning expansion of individual housing construction.

[Razgulyayev] That would solve the main problem over which passions have been boiling for several years now, but why was it so long in coming?

[Masaliyev] The reproach is justified, but it would be wrong to think that solving socioeconomic problems alone, regardless of how critical they may be, can remove all the tension in today's interethnic relations. The problem is much broader.

Why was the decree of the Council of Ministers adopted now and not sooner? This is not an easy question. Up until 1989, the corresponding decrees from the center prohibited us from using kolkhoz and sovkhoz [state farm] land for individual construction. Even more categorical prohibitions existed for suburban zones, especially around the capital cities.

Another reason was that almost all the land around the cities is irrigated and our agriculture is based mainly on that. When this land is allotted for individual construction it is necessary to make reimbursement to the kolkhozes, and this means very large expenditures. It also takes time to assimilate the new areas in more complicated mountainous conditions, and we have practically none of these.

[Razgulyayev] But yet your neighbor, Kazakhstan, has boldly proceeded to distribute the land. I think this removed the social tension to a considerable degree....

[Masaliyev] Obviously they have different possibilities. Different approaches are needed in our republic. Above all, we think we should engage more actively in improving the social sphere in rural areas, especially the semipermanent tribal villages in mountainous areas. The majority of young people who are justifiably demanding plots of land, I repeat, come from precisely these areas. They are drawn to the city not by the "charm of civilization" but by the unbearably difficult life of rural residents. After all shepherds—the majority of these young people's parents tend sheep—live in poorly outfitted homes or camps almost all year around. They have neither gas nor electricity. They have to bring in coal in trucks over hundreds of kilometers, over mountain passes and gorges.

Delegates to the 19th congress tried to take these specific features into account when developing the plan of action for the Kirghiz Communist Party.

[Razgulyayev] But how do you intend to implement it?

[Masaliyev] I will not lay out the entire program in detail but will give just one example. There is an entire cascade of hydroelectric power stations in operation in Naryn, which annually produce more than 10 billion kilowatt-hours, and the construction of more highly efficient stations is continuing here. We have decided to form this "energetic river" approximately 5 billion kilowatt-hours for rural areas.

[Razgulyayev] That is, the party committees are attaching themselves to the "economic locomotive" once again.

[Masaliyev] Not exactly. In the first place, any party, especially the one in power, unless it deals with questions of the constant improvement and implementation of its socioeconomic policy, does not have the right to exist and is destined to vegetate in the backwoods of social life. In the second place, in my opinion, after decades of direct leadership it is simply impossible to step aside all

at once. Life contains plenty of examples in which this kind of "principled behavior" leads to immense losses. And we do not intend to keep track of everything down to the last detail as we did before. It is important to develop a strategy, to determine the most important area of economic construction at a given moment, and select an area for a breakthrough.

But it is no less important to organize and concentrate all forces on this area that has been selected. After all, today we are completely refraining from command functions. We must act with conviction and efficient organizational work, that is by political methods.

We devoted a special plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee to these issues in party activity under the new conditions, and its decisions were discussed extensively in all party organizations. In keeping with this, we will shift the center of gravity of our work to the local party organizations. The party committee secretaries—from central to rayon—will spend a large part of their working time there. Many of them are on the party records there.

Our relations with social organizations are now being arranged in a new way. Directing and control functions are being replaced by business cooperation. There are more frequent meetings between secretaries and Central Committee members and "informals." We are engaging in lively discussions and listening to suggestions, and frequently to candid criticism as well. Right in the dormitories of the work places there is open discussion of the "painful" problems and burning issues. And the people are more aware of which of the leaders are responsible for which issues and how we work.

Our relations with the soviets are changing fundamentally. True, the process of transferring power to them is proceeding with difficulty. The confidence that someone will eventually come to help, to back them up, or simply to solve all of their problems for them is too deeply rooted, especially at the level of the rural and rayon soviets.

At the same time many young, popular power organs are boldly getting down to work. And I can tell you frankly that this is not without the help of Communists. For example, in Oktyabrskiy Rayon in the city of Frunze, with their participation self-government organs of the residential microrayons—community soviets—were formed. Having begun with the maintenance of law and order, they gradually took responsibility for solving practically all problems having to do with the life and recreation of the citizens.

In my opinion, Communists elected to management organs of trade unions, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and other mass organizations should be working just as actively. Then the Kirghiz Communist Party would have a real influence on the development of the society and the affairs of the labor collectives, and they would implement their policy firmly and confidently, the more so since the process of withdrawing from the party which has begun in certain regions of the country has become widespread in our republic.

There are of course people who are turning in their party cards for various reasons. There were 1,219 of these cases just in the first half of this year. But during this same period 2,357 new people entered the ranks of the Communist Party.

[Razgulyayev] Let us turn once again to the economic policy of the Kirghiz Communist Party. You have told us how important it is to determine the right strategy and to select the direction for our actions. But still people judge Communists not according to their plans and intentions but from their concrete actions.

[Masaliyev] We see this as the main objective of our work today. A resolute, radical change for the better in life, step by step, every day.

I wish to give one example from the life of people living in the high mountain zone. Having lived a long and difficult life, the elder in Toktogulskiy Rayon recalls how happy he was in his childhood when the heating in his home, as in many others, was changed over to electricity. But for us this joy is a bitter reproach. How can we say we have been working when people did not become accustomed to electricity until the Eighth Five Year Plan of Soviet power?

Of course we can blame everything on the center again. For many years the electric energy produced by the republic hydroelectric power stations has been distributed practically without our participation. So we have not been defending our rights or our interests firmly enough, and we have not been very persistent in this.

Now the republic is becoming an independent state. In sovereignty we do not see collectivization or loud declarations about property or the priority of our laws. The essence of independence is to make every citizen of the republic free and happy and provide a worthy standard of living for him.

Independence will enable us to solve problems of dividing up the land, introducing electricity in rural areas, supporting large families, and providing good living conditions for our youth. And there are many more vitally important, crucial, burning issues that will have to be resolved. Only now we can do this by constitutional, political methods.

[Razgulyayev] If you "divert" several billion kilowatt-hours to the electrification of our villages, will our neighbors and other consumers not suffer from this?

[Masaliyev] I will answer a concrete question concretely. If we make a request to the hydroelectric construction workers ahead of time they will be able to introduce a couple of energy blocks. As always, we will faithfully meet our commitments to our neighbors.

There is a good deal today that speaks of the relations among the republics and the future of our Union. There are the most contradictory opinions, and sometimes they simply cancel each other out. Our position is simple: We see our future only as a part of a renewed Union. And modest as our capabilities may be, we want not only to receive from but also to give to this Union. We want to strengthen the unified Union market—this unique opportunity to sell our products, to provide the Kirghiz with all the goods they need, and to reach the Union level and subsequently the world level.

[Razgulyayev] Incidentally, about the market. What do the new economic relations promise for the republic.

[Masaliyev] We have serious tests in store when changing over to the harsh, even cruel realities of the market. For up to this point the republic has been receiving a subsidy of a half billion from the Union. The roots of this do not just lie in the backwardness of the economy. This debt has come about as a result of imperfect prices, the one-sided structure of the economy, and other objective factors.

But the recognition of these realities will not protect us from the serious difficulties that await us next year. We are preparing for them ahead of time and trying to anticipate and calculate possible consequences and to do the best we can to smooth them out and make them easier. We have adopted laws on the land and leasing relations, property, local self-government, and the local economy. We have prepared a government program for changing the Kirghiz SSR to a regulated market economy which will be considered by a regular session of the republic Supreme Soviet.

Life itself is forcing us to increase our activity many fold. But this does not mean that we must seize everything at once and run to any fire with an empty hose. The time has come for action.

Makhkamov Addresses Tajik Supreme Soviet

90US1326A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 31 Aug 90 p 1

[Statement of K. Makhkamov, chairman of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, at republic Supreme Soviet Second Session; place and date not given]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

The people of the republic, like all the peoples of our country, are experiencing a difficult and crucial period in their history. Having embarked on the path of perestroyka; having launched fundamental transformations of the political, economic, and social structures; and havinf broken with the command and administrative system and the formation of a new society based on democracy and devotion to ideals common to all mankind, we have encountered unprecedented difficulties.

The economy is in the grip of crisis, even the stratification and confrontation of a certain part of the social forces of our society are in evidence, the factors bringing about political instability have yet to be fully removed, and in many instances words have substituted for actual deeds. There is growing doubt among the people as to the capacity of the renewed political, soviet, and economic structures for coping with the difficult tasks of the present day.

Nonetheless, however difficult the new problems they must all be overcome and resolved. The representatives of different forces need, finally, to give up speculation on the people's difficulties and the emotional verbal battles under various slogans. The Supreme Soviet Presidium has begun to probe the essence of the impending tasks and to study a number of urgent matters on which the government has adopted decisions.

For example, attaching great significance to the education of children beginning at an early age, at our suggestion the government has adopted an ordinance on lowering the standard workload for teachers of elementary classes from 20 to 16 hours a week. This will make it possible to increase somewhat the wages of this category of teachers and improve the quality of children's tuition and education.

As of the start of this year a number of government decisions providing certain benefits for participants in the Great Patriotic War and soldier-internationalists, the families of those who died in war and in the performance of their duties, and others have been adopted.

Together with the government we have begun to conduct negotiations on economic cooperation not only with the Union republics, but also with representatives of foreign states.

At this session we enacted the first laws that will contribute to a renewal of our life. However, it is known that laws will not work of their own accord. Those who believe that it is possible in the laws to reflect the entire mechanism necessary for their realization are also profoundly mistaken. The sole such mechanism is persevering, purposeful, practical work.

We have before us many laws that need to be elaborated and enacted. But time does not wait, and we can and must begin such practical work immediately. Yes, it is multilevel, broad-scale work. But if we correlate the problems of our life, the anticipated transition to a controlled market economy, and the focus of this work on concern for man, then I believe that in regard to the specific conditions of Tajikistan we should embark primarily on the solution of five main problems of program significance.

First, we need to considerably revise the use of land and agricultural areas, encompassing the whole republic, all its areas, and all valleys and mountain regions. It is a question of sharply enhancing the efficiency of land

tenure by developing peasant farms and rural cooperatives, long-term leasing of the land, and increasing personal plots to the necessary dimensions. There are many forms here.

But in each specific region and on each collective [kolkhoz] and state farm [sovkhoz] we need to take account of the specific features to forestall the emergence of contradictions. Specialists and research personnel must have their say. But the most important thing is that the people must be involved in this process.

More than two-thirds of the republic's population lives in the countryside. How often our countryside is associated in the minds of many people only with the sphere of activity that produces agricultural produce. How often in the cities we call to mind the countryside when there is a rise in prices at the market, and are not ashamed to say that the countryside should be producing more products and more cheaply without asking ourselves the question: What is the life of people in the countryside like?

We say: Our peasant is a toiler and he loves the land, but we tacitly resist a revival of land in the mountain areas and resist leasing and the transfer of land to personal plots.

Everyone knows that we are short of land. This proposition makes it incumbent upon us to get back from the land as much as possible. The experience of past years and the most minimal experience so far of the new forms of management on the land confirm that this is a perfectly feasible task.

I put the question thus because only the efficient use of land will be an objective prerequisite for a sharp growth in the commodity nature of the production of agricultural food produce. And this, under the conditions of movement toward the market, is what is most important for it will accelerate even more the creation of small processing businesses and shops in the countryside, both with the aid of the state and on the basis of cooperative and working private ownership.

I propose that the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Committee for the Agro-industrial Complex and Food be instructed to prepare proposals pertaining to this matter before the end of the current year. To a large extent this will reduce the tension in respect to a solution of the problem of the employment of rural labor resources and afford the rural worker an opportunity to increase his income considerably and develop his life in the modern fashion.

I realize that this is a difficult but practically feasible task, and we should move toward its accomplishment.

Second, in the sphere of social policy particular attention should be paid to practical work on the protection of mother and child in Tajikistan. Having proclaimed our movement as a movement toward a humane society, we can no longer tolerate high infant mortality and the mortality of women of childbearing age.

Much is being done for this today, it would seem, but the fundamental changes are insufficient after all. To all appearances, a fundamentally different approach is needed here. It should, I believe, consist of a system of measures that would be realized at all levels of our society and encompass each village, community, kolkhoz, sovkhoz, districts, and cities. Soviets of all levels, economic structures of all sectors, and the intellectual forces of our republic must be enlisted in the solution of the problems arising here.

Of course it will be necessary to build more health care facilities, educational centers for children and other facilities, and this will take time. Proceeding from our possibilities, it is essential to consistently tackle questions of direct material support for large families, financial included.

Will leaders, deputies, Communists, our intelligentsia, enlightened religious figures, and all of us long continue to tolerate the excessively large expenditure on weddings, meetings, Army sendoffs, funerals, and feasts knowing that substantial numbers of the population of the republic are living at the minimum consumption level, and that women prenatally and postnatally are not receiving the necessary meat and milk and other products. This cannot fail to have a negative impact on the children's health also.

This situation needs to be changed. We need to assign persons responsible in all soviet components, at all levels of our economy, and in all political and social structures of the republic and hold them strictly to account for the state of work on social support for mother and child.

Third, the republic like the country as a whole is on the threshold of the transition to a controlled market economy. This is an extraordinarily complex and multifaceted process which will require strenuous work in all areas of the economy. Objectively and self-critically evaluating the republic's intrinsic potential, it needs to be declared with all certainty that the greatest bottleneck is the lack of preparedness of personnel, specifically the managers and engineers. The republic's higher school is training them in accordance with programs that are oriented inadequately or not at all toward the new social requirements.

But even the programs where we have the level of preparedness of the personnel are beneath any criticism. The system of organization of tuition is out of date. The system of correspondence tuition, of the higher educational institutions and faculties of an economic profile particularly, leaves much to be desired.

Mention should be made of something else also. Hundreds and thousands of manager specialists—knowledgeable about market conditions and the particular features of the organization of various, largely new, production engineering processes—will be needed by the economy in the next five to 10 years in connection with the growth of economic potential.

It follows that such large-scale training and retraining of our personnel will have to be conducted on the basis of tuition in other republics of the country and overseas. Consequently a system of candidate selection, the start of which will take in the high school and vocational-technical training, will be needed.

It will be necessary to conclude the corresponding agreements and to provide them with financial guarantees, and not only from the republic budget. It will be necessary to involve in this the resources of enterprises, public organizations, ministries and departments, associations and concerns and banks, and soviets of people's deputies. It is essential that we urgently organize special courses in teaching foreign languages, primarily English and Italian.

In a word, we are talking about a radical reform of the personnel training and retraining system. We must strive to ensure that personnel trained by the republic work in all the main areas of the formation of an efficient structure of the economy. Particular attention here should be paid to the training of national personnel.

The republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Science, Public Education, and Training Committee need within a period of four months to have prepared a comprehensive program pertaining to the solution of this question.

Fourth, market relations will require a most appreciable transformation of the republic's economic management structure.

The ministerial form of production management under the conditions of transition to the market becomes outdated. It has been accustomed to operating in the command-administrative structure system, but has proven unreceptive to the new management ideology based on independent enterprises' entrepreneurial assertiveness.

Attempts to resolve current problems of the functioning and development of production, capital construction, and other spheres via an appeal to the central authorities are largely doomed to fail. The new economic relations will be beyond the ministries' field of vision. Individual fragments of the establishment of such relations will be the exception that proves the rule.

The tasks of the current stage require the creation of a qualitatively new system of material and technical supply in the direction of its commercialization and the development of brokerage functions. For our republic, which cannot markedly reduce the extent of construction for production and social and cultural purposes in view of its own inadequate base, the question of material and technical resources is of paramount significance.

The question of the creation of the management structure of the agro-industrial complex in accordance with the tasks of transition to a controlled market requires urgent solution. Branches of the agro-industrial complex must for the next few years be the catalysts of economic upturn for the republic's conditions. Here more than anywhere it is important to get rid of bureaucratic accretions, from the farm and rayon level through the republic level.

The structure of the economic organs of administration is in need of serious changes. In a word, reality insistently demands a reorganization of the organs of administration and a reduction in their costs and increased operational efficiency.

It is necessary to embark immediately on a solution of the paramount problems cited in this statement. It would be expedient, in all probability, for the republic government to have prepared the corresponding programs and proposals by the fall session even. The adoption, and most importantly realization of these programs and proposals will be a subject of the practical activity of all components of the political, social, and economic structures of our republic, the control authorities included.

It is essential that the Supreme Soviet committees, having with the enlistment of the deputies carefully studied the government's proposal concerning the new management structure, submit proposals for consideration by the next session.

And finally, Comrade Deputies! The said directions do not of course exhaust the immense front of work confronting us. We have to resolve the problems of the soldier-internationalists and medical personnel.

Our responsibility for the unification of all progressive forces of our society is growing many times over. The main thing here is to call to account those who are pushing for interethnic confrontation. Our republic is a sovereign state. And a state is duty bound to employ its levers, up to and including the use of command authority to neutralize these forces.

Each individual, whatever his nationality, should be firmly aware that his constitutional rights are protected by the state. In the practical plane we need a program of consolidation. The law enforcement authorities and the whole community should be involved its elaboration.

We need not only in words but in deeds to confirm each day the slogan: "Nationalism and chauvinism will not pass!"

On all that has been said I request your support.